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ABSTRACT 
In recognition of asymmetric handicaps concerning military, political, and 
economic power with the United States, weaker revisionist states complement diplomatic 
pursuit of their national security objectives with irregular warfare (IW) tactics. These 
tactics include subversion, sabotage, political manipulation, terrorism, smuggling, and 
utilization of proxy forces to compete with adversaries while not escalating to the level of 
conventional armed conflict. One revisionist state, the Islamic Republic of Iran, utilizes 
its extraterritorial special operations force, the Quds Force (QF), to conduct IW against 
its stronger and near-peer adversaries. The QF has intervened in no less than six wars 
over the past thirty years in pursuit of Iran’s goals. The unit provides us with a model for 
understanding how special operations forces can be utilized to coerce, deter, disrupt, and 
circumvent conventional strength of stronger foes. 
This thesis examines the conditions that enable the QF’s IW campaigns to be 
effective. While a great deal of this study concerns the tactics, techniques, and procedures 
utilized by the QF, this thesis also surveys the social and political factors among the 
belligerents that shape the nature of the conflicts and their outcomes. Through qualitative 
analysis of six case studies, this thesis finds three conditions for effective use of a weak 
state actor’s special operations forces to compete with near-peer and stronger state actors 
via an IW strategy. 
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I. THE PROBLEM 
Despite three decades of competition and conflict with its regional neighbors and 
the United States, the Islamic Republic of Iran has demonstrated exceptional resiliency. 
Iran wields its instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military, economic) 
to advance its national security objectives in a similar fashion as other nations in the Middle 
East. Iran is unique, however, in that it utilizes its special operations force to further its 
objectives in the region and globally on a level not demonstrated by any other nation. Iran’s 
extraterritorial special operations force is the elite arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards 
Corps (IRGC), known as the Quds Force (QF). The QF is a division of the IRGC that is 
responsible for expeditionary operations outside of Iran’s borders. Its operations are mostly 
covert in nature and encompass numerous activities. Covertness is defined by Austin 
Carson as “government-managed activity conducted with the intention of concealing the 
sponsor’s role and avoiding acknowledgement of it.”1 Actions conducted by the QF 
include monetary, material, and training support to militant groups aligned with Iran’s 
goals; sabotage; subversion; illicit funding schemes; and intelligence gathering.2 Little was 
known about how the organization functions until several years ago, when more open 
source material became available. 
The QF effectively operates at a level below or teetering on the threshold of armed 
conflict. Most QF operations occur in the “gray zone” of conflict, wherein the manner of 
the struggle exists somewhere between peace and traditional war. There exists significant 
evidence that QF operators, through support to various Iraqi militias, were responsible for 
over 600 U.S. soldier deaths in Iraq, failed assassination attempts in foreign countries, 
 
1 Austin Carson, Secret Wars: Covert Conflict in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2018), 5. 
2 Afshon Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, 1st ed. 
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), 6; Michael Wigginton et al., “Al-Qods Force: Iran’s 
Weapon of Choice to Export Terrorism,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 10, no. 2 
(July 3, 2015): 153–65, https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2015.1090053; Defense Intelligence Agency, 
Iran Military Power: Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance., Report No. 
DIA_Q_00055_A (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019), 57, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/
27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Iran_Military_Power_LR.pdf. 
2 
illegal arms transfers, illicit financing, and internal subversion of Middle Eastern 
governments. These campaigns and operations are unconventional in nature and their 
construct follows that of an irregular warfare (IW) strategy. The definition and key aspects 
of IW are examined in the literature review of this thesis; however, IW can be best 
described as a form of warfare encompassing nontraditional mechanisms to subvert an 
opponent and gain control of a population.  
Through qualitative analysis of several IW conflicts in which the QF have 
participated, this thesis determines the conditions that make QF’s IW campaigns effective, 
and provides recommendations for curtailing QF activities. As the QF serve as a model for 
how a weak state actor may use its special operations in asymmetric competition, the 
analysis also provides a framework for countering future revisionist states that may follow 
Iran’s blueprint for utilizing IW.  
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
This project addresses the following question: Under what conditions does a weak 
state actor’s use of special operations forces and irregular warfare prove effective against 
strong state actors, or near-peer adversaries who are supported by a strong state actor? 
Although the data gathered in this research concerns operations and campaigns conducted 
or orchestrated solely by the Quds Force, it does serve as a model for how other states may 
use their special operations in asymmetric conflict. This study also addresses several sub-
questions: 
• When does it work and when does it fail? 
• Why would a weak state actor employ its special operations forces in low 
intensity conflict over other mechanisms that support its national security 
objectives? 
• What effect does the belligerents’ form of government have on 
effectiveness in asymmetric competition? 
3 
B. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis examines the successes and failures of various campaigns where Iran 
utilized the QF as a mechanism to achieve national security objectives (NSO). The 
campaigns to be examined include the Balkans; the U.S. occupation of Iraq; the Syrian 
Civil War; the Yemen Civil War; the war against ISIS in Iraq; and Iran’s use of activities 
associated with terrorism. Qualitative analysis of these case studies will enable 
identification of the internal and external conditions that resulted in success or failure.  
The measurement of effectiveness in IW can be especially difficult and subject to 
numerous variables. It is easy to say that quantifiable metrics of losses in money, terrain, 
and lives will provide the answer to who won and who lost. IW, however, is more 
complicated than regular warfare since progress cannot be measured in terrain and fighter 
attrition. It must include dozens of variables including legitimacy and influence.3 The 
metrics that could hypothetically demonstrate progress are incredibly complex, and some 
are arguably impossible to measure. Trying to gauge effectiveness in IW shares many 
characteristics with measuring success in a counterinsurgency. 
The military fell into a trap in the Vietnam War by quantifying progress with body 
counts, and terrain lost or gained. In “No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness 
and Progress in the Vietnam War,” Gregory Daddis concluded that the United States lost 
in part because its metrics of success ignored the counterinsurgency aspect of the war. The 
military used measurements in body counts and terrain to show progress because it was 
simple and what conventional minded leaders understood.4 In fact, what was critical to 
winning the war for the populace, but almost impossible to collect data on was will, social 
development, and political growth.5 When the United States finds itself in an irregular 
struggle, the lessons of defining success in the Vietnam War still perplexes the military to 
 
3 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, JP 3-05 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014), II–
1, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_05.pdf. 
4 Gregory A. Daddis, “No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the 
Vietnam War” (Ph.D. dissertation, North Carolina, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2009), 
360–61, https://search.proquest.com/docview/304959457/abstract/1B5B5F1D929E4860PQ/1. 
5 Daddis, 364. 
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this day in Iraq and Afghanistan. Daddis contended that there were and are ways to measure 
progress and effectiveness in situations where the problem is not solely a military one, but 
one should not seek a statistical tool for the solution when the operational and strategic 
environment is poorly defined.6 
In recognition of the statistical trap of attempting to measure the effectiveness of 
IW in the aforementioned QF case studies, this thesis will define success in achievement 
of NSOs at an acceptable cost. Defining what is an acceptable cost is developed alongside 
determining Iran’s NSOs in Chapter II and III.  
The Islamic Republic of Iran portrays itself as the vanguard for the Islamic world 
in an existential struggle against Western imperialism, but research suggests that this is 
only one factor. Significant evidence exists that Iran only champions true Islamic tenets 
and the plights of Shiism when it benefits them.7 Following the literature review, this thesis 
will explore what the Islamic Republic says its objectives are in its political rhetoric, and 
then what evidence from think tanks and U.S. agencies, including the Defense Intelligence 
Agency and U.S. State Department suggest. Acknowledging the potential bias in these 
agencies, I also include scholarly articles and news reports from various agencies around 
the globe in the research. After identifying the NSOs that have the greatest evidential 
support, I will then be able to answer if the conditions in the examined campaigns yielded 
success, failure, or a draw for Iran. 
The QF is not a traditional military unit, and its operations occur along a long 
spectrum that range from smuggling to political influence and subversion. Joint Publication 
1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, recognizes that weaker adversaries 
in asymmetric conflict will employ not only military methods but diplomatic, 
informational, and economic schemes as well.8 Evaluating historical operations on 
6 Daddis, 378–79. 
7 Afshon Ostovar, “Sectarianism and Iranian Foreign Policy,” in Beyond Sunni and Shia: The Roots of 
Sectarianism in a Changing Middle East, ed. Frederic Wehrey (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
2017), 99–102.  
8 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, JP 1 (Washington, DC: 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017), I–6, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf. 
5 
traditional military standards of progress is not sufficient. The case studies of this thesis 
will examine the social-political situation in the territories in which the conflicts took place, 
along with those of the belligerents. Following this analysis, the tactics, techniques, and 
procedures of the QF in each conflict are examined. Finally, the tactics are then scrutinized 
according the social, political, military, and economic impact the QF’s campaigns had in 
advancing Iran’s interests at an acceptable cost. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Iran is a revisionist state with goals counter to those of the United States although 
the two are not in a conventional armed conflict, they have been in an asymmetric conflict 
ever since Ruhollah Khomeini formed the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. A core tenet 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran is that the revolution must be exported in order to survive. 
The IRGC in particular believed that the imperialist West would always seek to subvert the 
Middle East, and that spreading the revolution to other territories would be an effective 
defense.9 In the 1990s, the Iranian government found its mechanism to do so in the Quds 
Force. It was designed to be a special operations force (SOF) to promote the revolution’s 
ideals abroad and circumvent Western influence in low intensity conflict because Iran 
knew it could not compete symmetrically.10 
In order to develop a theory of how a weaker state such as Iran utilizes SOF units 
to circumvent diplomatic and military pressures of a stronger power at an acceptable level 
of risk, it is essential to examine existing literature for refinement. The definition of IW, 
and how SOF are utilized must be examined to determine how QF techniques and 
procedures differ from U.S. doctrine. Additionally, defense literature regarding 
asymmetric conflict and deterrence theory must be evaluated to understand the inability of 
the United States to force a change in Iran’s revisionist intent.  
 
9 Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam, 102–4. 
10 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran’s Networks of Influence in the Middle East 
(London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2019), https://www.iiss.org/publications/
strategic-dossiers/iran-dossier/iran-19-03-ch-1-tehrans-strategic-intent. 
6 
1. Defining Special Operations Forces and Irregular Warfare
Iran utilizes its expeditionary special operations unit to enact an asymmetric 
strategy for influence in the Middle East below the level of armed conflict. Believing 
exportation of the 1979 revolution as critical to its survival, the Islamic Republic created a 
sub-unit of the IRGC in the 1990s. This unit is called the Quds Force (QF), which is 
responsible for spreading Iran’s ideology outside of its borders.11 The QF is a SOF unit 
that operates mainly in the covert realm, executing Iran’s foreign policy through numerous 
activities including subversion, smuggling, proxy force development, sabotage, and illicit 
financing.12 However, before one analyzes its activities as a SOF unit, it is imperative to 
dispel misconceptions about what defines SOF, and the operations which SOF conducts.  
What defines a special operation and makes SOF unique is necessary for 
understanding how they are used in asymmetric conflict. Theory and military doctrine 
discern what makes a military activity special. However, we are examining a foreign unit 
that does not operate under the same rules and authorities, nor does it conduct these 
activities in a uniform manner due to its disadvantage in strength.  
As a graduate student pioneering special operations theory in the U.S. military, 
William McRaven combined intellectual insight with case study analysis to develop his 
theory of special operations.13 McRaven analyzed eight case studies to develop his six 
principles of special operations. The case studies encompass raids, and rescues across a 
span of several conflicts from World War II to the post-Vietnam era. The theory of SOF 
that McRaven posits does effectively explain how a small force can defeat a far superior 
adversary using six principles centered around the standard of achieving relative 
superiority.  
McRaven’s theory is lacking, however, in that it forgoes inclusion of irregular 
warfare, and focuses entirely on two types of operations: raids and rescues. McRaven is 
11 Wigginton et al., “Al-Qods Force,” 154. 
12 Wigginton et al., 161–62. 
13 William McRaven, SPEC OPS: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare Theory and Practice 
(New York, NY: Presidio Press, 1996). 
7 
upfront in his introduction, stating that his case studies discount many types of special 
operations and instead focus on direct action operations.14 An unfortunate side effect from 
McRaven’s book, which is likewise demonstrated in the majority of media regarding 
special operations, is that the understanding of what encompasses special operations 
continues to neglect activities such as unconventional warfare, illicit financing, and 
political subversion. This loss is especially important to correct in advancing to political 
decision makers how SOF can be used to accomplish national security objectives at a less 
costly and bloody level of risk. 
The QF is designed to further the goals of the Islamic Republic through special 
means, and critical to its ability to do so is remaining in the overt realm for the purpose of 
signaling, and in the covert realm when plausible deniability must be maintained. The 
weaker actor in asymmetric conflict must often omit those activities that occur in the 
conventional or “regular” state of conflict due to fewer resources and deterrent capabilities. 
Therefore, the weaker actor must be better in the irregular realm.  
Joint Publication 3.05, Special Operations, defines the principles for employment 
of special operations, and advises commanders at different levels for preparing and 
conducting special operations.15 A key tenet of special operations that is often overlooked, 
but essential to understanding how SOF supports national security objectives in low 
intensity conflict, is the definition of irregular warfare: 
Irregular warfare (IW) [is] a violent struggle among state and non-state 
actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Non-
state actors often seek to create instability and disrupt and negate state 
legitimacy and governance to gain and maintain control or influence over 
and the support of a relevant population. Non-state actors use political, 
psychological, and economic methods, reinforced with military- type 
activities that favor indirect approaches and asymmetric means. Countering 
these methods requires a different mindset and different capabilities than 
traditional warfare methods.16 
 
14 McRaven, 2–3. 
15 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, 1–1. 
16 Joint Chiefs of Staff, II–1. 
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The issue with JP 3.05’s definition is that it appears to limit the adversary to a non-
state actor, traditionally seen as terrorists or an insurgency. However, other doctrine 
clarifies that the less powerful participant can be either a state or non-state actor.17 Iran is 
a state actor that has utilized IW in numerous operations where Western intelligence 
agencies linked the QF to the incident.18 The Iranian military cannot compete in a 
symmetric fight, so it utilizes SOF to conduct IW operations that disrupt or circumvent 
U.S. deterrence measures. How a SOF-executed IW strategy enables Iran to spread the 
ideals of the Islamic Revolution, while competing for influence with the United States 
below the level of armed conflict, is examined in the case studies of this thesis.  
2. Asymmetric Conflict Theory
The theory of how a weak actor can prevail in asymmetric conflict is essential to 
understanding Iran’s activities and how seven U.S. presidents have been unable to curtail 
many of its revisionist undertakings. Numerous researchers have formulated hypotheses to 
answer how a world power can be bested by a significantly weaker actor. The question 
itself is nothing new; a conglomeration of colonists with French support shocked the world 
when they defeated the world’s strongest empire in 1783. However, the literature 
addressing this question only began to form following the defeat of U.S. forces in Vietnam. 
In 1975’s “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars,” Andrew Mack was the first to 
define asymmetric conflict as a struggle between two rivals, which Mack refers to as the 
insurgents and the external/metropolitan power, with two distinct variables: 1) “the 
insurgents can pose no direct threat to the survival of the external power because...they 
lack an invasion capability,” 2) “the metropolitan power poses not simply the threat of 
invasion, but the reality of occupation.”19 In his analysis of several conflicts, Mack 
demonstrates that military superiority is not an adequate predictor of victory in war. The 
superior determination to see the fight through is the greater predictor. Mack most 
17 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, I–6. 
18 Iran Action Group, Outlaw Regime: A Chronicle of Iran’s Destructive Activities (Washington, DC: 
U.S. State Department, 2018), 13–17, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Iran-Report.pdf. 
19 Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” World 
Politics 27, no. 2 (1975): 181, https://doi.org/10.2307/2009880. 
9 
predominantly uses the outcome of the Vietnam War to build his case that war, traditionally 
viewed as only being fought on the battlefield, is actually fought on two fronts: the physical 
battlefields, where the cost is in blood of soldiers and in the belligerents’ home where the 
fight is for the mind of the body politic and social institutions.20  
Explicitly demonstrated in the case of Vietnam, the overwhelming military 
superiority of the United States was counter-productive to the war effort. Leaders failed to 
recognize the political reciprocation it had on civilians at home, viewing images of war 
from their personal television screens for the first time in history. This led to mobilization 
of the anti-war effort which decimated support for the war itself. The North Vietnamese 
and Viet Cong on the other hand were fighting a war for survival, where surrender meant 
complete destruction of their communist ideals and possible continued occupation by a 
foreign government.21 In his conclusion, Mack surmises that governments must fully 
understand the nature of the conflict they will face before embarking on one. Ultimately, 
what he calls an “external power” will be forced to withdraw once it loses popular support, 
which is harder to maintain over time and when there is no real threat to the homeland.22 
Ivan Arreguin-Toft built upon Mack’s theory of the more determined actor being 
the best predictor for winning an asymmetric struggle. In “How the Weak Win Wars,” he 
quantifies what makes a conflict asymmetric as one that involves at least 1,000 deaths per 
year and is between two actors where one’s material power is at least 10:1 over the other 
actor.23 Arreguin-Toft uses measurable data under these guidelines to determine that 
Mack’s thesis is not sufficient to answer why the strong lost in all asymmetric conflicts.24  
In order to explain asymmetric outcomes, Arreguin-Toft introduces his theory of 
strategic interaction which analyzes the outcomes of previous conflicts based on the 
strategies chosen by the competitors. These strategies range from the conventional direct 
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attack and defense, to guerilla warfare and barbarism.25 Data analysis of conflicts meeting 
his criteria from 1800–1998 showed that stronger actors won 76 percent of the time when 
both chose the same approach to the conflict, whereas the weaker actor won 63 percent of 
the time when there were opposite approaches.26 Arreguin-Toft admits the analysis is 
imperfect given that some data is unavailable and, therefore, conducts a case study of the 
Vietnam War to further compare his theory to Mack’s.  
Following his analysis, Arreguin-Toft concluded that “strong actors lose 
asymmetric conflicts when they adopt the wrong strategy vis-à-vis their weaker 
adversaries.”27 In his conclusion, there are two key points suggested for a U.S. strategy in 
asymmetric conflict: “1) preparation of public expectations for a long war despite U.S. 
technological and material advantages, and 2) the development and deployment of armed 
forces specifically equipped and trained for Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations.”28 
Arreguin-Toft’s final points are sound and are supported not only by his case study of 
Vietnam but are also evident in the failures of the United States in Operation Iraqi Freedom 
and Enduring Freedom. What is missing from his and Mack’s analysis, however, is the 
belligerents’ advantages and disadvantages based on their form of government. 
Additionally, the scope of their analyses is limited to conflicts of open warfare. Conflicts 
fought in the gray zone between proxy forces, and through covert mechanisms are not 
included. 
In a separate piece of literature, examining faults in the U.S. strategy during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, Jeffrey Record emphasized the disadvantage conventional 
militaries face with insurgencies, and the problem set democracies face as conflicts drag 
on. In “Why the Strong Lose,” Record concluded that the U.S. military required a 
substantial change to how it was organized in order to be effective at defeating 
insurgencies.29 Conventional military thought and an unwavering adherence to traditional 
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warfighting is cited as the problem, as well as an unwillingness to address the fact that 
opponents were adapting irregular warfare strategies to circumvent U.S. military might.30 
The most prominent point of Record’s argument for why the United States was faltering in 
Iraq, however, was that democracies are especially vulnerable in protracted conflict. He 
argued that when the weaker competitor can bring a stronger will and counter strategy 
coupled with external assistance, it will likely prevail as the democratic body politic 
support base falters over time.31  
The existing literature overwhelmingly supports the theory that authoritarian 
governments hold the political advantage in war. In “War and the Survival of Leaders,” the 
authors tested seven quantitative hypotheses to determine the effect of international warfare 
on political leadership survival.32 The analysis demonstrated the domestic political hazard 
of warfare is mitigated for authoritarians, but both democratic and authoritarian leaders are 
subject to the fallout of high costs, and defeat on the battlefield.33 However, a gap exists 
in the analysis. The authors examined warfare data from 1816–1980 but exclude several 
types including cases where casualty counts were not available and when there was no clear 
victor.34 All of the case studies my thesis examines fall into the excluded categories 
because they occurred in the realm of IW. 
The preceding literature makes several key observations regarding the nature of 
asymmetric conflict and recommends strategies for asymmetric warfare, but does not 
illuminate in detail the manner in which a weaker actor can prevail below the level of 
conventional armed conflict. In this thesis, I define conventional armed conflict as when 
two belligerents deploy conventional military forces to overtly engage in direct combat. 
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom fall into the realm of conventional armed 
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conflict because the United States deployed conventional forces to defeat state and non-
state actors. The ongoing conflict between Iran and the United States does not fall under 
this definition because the conflict is being fought utilizing irregular methods.  
Additionally, the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the preceding works did 
not examine low intensity struggles often fought in the covert realm. Obtaining data for 
these conflicts, which forego military attrition-based strategies for terrain and body counts, 
is especially difficult if not impossible in many cases. Irregular struggles involve fighting 
in the gray zone with multiple instruments of national power, and the winner may not 
always be clear. 
3. Deterrence Theory
In the United States’ effort to curtail Iran’s pursuit of nuclear power and its 
adventurism across the Middle East, it seeks to coerce and deter through economic 
sanctions and military posturing; but Iran arguably never stops pushing back. Iran 
recognizes that it is the weaker party in a long-term asymmetric match for power in the 
Middle East. In admitting its position early on, it effectively adopted what Thomas 
Schelling referred to as erosion, or salami tactics.35 In his theoretical perspective written 
in Arms and Influence, Thomas Schelling examined the state of affairs between the United 
States and the Soviet Union as they faced off in the early Cold War years. In his salami 
tactics concept, Schelling recognized that there are certain exploits that an actor may 
commit to assist their goals while staying below their adversaries’ level of commitment. 
This technique can be risky as an opponent may overreact leading to a more violent 
outcome, but in life as well as politics, it a tested method for children dealing with parents 
to tardy tenants sidestepping landlords threatening eviction.36 Schelling also makes 
excellent use of the Cuban Missile Crisis as an example of a time when the United States 
was tested to a point where it had to establish a red line and stand firmly behind it to end 
35 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (Hartford, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 67, 
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the Soviet’s tactic.37 Schelling’s analysis of actions to be taken by either the Soviets or 
United States to utilize or counter this tactic reflected the time in which it was written. A 
side effect of this is the lack of analysis of covert warfare, which is the preferred mechanism 
for this tactic by Iran.  
In Secret Wars: Covert Conflict in International Politics, Austin Carson examines 
how covert actions were utilized from WWI through the Soviet-Afghan war to keep wars 
limited. Carson posits that the secretive gamesmanship and back room dealings between 
leaders to control escalation helped avoid conflicts from heating up and may have kept the 
Cold War cold. However, he does point out that the secrecy can backfire when discovered 
by the body politic in democracies, and it favors authoritarians, who can deny the 
operations to their constituencies and the world.  
In his concluding chapter, Carson begins an examination of Iran’s covert war in 
post-2003 Iraq, exploring why Iran conducted it as well as why the United States did not 
overtly fight back. U.S. intelligence reporting beginning in 2004, alluded to Iranian 
smuggling of weapons and fighters into Iraq, which included the introduction of the 
explosively formed penetrator devices.38 The fear through 2006, according to several cited 
reports, was that the QF was capable of substantially escalating the conflict if they or Iran 
itself was attacked.39 Carson goes on to theorize that the United States would eventually 
confront Iran’s covert action via the surge of 2007, where the solution was to put more 
boots on the ground to overwhelm the Sunni and Iran-backed Shiite insurgencies.40 Carson 
admits that his theory is incomplete due to the unavailability of declassified source material 
available at the time he finished writing in 2018.  
This thesis expands upon the foundation that the above literature establishes. There 
exists a gap in the literature regarding asymmetric conflict and deterrence theory when 
SOF is utilized. The QF and the manner in which it is employed by Iran is unique from 
 
37 Schelling, 80–82. 
38 Carson, Secret Wars, 292. 
39 Carson, 292–93. 
40 Carson, 294. 
14 
how any other nation utilizes its SOF. The QF’s tactics, techniques, and procedures are 
studied in detail across six case studies to learn how the unit functions, the reasons, and 
how this compares to U.S. doctrine concerning IW. Additionally, this thesis surveys the 
social and political factors of the belligerents involved, and how that shaped the situation 
and outcomes of the irregular wars the QF have been involved in. 
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II. IRAN’S NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES  
Before one can understand Iran’s behavior, one must understand what its goals are. 
Iran champions itself in the media as guardians of the oppressed in a never-ending conflict 
to stop Western imperialism. It is an authoritarian theocracy with a constitution based on a 
specific interpretation of Shia Islam: Velayat i Faqih (principle of the jurist). There exist 
arguments that Iran bases its decision making on Islamic fundamentalism or pursuit of 
regional hegemony. Islamic ideology and pursuit of regional dominance do play into the 
regime’s decision-making process but ultimately it is a revisionist state, surrounded by 
enemies who are aligned with the United States. Iran’s behavior can be more understood 
in terms of strategy, security, and regional competition.41 In the post-9/11 era, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran’s primary goal is regime survival.  
Although it may often portray itself as being at the forefront of Islam, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran is not a fundamentalist Islamic state, and its actions are not solely based 
on religious motivations.42 Islamism is alive in Iranian politics and cultural expectations, 
with women being required to wear a head scarf for example.43 However, modern Iran’s 
comparison with fundamentalism is more than likely the product of misguided media and 
erratic behavior during the 1980s. The Iranian regime maintains a fundamentalist stance 
on social issues, but there is a looseness in its system. Democratic principles are interwoven 
with theocracy in its constitution, and a more relaxed stance towards women’s rights when 
compared to the laws of Saudi Arabia and Taliban controlled Afghanistan. Iran is an 
authoritarian theocracy where Shia Islam is a factor, but only one of several that drives its 
actions and foreign policy.44 Significant evidence exists that other elements play into its 
decision-making process.  
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One could present a case that Iran’s exportation of the revolution’s ideals, and 
emphasis on military development is based on attaining regional hegemony. Before 
solidifying power, Ruhollah Khomeini sought to entice a Shia uprising in Iraq to overthrow 
the regime, and unite with it under theocratic rule.45 Iran spent tens of billions of dollars 
to further Hezbollah’s grip in Lebanon, and keep Bashar Al-Assad in power in Syria. Saudi 
Arabia is its greatest rival in the Middle East with an arguably less effective military. If it 
were defeated, pacified, or removed from regional competition, could Iran then not gain 
regional hegemony? The answer, as pointed out in a 2019 study by Huda Raouf, is more 
than likely no. The presence of the United States, its support to Iran’s adversaries, and deep 
sectarian issues amongst Middle Eastern states will continue to keep Iran from gaining 
regional hegemony.46 In analysis of its military development, the model it chooses is 
primarily based on deterrence, and not offensive capabilities.47 Numerous obstacles would 
need to be removed before the Islamic Republic could hope to become hegemonic. 
The leadership of Iran is most concerned about survival. U.S. officials and 
diplomats have stated repeatedly that the Iranian regime should be removed. In President 
George W. Bush’s 2006 State of the Union address, he made a call for change in Iran. In a 
veiled statement for regime change he said: “Let me speak directly to the citizens of Iran: 
America respects you, and we respect your country…We respect your right to choose your 
own future and win your own freedom.”48 In 2017, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated 
that the administration supported a philosophy of regime change. His successor Mike 
Pompeo in 2018 called into question the legitimacy of the Iranian regime and expressed 
hope of internal revolt.49 A long-standing history of Western intervention from the Bay of 
45 Lyse Doucet, “Legacy of Iran-Iraq War Lives On,” BBC, October 6, 2015, https://www.bbc.com/
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Pigs in Cuba, the British/American orchestrated coup of Prime Minister Mossadeq, and the 
overthrow of Saddam Hussain certainly weighs on the Iranian regime’s concern. 
Although the Supreme Leader exercises absolute power, his decisions are not 
monolithic. He must also keep the ruling constituency content. The Supreme Leader and 
the ruling elite of Iran face two threats: external invasion from the United States or an 
alliance of Western and regional allies, and internal dissention that could evolve into a 
revolution. To counter these threats, the Islamic Republic seeks to achieve four national 
security objectives (NSO) internally and abroad. These objectives are domestic control, 
expansion of regional influence, ensuring economic security, and removal of the United 
States from the Middle East. In achieving these objectives internally and externally, the 
Iranian regime can survive against all dangers. The following sections will elaborate on 
these NSOs and provide examples of methods Iran utilizes. First, I will provide an 
overview of Iran’s internal security apparatus. Next, I will discuss Iran’s strategy of 
regional expansion. The third section explains how Iran seeks to ensure economic security. 
Lastly, I will discuss Iran’s effort to drive the United States out of the region.  
A. NSO 1: DOMESTIC CONTROL
The Islamic Republic of Iran is unique in that its people meet at an intersection of
ethno-linguistic identity, national identity, and Shia religious identity, which differentiates 
it from much of its Sunni-dominated surrounding region.50 To maintain control and deter 
internal calls for reform that may result in regime change, the ruling elites of Iran must find 
ways to unite the identities of its population. Sometimes it is through rallying in the face 
of existential threats, at others it is through brutality, and sometimes it is through 
subversion of information.  
This identity crisis that could have jeopardized Ruhollah Khomeini’s seizure of 
power was most profound during the reorganization of the government in 1979. Ruhollah 
Khomeini began to seize power in 1979 amongst dissenters with nationalistic views. 
Persian nationalism did not align with their belief that Islam should be the only identity 
50 Alam Saleh and James Worrall, “Between Darius and Khomeini: Exploring Iran’s National Identity 
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under which Iranians held themselves.51 Iran had an identity crisis as it was collecting the 
rubble of the Revolution. It was also facing potential retaliation from the United States, an 
eager Soviet Union to the north and in Afghanistan, and unfriendly Sunni neighbors on 
both sides. In the face of external and internal threats to codifying clerical rule, the new 
government would find a mechanism for uniting the identities under common goals to 
circumvent these threats.  
In the 1980 invasion of Iran by Iraqi Forces, Khomeini found the answer to his 
problem of rallying the people to the new Islamic Republic’s flag pole. Originally a close 
ally of Khomeini, President Bani-Sadr began disagreeing with the pro-clerical leadership 
about how to fight the war and deal with the political situation.52 As Bani-Sadr, the 
commander in chief for armed forces at the time, attempted to stymie the Iraqi momentum, 
his populist support was being overwhelmed in the rear by the clerical Islamic Republican 
Party (IRP). The religious clout of the IRP proved to be a significant factor. What followed 
was a brief, but violent civil war with Khomeini rising to unfettered power. With the 
nationalist movement crushed, Khomeini united Iranians in an Islamic holy war against the 
invaders, using religious Shiite fervor to turn the tide of battle.53 Khomeini’s most 
profound apparatus during this time of internal and external conflict was the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). The IRGC became the protectorate of the Islamic 
Revolution, subjugating those advancing nationalism or democracy over theocratic rule.  
The success of the IRGC in late 1979 cemented Khomeini’s grip on power and 
became the theocratic system’s enforcer.54 Over subsequent decades, the IRGC evolved to 
become a military force parallel to the regular armed forces. The effect of this was 
establishment of a protective measure in line with what James Quinlivan coined as “coup-
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proofing.”55 Quinlivan posits that a state can effectively become coup-proof when it has 
the following characteristics:  
1. The effective exploitation of family, ethnic, and religious loyalties for 
coup-critical positions balanced with wider participation and less 
restrictive loyalty standards for the regime as a whole. 
2. The creation of an armed force parallel to the regular military. 
3. The development of multiple internal security agencies with 
overlapping jurisdiction that constantly monitor the loyalty of the 
military and one another with independent paths of communication to 
critical leaders. 
4. The fostering of expertness in the regular military. 
5. The financing of such measures.56  
The IRGC through the armed forces general staff have a direct line to the Supreme 
Leader. The paramilitary volunteer force known as the Basij is controlled by the IRGC and 
is their primary tool for countering internal dissent.57 In the 1990s, the IRGC became 
invested in numerous state contracts, public works industry, and oil contracts. In these 
activities, the IRGC became intermingled with Iran’s economy.58 This vested interest in 
economic success gave IRGC leadership a greater investment in ensuring that there would 
be no threat to the regime. The synergy between the IRGC and hardline leadership 
continues today as the IRGC leadership has financial, political, and cultural investment in 
muting internal calls for reform.  
When rhetoric of a Western conspiracy causing the economic hardship of its people 
is no longer satisfactory, the government couples the narrative with brutality utilizing the 
IRGC and Basij. Following 2017 proposals by President Rouhani to increase funding for 
the IRGC and bonyads, protests erupted in more than 80 cities. The government’s response 
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eventually admitted some faults, but initially placed blame on covert action, and responded 
violently to protestors.59 Placing blame on Western influence grants the regime a scapegoat 
for its failures and violent suppression of dissenters.  
The internet is a double-edged sword for the Iranian government: on one hand, it 
allows the sharing of ideas and mobilization contradictory to what the regime advocates, 
but on the other it also allows the government to conduct surveillance on a grand scale. 
Iran was one of the first Middle Eastern countries to access the internet when it became 
commercially available. In it, Iranians found a mechanism to share ideas, expand their 
identities as a people, and listen to ideas from around the world. The Iranian government 
has struggled in many cases to filter incoming information as internally developed 
platforms proved far less attractive to those developed primarily in the United States, such 
as Facebook. However, it has succeeded in some cases of using applications to gain access 
to dissenter’s information and effectively map resistance networks such as Telegram-
Farsi.60 There is also evidence that hardline leaders will utilize illicit cyber groups to spy 
on politicians and their family members for the purposes of control and curtailing reform.61 
Because the internet brings people together to share ideas and discuss the issues that affect 
their lives, the hardline elites inside the regime effectively use that to influence and target 
those who may wish to see things change. 
Iran is an authoritarian theocracy in a world where free flowing information 
champions individual rights and democracy. Therefore, the regime must quell any calls for 
significant reform to survive. The IRGC’s unrelenting obedience to the Supreme Leader, 
coupled with a vested interest in keeping the principal ruling elites in power is a formidable 
tool for squashing dissent. The regime also understands the importance of controlling 
narratives, demonstrated in filtering of the internet, internal espionage to locate discord, 
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and blaming the West for all Iranian problems in the media. With a chained body politic, 
the regime is free to exercise its external activities that support its other objectives. 
B. NSO 2: EXPANSION OF REGIONAL INFLUENCE  
Since 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been surrounded by adversaries. Iran 
is in a constant state of conflict with these adversaries because it believes continuing the 
revolution abroad is necessary for its survival. After the Iran-Iraq war, this state of conflict 
reflects a cold war where fighting mainly occurs between proxies, special operations, or 
covert action. Iran and its opponents have not engaged in conventional warfare since 1988, 
but it is continuously involved in regional conflict. Iran has a powerful military, but it 
cannot attain hegemony in the Middle East while the majority of countries have the ability 
to counter its actions, and the United States continues to support and protect Iran’s rivals 
like Saudi Arabia.62 Remembering the intervention of the United States and Great Britain 
in 20th century Iranian affairs, alongside Soviet Union establishing autonomous republics 
in the region surrounding Iran, a core tenet of the IRGC became exportation of the 
revolution. This tenet served the purpose of remaining on the offense against Western 
interference as well as assisting the Muslim world in protecting itself.63 Recognizing its 
asymmetric imbalance with the West, Iran utilizes the IRGC to follow a strategy of IW 
masked under the guise of a pan-Islamic strategy. Through methods such as covert action 
and training support to proxies, Iran can maintain plausible deniability in the face of failure 
and claim victory in the face of success. 
Seeking to obtain allegiance or support from state and non-state actors, Iran finds a 
manner in which to strengthen itself against the possibility of foreign intervention. The 
IRGC is its primary apparatus for doing so. As a nation it is easy to contain, but with 
alliances linking it to the Mediterranean Sea, and proxies in Yemen on its enemy’s 
doorstep, subversive activities become much harder to control. Its proxies and allies are in 
Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and Afghanistan, effectively creating a complex dilemma 
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for the United States and its allies. In order to unite these groups and potential allies beyond 
its borders, a strategy masked as Pan-Islamic is used. 
Rhetoric from Iranian leadership combined with support to predominantly Shia 
non-state actors demonstrate that it is biased to Shia causes, as long as those causes 
mutually support Iran’s interests.64 Ayatollah Khamenei, the current Supreme Leader, 
promotes the idea of Pan-Islam in his statements, but numerous avowals of other leaders 
continuously promote unification under Iran and Shiism as the only way. In 2010, President 
Ahmadinejad’s chief of staff caused an uproar internally and abroad when he said “without 
Iran, Islam would be lost” and added, “If we want to present the truth of Islam to the world, 
we should raise the Iranian flag.”65 Former head of the QF, Qassem Soleimani, additionally 
asserted on multiple occasions that Iran was the only one who could unite the Islamic 
world.66 Article 12 of Iran’s constitution clearly defines Twelver Shiism as “the” religion, 
and the Velayat i Faqih (rule of the jurist), which states theocratic rule as the only option 
for ruling over Islam, is uniquely Iranian.67 Perhaps their most sectarian action of the past 
20 years was ensuring Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki was reinstated to maintain a grip 
over recovering Iraq.68 This sectarian action would directly contribute to the instability of 
Iraqi forces during the rise of ISIS as it marginalized Sunni soldiers and promoted those 
who were Shia. Iran will support the goals of other actors and Islamic sects as long as they 
are mutually supporting. However, in masking these actions as part of a pan-Islamic 
strategy, they have been able to rally others to their cause while maintaining domestic 
control. 
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The Islamic Republic spreads its influence through methods including covert 
action, support to proxies, and subversion. This irregular strategy masked as one to unite 
the Islamic world can be effective as Iran’s diplomatic reach is weak given sectarian issues, 
and overt use of its military against an ally of the United States would mobilize an 
overwhelming response. Significant evidence in rhetoric as well as bias towards select 
interventionism of Islamic struggles demonstrate that Iran’s strategy cannot be labeled Pan-
Islamic. This includes support to Bashar Al-Assad’s brutal response to the rebellion in 
Syria because it served Iran’s national security interests to keep him in power.69 It has 
elements of pan-Islamic ideals but it is more about creating a rallying cry for the domestic 
population and those groups across the Middle East that have mutually supporting goals. 
In achievement of this NSO, Iran ensures that external actors must engage in a proverbial 
game of whack a mole against numerous allies and proxies. In effect, it counteracts the 
ability to invade Iran as the invader’s interests throughout the Middle East would also be 
engulfed. 
C. NSO 3: ENSURE ECONOMIC SECURITY 
The Islamic Republic of Iran maintains strict control over the handling of its 
economy to preserve support from political-military elites and to circumvent undue 
influence from foreign investment. Due to its isolationism and violent behavior, foreign 
sanctions have taken a continuous economic toll. To ensure regime survival, it will often 
engage in illicit activities, including support to terrorism, that will expand its economic 
options. The history of its economy and the effect of sanctions reveal that it methodically 
supports elites with political power and will find exceptional methods to ensure its survival. 
Following the 1979 revolution, Iran found itself isolated and has been faced with 
economic issues since that range from a lack of foreign investment to sanctions. The gross 
economic mismanagement of Shah Pahlavi was a major contributing factor to the 1979 
revolution as it favored development of Western industry over assisting the poor. After 
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Ruhollah Khomeini seized power, the government nationalized most industry and the 
economy was plagued with issues from the start.70 Iran began to isolate itself, seize assets, 
and adopt restrictive policies during the costly war with Iraq, removing the attractiveness 
of foreign investment.71 Following the end of the Iran-Iraq war, which cost between $43 
and $45 billion in the first five years of the war alone, the next two administrations focused 
on economic growth.72 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in 2005, promising to 
redistribute wealth, but ultimately was undermined by the beginning of the United States 
and United Nations’ efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear program.73 Without sanctions relief from 
President Trump’s maximum pressure strategy, Iran will likely continue to suffer with 
expected negative economic growth, coupled with high inflation.74 However, evidence 
suggests that sanctions alone will not force the Iranian government to change course as 
long as it views the cost as low in the long run; especially when the United States and 
Europe disagree on how to implement the costs.75 According to author Richard Haass, 
sanctions can be particularly ineffective with authoritarian regimes, which historically 
demonstrate an ability to weather the storm. Additionally, the stricter control of 
information can create a “rally around the flag” effect in the body politic instead of 
coercion.76 To expand its economic options through unconventional, and in many cases, 
criminal ways, the IRGC is utilized.  
The IRGC has a vested interest in maintaining the status quo regarding how the 
economy is handled. This branch of the military is the mechanism with which Iran is able 
to manipulate its neighbors, conduct terrorist activities, and protect the supreme leader’s 
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hold on power. Ayatollah Khomeini once remarked that “If there did not exist the Guard 
Corps, there would not exist a country either.”77 According to a 2015 Bloomberg News 
article by Ladene Nasseri and Golnar Motevalli, The IRGC and bonyads (Islamic charitable 
foundations) control up to 70 percent of the economy.78 As a method of keeping the elites 
within the IRGC satisfied, “the regime prioritizes political control and rewarding its 
supporters over economic efficiency.”79 Providing the IRGC with an economic 
motivation, the regime ensures its loyalty and investment in regime continuation.  
To survive in the face of international sanctions without becoming a hermit 
kingdom the likes of North Korea, Iran must look for economic opportunities. Its methods 
are typically through illicit means and assist in explaining certain actions. Through the QF, 
Iran engages in financing schemes to terrorist organizations including Hezbollah and 
Hamas. In one instance, the QF exploited the United Arab Emirates currency exchange 
market to transfer several hundred million U.S. dollars.80 This funding stream enabled 
Iran’s proxies to continue activities supporting other national security objectives including 
increasing regional influence. In a separate case linked to the QF, the United States 
identified a scheme to obtain parts necessary for Iran’s dual military-civilian use Mahan 
Airlines. From 2011–2018, through a series of front companies in South East Asia, Iran 
was able to acquire aircraft parts, which sanctions sought to prohibit. The materials enabled 
Mahan Airlines to keep flying commercially, while also delivering weapons, fighters, and 
materials to proxies and allies across the Middle East.81 Iran’s methods for circumventing 
economic boundaries explain many cases in its illicit behavior, but it is not alone in 
conducting this subversive behavior.  
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In addition to utilizing the QF, Iran will collaborate with others to evade 
restrictions. Iran’s primary source of income is its oil reserves, which are the fourth largest 
in the world.82 Exportation is vital to the economy and Iran will go to significant lengths 
to ensure it is able to sell it. China continues to receive Iranian oil, but is reporting less. On 
the surface this appears to be to comply with sanctions, but evidence suggests everything 
may not be as it seems. Data compiled during an October 2019 report by Bourse and Bazaar 
suggested that oil was still moving in similar quantities, but that it may be transferred to 
Malaysia first. This method allows China to overcome sanctions through showing customs 
data that imports are coming from Malaysia instead.83 
The Islamic Republic of Iran seeks to continuously expand its economic options to 
protect the regime and ruling elites from external and internal threats. It steals and funnels 
money to terrorist organizations, obtains exports through subversive measures, and goes at 
great lengths to export oil. It is a political objective that is not limited to countries sharing 
its ideological values such as in the case of China. It is an NSO essential to keeping not 
only the political and military elitists content, but also the body politic who may seek 
regime change if the economy crumbles.   
D. NSO 4: REMOVE THE UNITED STATES FROM THE MIDDLE EAST 
Since 1979, Iran’s leaders have feared that their regime would be toppled by the 
United States. Previous experiences with Western interference shape Iranian foreign 
policy, including how its military was constructed and utilized. It became clear 
immediately following the birth of the Islamic Republic of Iran that it would not be able to 
compete symmetrically with the United States, but Iran needed the United States removed 
from the Middle East.  
Western democracies have a history interfering with weaker countries like Iran to 
obtain more auspicious conditions. In 1953, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and 
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MI6 (British Secret Intelligence Service) orchestrated a coup of the democratically elected 
Prime Minister Mossadeq over fears that an oil dispute could push Iran towards Soviet 
influence.84 In 1980, the United States launched Operation EAGLE CLAW, an audacious 
hostage rescue attempt to infiltrate hundreds of forces into Iran to retrieve American 
hostages being held by the new regime for bargaining purposes. The message was clear, 
the West would intervene, forcibly if necessary, into Iranian territory if its interests were 
jeopardized.  
From 1980 to 1988, the newborn Islamic Republic fought a costly and destructive 
war of attrition riled with periods of stalemate. Iran engaged a peer force on the battlefield 
for eight years, and the only results yielded were stalemate and scores of dead. In 1991, the 
United States and a coalition of allies sacked the Iraqi force that had stalemated Iran’s. 
What was worse was that this defeat took just over a month. The conventional might of the 
United States was put on display again in 2003 when it destroyed the Iraqi military and 
overthrew its government in one month.  
From these lessons, Iran learned that the United States’ military was a force to be 
reckoned with and that following the strategy of Iraq would be disastrous. It needed to 
remove the United States from the Middle East physically and erode its influence. To 
compete, Iran adopted a strategy that focused primarily on IW.85 IW emphasizes mostly 
covert techniques that seek to erode an adversary’s will to continue conflict participation. 
These techniques typically involve using proxy forces as the adversary is less likely to 
retaliate against the state sponsor if deniability can be maintained. These techniques allow 
Iran to punish U.S. forces and interests without resulting in an overwhelming military 
response.  
The U.S. occupation of Iraq following the overthrow of Saddam Hussain’s 
government is perhaps one of the greatest short-term successes Iran has had using IW to 
remove the United States from the area. Sometime after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
Iran infiltrated exiled Shia, alongside QF members into Iraq to sow chaos through sectarian 
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violence, and support Shia militia groups. These groups waged an arduous insurgency 
against the United States and its allies who were fighting Sunni insurgencies 
simultaneously. With this support to Shia militias came the now infamous improvised 
explosive devices and, eventually, the even more deadly explosively formed penetrator 
versions that would result in hundreds of U.S. servicemember deaths.86 Concurrently, Iran 
subverted the political process through supporting politicians who could be manipulated. 
Nouri Al-Maliki, a member of the Islamist organization known at the Dawa Party, was an 
effective puppet of the IRGC, aggravating U.S. attempts to curtail Iran’s support to Shia 
insurgents, while making sure Shia politicians and military officers ascended to higher 
power.87 However, Maliki’s sectarian actions, motivated by the IRGC leadership, would 
ultimately accelerate the rise of ISIS and demonstrate the damage done to the Iraqi military 
with the marginalization of Sunni leaders.88 Iran would learn the lesson the hard way from 
its sectarian actions, as it not only forced Iran to confront ISIS in Iraq and Syria, but also 
caused the return of the U.S. military to Iraq. 
Iran’s true obstacle to becoming the hegemonic power in the Middle East is the 
continuous presence of the United States’ military and diplomacy. Gaining influence over 
other countries with numerous sectarian issues is also an obstacle, which is exacerbated 
through the influence the United States wields.89 Removing the United States from Middle 
Eastern affairs is an NSO that is demonstrated in many of Iran’s activities such as support 
Shia insurgencies and political subversion during the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Iran’s hard 
line leaders still remember Western interventionism throughout the 19th century in Iranian 
affairs and believe that security can only be attained when the United States is removed. It 
is likely that many of the IRGC’s activities will remain focused on achieving this NSO. 
 
86 Uskowi, Temperature Rising, 46–47, 50–51; Carson, Secret Wars, 289–91. 
87 Uskowi, Temperature Rising, 36, 54. 
88 Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam, 220–21. 
89 Raouf, “Iranian Quest for Regional Hegemony,” 242. 
29 
III. IRAN’S UNACCEPTABLE COST OF CONFLICT 
Determining the qualitative measurement for what an authoritarian government like 
Iran uses for defining its acceptable cost for conflict is difficult given the lack of open 
source data. Iranian leadership has supported terrorism, relied on human wave tactics in 
the Iran-Iraq War, apparently accepted conspiracy theories such as President 
Ahmadinejad’s denial of the Holocaust, and Ayatollah Khamenei’s advocation that the 
United States created the COVID-19 virus, and constant violent oratory in the media all 
suggest that its leadership are illogical. If Iran was truly and irrational actor, developing a 
model for its acceptable threshold for conflict would not be possible. However, there is 
significant evidence that Iran’s leaders, are in fact, calculating and base their decisions on 
avoiding escalation past a certain level.  
Many examining the activities of Iran point to the rhetoric of its leaders regarding 
politics, warfare, and ideology as evidence that it is an irrational actor.90 Iran has on several 
occasions threatened action against the United States that would result in a form of total 
war, which it had no hope of winning. Iran’s foreign minister Javad Zarif threatened the 
United States and Saudi Arabia with “all-out war” should there be reprisals for an Iranian 
proxy linked drone strike against Saudi oil fields in September 2019.91 The IRGC through 
its propaganda news service, Tasnim News Agency, almost daily flaunts capabilities for 
decisive action against the United States that is far-fetched, and the remarks of its 
leadership demonstrate absurd decision making for their capacity to compete with the West 
militarily.92 In response to the outbreak of the COVID-19 virus in the winter of 2020, 
Ayatollah Khamenei suggested a conspiracy theory via his Twitter account on March 12 
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and 22, 2020. In these tweets he went to far as to suggest the crisis in Iran was a biological 
attack orchestrated by the United States, aimed at damaging its enemies, notwithstanding 
internationally validated evidence that the virus began in China, and the United States was 
also facing consequences of the pandemic.93 Despite this grandiloquence, Iranian 
leadership demonstrates aptitude for political maneuvering to attain its NSOs and survive. 
One should recognize that U.S. officials also routinely circulate conspiracy theories and 
antagonistic rhetoric via Twitter and other social media. The aggressive rhetoric is more of 
a propaganda tool, and a method for obtaining concessions from governments who are 
more likely to blink in the face of threats. 
There are two prime examples in the past ten years that demonstrate Iranian leaders 
walk back of rhetoric and concessions in the face of potentially catastrophic consequences. 
The first being the Supreme Leader’s acceptance of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (JCPOA) despite originally saying that there would be no agreement in which 
sanctions remained.94 By accepting the deal, the Supreme Leader and the IRGC obtained 
victories. The IRGC continued its support to proxies throughout the Middle East, its 
ballistic missile testing was not halted, and it obtained significant monetary gain in a 
concession from the United States regarding unfulfilled delivery of military equipment 
from pre-revolution dealings.95 Ayatollah Khamenei also achieved political gain by on one 
hand being able to take credit for economic relief and on the other hand distancing himself 
from President Rouhani; who could be blamed if the deal ended up yielding poor results.96 
Despite intense statements that suggested an unwillingness to cooperate with the Western 
alliance, Iran’s leaders demonstrated political maneuvering that allowed them to receive 
concessions, while only slowing their nuclear program. 
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The aftermath of the January 2020 targeted killing of the QF commander Qassem 
Soleimani also demonstrates Iran’s rational behavior counter to irrational statements. The 
United States retaliated against QF support to attacks on the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, 
Iraq, and a reported pending attack being formed by the QF against American interests. 
Iran needed to respond to such an overt attack on one of its own, and especially one like 
General Soleimani, who held such power and influence. In the days following his death, 
General Hamid Sarkheili of the IRGC spoke of revenge and the ability to strike U.S. targets 
across the Middle East.97 On January 2, 2020, Ayatollah Khamenei tweeted 
“#SevereRevenge awaits the criminals who have stained their hands with his [Soleimani] 
and the other martyrs’ blood.”98 However, the response that came was far from the 
vengeance alluded to. Iran retaliated with a volley of ballistic missiles, landing on or near 
a U.S. base with the U.S. military having advance warning. There was potential for 
inflicting U.S. deaths, but the proximity of the impact sites demonstrated Iran knew it had 
to avoid casualties to prevent further escalation. Iran could say they responded for General 
Soleimani’s death, but the response was little more than an annoyance to U.S. military 
forces in Iraq. This effectively demonstrated that Iranian leaders knew the consequences 
of enacting the hardline speeches, and they made a calculated decision to avoid following 
through with their words. 
Assuming that it is an irrational entity is misplaced and improper for determining 
how far it is willing to go to attain its four national security objectives. Iran’s leaders may 
voice outlandish statements, but they are perhaps more about riling up hard liner support, 
and making less powerful governments blink. Democratic leaders are also not immune 
from criticism to their statements. President Donald Trump’s statements particularly during 
the COVID-19 pandemic were critiqued daily for rationality by U.S. media outlets with 
dissenting views. So, if it is in fact a rational actor, how does one determine or at least 
estimate the costs it is willing to incur for its revisionist actions? 
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The answer lies in examining the two events that shaped the Islamic Republic of 
Iran during its infancy: the revolution itself and the Iran-Iraq War. Both represent times 
where the survival of the government was truly in jeopardy. As the Islamic Republic sought 
to rebuild itself in the 1990s, it began to demonstrate that it would support illicit actors and 
activities to attain its NSOs. However, it also demonstrated when faced with a counter-
action that would likely lead to a repeat of any of the two aforementioned events, it would 
pull back as a return to those circumstances are seen as too dangerous for the regime. 
A. THE REVOLUTION 
The Islamic Republic of Iran is a nation born from revolution, and because of the 
nation’s young age, all of the senior leaders were present for it. These leaders remember 
the overthrow of the Shah, the splintering of the nation, and the violence that went along 
with groups vying for power. The regime cannot and will not allow another revolution to 
birth; its survival depends on this. Therefore, the question becomes: at what point does the 
internal strife becomes so great that the regime is forced to concede significant changes? 
The advent of widespread protests seeking reform began in 1999, and have occurred 
roughly every ten years since, with increasingly tense turnout and violence. President 
Khatami’s inability to create real reforms, coupled with the shutdown of the reformist 
newspaper Salam led to five days of protests in 1999. These protests saw thousands of 
students descend upon the streets of Tehran and other parts of the country. The IRGC 
unleashed the Basij to subdue the protestors. This event was the largest social upheaval 
against the government since 1979, but the regime survived without having to give in to 
reforms.99 IRGC leadership criticized Khatami’s handling of the situation, and reluctance 
to quash the protests. They saw these protests as potentially spilling out of control, putting 
theocratic rule at risk. This became the point where the IRGC truly asserted itself as a 
political force against reform.100 The IRGC, with its tether to ensuring regime survival, 
would not allow internal strife to gain traction. They remembered the revolution, and what 
it would mean if they allowed one to develop. 
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In 2009, the moderate presidential candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi was expected 
to replace conservative hardliner, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, but this did not occur. In what 
would be coined “the green movement,” millions of protestors again took to the streets 
against suspected election fraud. Unlike 1999 however, these went on for three months and 
the IRGC’s reaction was even harsher.101 The IRGC saw the turmoil as a direct threat to 
the regime, and voiced it as being caused by a Western conspiracy.102 
In response to an escalation in protests over a 50% rise in fuel prices in November 
2019, the Iranian Government shut down the internet in the country for five days to limit 
popular organization and the ability to counter the government’s narrative to the outside 
world. External organizations received some information and images, estimating casualties 
in the hundreds.103 The regime blamed the riots on a Western conspiracy just as they had 
in 2009. Khamenei stated that “the whole centers of evil in the world have mobilized efforts 
in recent days to encourage unrest in Iran.”104 Just before the internet was blocked, Iranian 
Foreign Ministry Spokesman Seyed Abbas Mousavi claimed Iranians did not want support 
in reforms being voiced by Western leaders stating: “The dignified people of Iran are well 
aware that such hypocritical and spurious comments [from Pompeo] do not embody any 
sincere and affectionate sympathy.”105 The regime was once again faced with an internal 
crisis, but in terms of turnout and destruction, things were getting worse. The access to 
information via the internet made narratives harder to control and allowed the world to 
witness the regime’s solution to free speech: violent retribution. 
All three events resulted in the yielding of little reform by the Iranian government. 
The current president, Hasan Rouhani is more moderate than his predecessor, but he 
appears to be unable to enact a new approach to Iran’s foreign and domestic policy. The 
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government’s foreign policy favors security over the economy, and its projection of hard 
power is often to the detriment of its soft power options.106 While the supreme leader and 
ruling elites do not seem to be changing their ways, what is clear is domestic grievances 
are yielding more dynamic protests over the years, and they are being aided by advances 
in technology. The IRGC sees them as a direct threat to the foundation of the country and 
will violently suppress them. 
With no true examples of large reformist concessions to popular uprisings, one 
cannot determine the level of domestic disarray the regime sees as too great. However, 
what is clear is that popular uprisings calling into question the government and theocratic 
rule are to be dealt with harshly. Allowing a movement to birth and grow is an unacceptable 
cost to the regime.  
B. THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR 
The Iran-Iraq war, which many Iranians refer to as the “imposed war,” began with 
an invasion of Iranian lands, but one would be mistaken to not recognize Iran’s role in 
poking the Iraqi tiger. Iran refused to return land specified in the 1975 Algiers accord, and 
Ruhollah Khomeini was too eager to spread the revolution, throwing his support Iraq’s 
senior Shia cleric, Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr, who advocated for regime change in Iraq. 
The spread of the revolution was voiced as the struggle to free the oppressed Shia of the 
Middle East, and this was a direct threat to Saddam Hussein’s control of Iraq.107 Iranian 
leadership assisted Iraq’s reasoning to go to war, and the next eight years devastated Iran 
in blood and treasure. The exact cost in lives and money is not known. It is estimated that 
over a half million Iranians were killed, and approximately $228 billion was spent between 
both sides, not accounting for infrastructure damage.108 The government and military were 
devastated, and it became clear to the regime that no one was coming to help after the U.S. 
 
106 Mahmood Sariolghalam, “Prospects for Change in Iranian Foreign Policy,” Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, February 20, 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/20/prospects-for-
change-in-iranian-foreign-policy-pub-75569. 
107 Tabatabai and Samuel, “What the Iran-Iraq War Tells Us.” 
108 History, “Iran-Iraq War,” History, August 24, 2018, https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/
iran-iraq-war. 
35 
Navy mistakenly shot down an Iranian civilian airliner with no repercussions. Khomeini 
was forced to accept a cease fire on July 20, 1988 with his “poison chalice” speech.109 
Iranian leadership remained in power, but at an unforeseen cost. The future political and 
military leaders would be shaped by the devastation, thirst for revenge, and reflections of 
what went wrong. 
The Iran-Iraq war shaped a generation of Iranians, and the majority of its political 
and military leaders today took part in, or suffered as civilians during the war.110 To 
discount the experiences of Iran’s leaders from this conflict, and the evolution of its 
military facing terrible losses, and exacerbated by a demonstration of U.S. military might 
against Iraq in 1991, would be only to the detriment of critical analysis. As stated in a 2001 
IRGC volume on the war, “The Iran-Iraq War, . . . because of its vast impact and outcomes, 
will affect every issue of internal and foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran for at 
least the next several decades.”111 The military’s change to an irregular warfare offense, 
and conventional warfare defense demonstrate that its leaders recognized that it could ill 
afford another total war due to a lack of outside support and technological capability.  
A journal overseen by IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaee stressed the lessons of 
the conflict saying “Considering the substantial impact Iraq’s war against Iran had on . . . 
the country, it is necessary to [examine] this war . . . in order to adopt appropriate measures. 
. . to prevent or lessen the damages that competitors of the Islamic Republic of Iran might 
impose on the country.”112 When faced with crossing a red line of the United States, and 
arguably Israel, Iran will pull back because its leaders reflect on the consequences of 
Ayatollah Khomeini overly aggravating Iraq, and giving Saddam Hussein sufficient reason 
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for invasion. This was demonstrated in the acceptance of the JCPOA, lack of retaliation for 
the targeted killing of Qassem Soleimani, and non-reciprocal action against the Israeli 
striking of 16 QF installations in Syria in the spring of 2018.113 The Iran-Iraq war shaped 
an entire generation as civilians and soldiers experienced it firsthand. It should be 
considered at the forefront of the regime’s mind in considering the consequences for its 
actions. A return to the destruction of those eight years would be an unacceptable cost of 
conflict.  
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IV. CASE STUDIES IN QUDS FORCE CAMPAIGNS 
This chapter analyzes six case studies of Quds Force (QF) irregular warfare (IW) 
campaigns: The Balkans, the U.S. occupation of Iraq, the Yemen Civil War, the Syrian 
Civil War, the war against ISIS in Iraq, and Iran’s support to and use of terrorism. Analysis 
of these case studies determines what independent variables have the greatest impact on 
the effectiveness of QF IW campaigns. After identifying these variables, one can develop 
a counter strategy to defeat these campaigns. As I discussed in Chapter II, determining 
success or failure in a traditional manner is not possible in most of these cases. The latter 
four are still ongoing. However, one can utilize achievement of Iran’s NSOs at an 
acceptable cost as the dependent variable.  
In each case study I provide an overview of the social-political situation during the 
time of conflict for each participant. I then observe the activities conducted by the QF 
during the conflict. Next, I examine the reactions to QF operations of the parties involved, 
whether they be non-state actors, social organizations, or nations. Finally, using the 
evidence at hand, I determine if Iran’s use of the QF was able to successfully advance its 
national security objectives (NSOs) at an acceptable cost. The qualitative data gathered 
from the outcome of each of these studies enables determination of which independent 
variables lead to success or failure in achieving objectives for QF IW campaigns. 
A. THE BALKANS, 1992–1996 
The first known action by the QF outside of Iran was in the Balkans during the 
breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. At the heart of the conflict was the Bosnian Civil 
War. The QF’s apparent intention was to ignite a movement that mimicked the Iranian 
revolution with Bosnian Muslims who were facing subjugation and genocide at the hands 
of Bosnian Serbs. This campaign failed to achieve any lasting gains concerning Iran’s four 
NSOs, but it ultimately shaped the QF’s IW construct in future conflict. The case of the 
Balkans was a sort of dress rehearsal for developing proxy forces and influencing politics, 
while avoiding unnecessary attention. Conducted in the gray zone of the conflict spectrum, 
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the QF’s campaign manipulated political systems, trained jihadis, and kept the domestic 
population ignorant of its activities.  
The case of the Balkans differs from the majority of known QF campaigns as it 
occurred well outside Iran’s region of interest. The probability of success throughout the 
campaign was low given the involvement of major world powers in the conflict and a 
tremendous mix of socio-ethnic societies that had no interest in establishing a government 
modeled after the Islamic Republic. Despite the low chance of success, Iranian leadership 
likely saw several factors that worked in its favor. These included Bosnian President Alija 
Izetbegovic’s party of being a staunch supporters of the Iranian regime, previously 
established Yugoslavian student exchanges that sent hundreds of Yugoslavian Muslims to 
Iranian schools each year, and the ability to subvert influence of Sunni rival governments 
attempting to gain footing in Europe’s underbelly.114 Iran additionally intervened to 
support the same population as NATO, lessening the likely hood that QF operatives would 
come into conflict with NATO forces. Gaining a foothold in Eastern Europe for easier 
infiltration of agents into Europe was also a likely strategic goal and investment in ties to 
Bosnia continue. The Iranian embassy in Sarajevo is the largest Iranian embassy in Europe 
and Iran has established numerous academic and charitable exchanges in Bosnia including 
the Persian-Bosnian College.115 While the strategic value for Iranian support to a 
community in Europe can be speculated, the case demonstrates that the campaign provided 
lessons for the QF that would be incorporated in campaigns down the road, and I discuss 
these in the second and third section of this case study. The low cost in testing the QF’s IW 
construct is itself, strategically valuable. 
1. Social-Political Situation 
a. The Balkans 
The breakup of Yugoslavia, beginning with the separation of Slovenia in 1991 
began a lengthy conflict between groups fighting for identity, nationalism, and 
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independence. Slovenia and Macedonia broke away and formed relatively peacefully, but 
Bosnia erupted into war and genocide. Cultural and religious divides fermented into all-
out war that threatened to tear Europe’s underbelly apart. The three main groups: Bosniaks, 
Croats, and Serbs are all ethnically the same and speak the same language. Differences 
between the groups stems from religion and culture. The breakup culminated in April 1992 
when Bosnia declared itself independent from Yugoslavia, which was to the dismay of the 
Bosnian Serb population. A civil war began between Serbs and government forces with 
various groups caught in the middle. These groups included a Muslim population, known 
as the Bosniaks, that accounted for an estimated 44% of the Bosnia-Herzegovina 
populace.116 Bosnian Serbs with greater weaponry and resources began to expel and 
commit atrocities against the non-Serbian population including Muslims. Bosnian Serbs 
sought to create their own country while forcing other ethnicities and religious sects to 
leave.117 The Bosnian government was not prepared, and the Serbs soon cut out their own 
country: the Serb Republic. Bosnian Serbs surrounded the capital of Sarajevo and 
eventually control up to 70% of the country.118 Prevalence of ethnic cleansing and other 
war crimes gained the West’s attention, resulting in NATO’s first ever offensive campaign, 
led by the United States. 
b. The United States and NATO 
The role the United States would assume as the World’s only superpower was in 
flux after the fall of the Soviet Union in December 1991. The proverbial boogeyman was 
defeated and what the future of NATO would look like was unknown. Bill Clinton assumed 
the U.S. presidency in 1992, advancing policies to reinvest in U.S. infrastructure over a 
grand military. However, his administration was also faced with various foreign policy 
issues. For example, military intervention in the name of humanitarianism in Somalia 
ended in a disaster, and North Korea was about to obtain a nuclear weapon. Additionally, 
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international terrorism began hitting the U.S. homeland for the first time in 1993 with the 
World Trade Center bombing. In 1992, the situation in the Balkans cascaded into a civil 
war in Bosnia that only grew more devastating in 1993. This crisis only added more foreign 
problem sets to the administration’s plate. The American people were witnessing images 
of Serbs killing scores of Muslims in Bosnia in the media every day. The American body 
politic wanted something done; however, the United Nations seemed incapable, and NATO 
did not appear ready to take the lead, at least from the U.S. point of view. 
After five months of British led negotiations with the parties involved in the 
Bosnian Civil War, beginning in September of 1992, President Clinton did not accept the 
Vance-Owen plan for peace in the Balkans and elected to intervene. The president saw 
more needed to be done to deter the Serbs and help the Muslims.119 The Clinton 
administration proceeded to sideline NATO allies in negotiations and embolden the three 
main actors in the Bosnian Civil War, the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims.120 The 
administration’s decision to intervene in yet another conflict led to more foreign dilemmas 
on the U.S. plate. As the war dragged on, President Clinton’s later decisions to turn a blind 
eye to Iran’s activities may be in part based on a sense that the United States wanted out to 
refocus on other foreign issues.  
c. Iran 
The early and mid-1990s were a time of reflection and experimentation for the 
Iranian government and the IRGC. The country was rebuilding after eight years of war 
with Iraq, the death of its founder in the summer of 1989, and continued isolation from 
most of the international world. Ayatollah Khamenei ascended to power, and President 
Rafsanjani effectively supported the new supreme leader in reconstruction efforts aimed at 
modernizing certain sectors and promotion of reliance of domestic industry.121 Included 
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in this period of reconstruction was also significant inclusion of the IRGC in economic 
opportunities. This inclusion helped cement the IRGC as a player in the internal and 
external politics of Iran.122 The IRGC now had significant interest in “coup proofing” the 
regime internally, while also examining new areas to enact its core tenant of spreading the 
revolution abroad. However, still rearing from its losses during the Iran-Iraq War and the 
looming fear of U.S. intervention, the IRGC needed a plan that did not draw discontent 
from an Iranian population still recovering. 
In the early 1990s, the IRGC saw an opportunity to create an Islamic revolution 
like that of its own in Bosnia. There was also an opportunity to gain influence over Saudi 
Arabia, its archrival, for support from a significant Muslim population in Europe’s 
underbelly.123 The Muslim president of the Bosnian government, Alija Izetbegovic, found 
no timely military support from Western powers to repel the well-armed Serbian forces. 
President Izetbegovic turned to Iran for support as Iran’s influence over him and his 
political party began many years before.  
Turning to Iran for assistance was easy because Izetbegovic and several of his 
political party’s core members were supporters of the Islamic Revolution and traveled to 
Iran in 1982 to attend anniversary celebrations.124 Izetbegovic wrote a political manifesto 
in 1970, titled the “Islamic Declaration.” This manifesto stated that Islamic and non-
Islamic institutions could not coincide in the interest of peace.125 His manifesto and 1982 
trip to Iran earned him and other Islamic activists a prison term in 1970 and 1983. Several 
of those interred with him would be in his inner circle when he became president.126 The 
political alignment with Iran’s goals enabled access and placement for Iranian agents and 
QF operatives as Iran sought to insert itself into the Bosnian conflict. 
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As the IRGC planned how its newly established QF branch could spread the 
revolution abroad in the post Iran-Iraq War era, it looked back at an earlier success story. 
In 1982, the QF’s predecessor, the Office for Liberation Movements, sent 1500 IRGC 
soldiers to establish a base of operations on the Lebanese border in Syria.127 IRGC Soldiers 
armed, trained, and indoctrinated disenfranchised Lebanese youth during a time of civil 
war and occupation by Israel. The IRGC did not have to fight, it could get the indigenous 
population to do that with enough support. This action would ultimately yield Hezbollah 
(The Party of God), who is arguably the IRGC’s greatest success story at exporting the 
revolution.128 In this model, the IRGC found a method for furthering Iran’s extraterritorial 
objectives. This method is mostly covert, cheaper, less risky for Iranian soldiers, and was 
less likely to receive criticism from the Iranian people, or retaliation from Western powers, 
than deployment of traditional combat forces. 
2. QF Operations 
Iran’s strategy in the Bosnian Civil War was to utilize the QF to arm, train, and 
support Muslim groups fighting Bosnian Serbs. They would also influence social and 
political institutions through establishing charitable foundations as cover for agents.129 It 
is unclear which agents were QF operatives and which fell under Iran’s foreign intelligence 
service, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), but they worked to the same 
goals. Others including Turkey and Saudi Arabia sought to support the Muslim struggle.130 
The majority of Bosnian Muslims were in fact Sunni. However, evidence suggests Iran 
outperformed both competitors, and saw the benefits of ignoring sectarianism in order to 
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further its goals.131 Open source reporting regarding Iran’s support to Muslim groups in 
the conflict began in late 1992, but its activities did not warrant an overt response from 
Western nations who were stuck in debate of how to solve the crisis. Iran was also 
supporting the same group NATO intervened on the behalf of, so there was little threat of 
a direct confrontation. 
Iranian operations conducted by the QF and MOIS were not limited to arming and 
training Islamic fighters. To gain access to political and social institutions, Iran utilized 
what is known as “soft power.” In using soft power techniques, narratives and perception 
are shaped through cooperation and incentive versus coercion. Iran established cultural, 
media, and religious establishments. Infiltrating these establishments enabled agents to 
further pro-Iranian narratives, move into positions that brought better intelligence 
gathering, and fronts for covert operations.132 Iran’s political influence went to the highest 
level as the CIA discovered President Izetbegovic was personally on Iran’s payroll.133 
Iranian operatives also utilized legitimate organizations as cover for moving into and 
through the Balkans. In an April 2019 interview with Iranian internet channel Aparat, 
retired IRGC general Saeed Qassemi stated that he used Iran’s Red Crescent Society 
uniform as part of his cover while training and supporting Bosnian Muslims during the 
civil war.134 It is unknown if Western intelligence knew of this cover at the time, but it is 
a clear violation of international law. Utilization of soft power mechanisms and cover for 
action through legitimate organizations like the Red Crescent proved useful for the QF, 
and no known impacts to their operations occurred until the 1995 Dayton Peace 
Agreement. 
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Other QF operations, however, tested the threshold for retaliation by the United 
States and NATO as Iran could be directly linked to arms smuggling and training jihadis. 
In September 1992, Croatian officials seized an Iranian Boeing 747 that was supposed to 
be delivering relief supplies into Bosnia. Upon inspection, 4,000 weapons, over a million 
rounds of ammunition, and 20–40 Iranians were discovered.135 By at least mid-1993, U.S. 
intelligence began to recognize the potential long-term threats posed by QF operations. A 
report by the CIA stated that “Over the long term, Bosnian Muslims, who are likely to be 
the biggest losers and to blame the West, may become the biggest threat [to U.S. Forces].” 
The report estimated that 150 IRGC personnel were operating in Bosnia, and that Iran 
backed Hezbollah was expected to have a terrorist cell established.136 In 1995, a CIA 
station chief’s identity was revealed by Bosnian intelligence to Iranian agents. He was 
evacuated before a reported assassination attempt could manifest.137 Despite, the bravado 
of some of these activities, little was done by the West to combat the QF’s efforts. 
3. Reaction to QF Operations 
Iran did not receive any significant pushback for its efforts in the Balkans because 
United States foreign policy supported the Muslim cause, there was little concern for 
terrorism spilling out of the Balkans, and United States led NATO wanted an end to the 
conflict. Atrocities were committed by all sides during the Bosnian civil war, but it was 
those committed by the Serbs who gained attention in the media. Concern for terrorist 
camps and violations of international law by Iranians was marginal compared to the scale 
of ethnic cleansing being reported.  
Support for the embattled Muslim community of Bosnia came from both the U.S. 
democratic administration and republicans alike. While some such as senate minority 
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leader Bob Dole favored direct intervention, President Clinton favored a policy of lifting 
the arms embargo and air strikes against the Serb military.138 NATO launched its air 
campaign in the summer of 1995 following the massacre of several thousand Bosnian 
Muslims near Srebrenica, Bosnia.139 This operation forced the Serbs into a resolution at 
the end of 1995. Assistance to President Izetbegovic, however, came much earlier when 
President Clinton reportedly decided to turn a blind eye to the arms shipments Iran was 
funneling into Bosnia. This decision was not voiced to the CIA and discounted its concern 
for the threat further Iranian influence would bring.140 This disconnect with the 
intelligence assessment was one of several. Supporting the Muslim struggle in Bosnia and 
enabling a cease fire was perceived by the administration as far outweighing the threat Iran 
posed. 
There appeared to be a sharp disconnect between the White House and State 
Department with the CIA over the threat Iran warranted.141 Two declassified reports from 
U.S. National Security Council meetings in September and December 1995 demonstrate 
the U.S. intelligence assessment that QF and MOIS operatives posed a threat to U.S. 
peacekeepers. Both reports also doubted President Izetbegovic would follow through with 
expulsion of all Iranian military members within 30 days of the Dayton Peace Agreement 
being signed.142 In the end, all President Izetbegovic was required to do to receive $100 
million in aid from the United States was expel 200 Iranians from Bosnia and fire his 
deputy defense minister, Hasan Cengic, who was thoroughly involved with Iranian 
intelligence.143 Upon fulfilling these two requirements, the United States and NATO gave 
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the appearance that they were satisfied with Izetbegovic owning up to the Dayton Peace 
Agreement. 
Although the appearance of abiding by the peace agreement was demonstrated, the 
QF were not done in Bosnia. In February 1996, NATO forces conducted a raid near 
Sarajevo where they detained 11 individuals with bomb materials, various weapons, and 
maps of peacekeeper bases. Three of the individuals were Iranian and one had a diplomatic 
passport. Iran did not deny the event and stated it would continue to support the struggle 
of Bosnian Muslims.144 NATO did not seek more than expulsion of the individuals 
because it did not want to upset the fragile peace that NATO forces were enforcing with 
success. Iranian forces demonstrated no further threats to NATO peacekeepers and Iranian 
agents appeared to return to a soft power strategy. 
4. Iran’s NSOs Advancement 
The QF’s campaign in the Balkans did not succeed in attaining gains in Iran’s four 
NSOs, but it did provide the organization with a framework for conducting IW without 
garnering retaliation. Several variables present should have acquired success. For example, 
the United States and NATO did not retaliate militarily, economically, or diplomatically 
against Iran significantly because QF and MOIS operations were not seen as threatening 
enough to warrant a response. The Clinton administration was faced with numerous foreign 
policy issues and its decision to not let NATO lead eventually lead to a “just get it done so 
we can move on” mentality. There were sharp disagreements between the Clinton 
administration and U.S. intelligence. Ignoring the Bosnian government’s relationship with 
Iran, including failing to expel all Iranian operatives, were acceptable as a cease fire was 
attained.  
These variables, however, did not contribute to supporting Iran’s NSOs given the 
appetite in Bosnia and other Balkan states for following Iran’s model. Despite its 
significant political influence over President Izetbegovic, investment in soft power 
projects, and lack of resistance from NATO, the QF’s campaign failed to plant Iranian 
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ideology in Bosnia. Between 1994 and 1996, Iran reportedly invested more than $200 
million in Bosnia.145 The Muslim population, although significant, was also only one of 
several in Bosnia, and no others showed support for Iran. The fact that NATO peacekeepers 
had to remain for over 10 years demonstrates the strong ethnic divides in the country. There 
is evidence that Iran followed a purely soft power strategy soon after in Albania, mimicking 
techniques used in Bosnia, but little gains from this venture are apparent.146 Iran cannot 
compete with Western powers when it comes to the ability to wield economic and 
diplomatic influence when the target audience does not align ideologically with Iran. 
However, the one concern Iran’s efforts in the Balkans presents is the potential for 
activating cells in Europe’s underbelly.147 Borders between so many nations remain 
porous and represent a point to starburst terrorist activities across Europe given Iran’s 
political presence in Sarajevo alone.148 The QF’s campaign in the Balkan’s may not have 
succeeded outright, but it has the potential to be simply dormant, waiting for reactivation 
to meet Iranian objectives in Europe. 
B. THE U.S. OCCUPATION OF IRAQ, 2003–2011 
Quds Force operations countering the U.S. occupation and stabilization of Iraq is a 
key example of overstepping victory. Iran’s intervention in the U.S. led Operation IRAQI 
FREEDOM led to significant gains in all four of Iran’s NSOs. The overthrow of Saddam 
Hussein in 2003 presented Iran with an opportunity to expand its influence in Iraq and turn 
its former adversary into a partner.149 The United States removed Iran’s top rival in the 
Middle East for Iran and opened greater access to the Shia holy cities of Najaf and 
Karbala.150 The U.S. military’s lack of preparation for combating insurgencies allowed the 
QF to devastate the American will to continue. However, the overreach of QF activities in 
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Iraq following the U.S. withdrawal in 2011 ultimately reversed many of Iran’s gains and 
contributed to the rise of ISIS.  
1. Social-Political Situation 
a. Iraq 
Prior to the 2003 invasion, Iraq was an ostensibly secular country united under a 
brutal dictatorship bent on survival above all else. The country was and is mostly Arab, 
with a large Kurdish population. The majority followed the Islamic faith and religious 
rivalries were somewhat controlled under the finger of the oppressive Baathist regime.151 
The regime violently quelled any reformers or dissenters. After the Iran-Iraq War, both 
Arab Shiites in the south and Kurds in the north conducted an unsuccessful rebellion 
against Saddam Hussein’s Baathist party. They were violently subdued and marginalized 
from any political power.152 After Saddam’s regime was toppled in 2003 and the Iraqi 
army was dismantled, the secular grudges proved disastrous for the U.S. led coalition. As 
time passed, sectarian actions such as the Al-Qaeda attack on the Shia shrine in Samarra in 
2006 exacerbated the violence. Shia and Sunni groups attacked each other in the name of 
justice, and coalition forces were caught in the crossfire. They soon became the targets 
when there was no domestic force to control the chaos and provide relief. However, the 
Iranians effectively exploited these grudges, particularly those of the marginalized Shia, to 
subvert stabilization of the country’s military and political redesign. 
b. The United States 
The decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein with no plan for establishing an 
effective and friendly government post conflict is a clear mistake of the Bush 
administration. The United States’ reasoning behind the invasion reflects American 
sentiment in the post 9/11 era. According to the U.S. State Department following the 
overthrow of Saddam, the goal in Iraq was to “[defeat] a regime that developed and used 
 




weapons of mass destruction, that harbored and supported terrorists, committed outrageous 
human rights abuses, and defied the just demands of the United Nations and the world.”153 
The Bush administration began seeking coercion against Iraq via the United Nations in 
2002 for the reasons the State Department gave, but there were more reasons. These 
included perceived success in Afghanistan, a bipartisan congress motivated by constituents 
wanting to see justice brought to terrorists, a sense that the Middle East would accept 
democracy, and the fact that Saddam would always be able to fund trouble in the Middle 
East with Iraq’s oil reserves.154 Many factors contributed to the approval for the U.S. 
invasion, but the decision making and support that went behind the approval both from 
Congress and the American body politic was short sighted.  
The American people expected a short decisive war with minimal casualties; it did 
not go as planned. By the end of 2006 it became apparent that the war was going poorly 
and popular support was withering. Attacks on U.S. forces in October 2006 doubled over 
10 months to an average of 180 per day.155 U.S. Soldiers were being targeted by both 
Sunni and Shia insurgents, while also being caught in the middle between both groups 
fighting each other.156 The Iraqi Army, touted by the administration as being the ones who 
would be ready to take over security were performing poorly. The 2006 Iraq Study Group 
Report called into concern everything from ethnic loyalties, refusals to carry out missions, 
low readiness rates, and an inability to sustain themselves.157 The disenchantment between 
the Bush administration and the body politic resulted in the republicans losing control of 
the Senate and House of Representatives.158 The loss of faith in the Iraq strategy continued 
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to have political ramifications and was exacerbated by other crises including the 2008 U.S. 
housing crisis. Barack Obama ran on a promise to end the war in Iraq in 2008 and saw his 
promise fulfilled in 2011. His decision to withdraw all forces in 2011 as purely political is 
debatable.159 What is not debated, however, is that the majority wanted out as they had 
lost faith in the outcome that President Bush touted in 2003. Over 4,000 Americans were 
dead, and the world’s strongest military was leaving. The termination of the American 
experiment in nation building came about in large part from QF operations exploiting 
political fissures and U.S. Military unpreparedness.  
c. Iran 
The years leading up to the 9/11 terror attacks and the invasion of Iraq included the 
emergence of liberalism and conservative efforts to quash it in Iran.160 Mohammad 
Khatami won the Iranian presidency in 1997 with a staggering 70 percent of the vote, 
alarming Ayatollah Khamenei, the IRGC, and other conservatives.161 President Khatami 
sought to make reforms but was rebuffed at almost every turn by conservatives, claiming 
his policies sought to weaken Iran in the interest of its enemies.162 In July 1999, the conflict 
between the reformist and conservative movements boiled over. 
In 1999, Iran experienced its first significant upheaval since the 1979 revolution 
when the reformist newspaper Salam was shutdown. The newspaper published an article 
concerning a conservative conspiracy bent on stopping Khatami’s reforms. For five days, 
thousands of protestors clashed with the Basij and other pro-government organizations.163 
The uprising was subdued and led to the IRGC asserting more control in the 
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government.164 The event frightened the conservative hardliners in Iran, and the regime 
could not allow a movement to form that could lead to a second revolution.  
The conservatives’ control over Iran was reestablished in the mid-2000s, thanks in 
part to tense relations with the United States. In January 2002, despite intelligence sharing 
with the United States regarding Al-Qaeda, President Bush labeled Iran a member of the 
“axis of evil.” Iranian conservatives found in this policy their so-called evidence to show 
that liberalism was a U.S. tool to overthrow the regime. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 only 
further aided the conservative argument. Additionally, the Bush administrations rejection 
of Khatami’s resolution to prevent conflict over the discovery of Iran’s nuclear program 
further damaged Khatami’s standing.165 U.S. aggression enabled conservatives to reassert 
power and setup ultra conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for the 2005 presidential 
election.166 The conservative control of Iran enabled the IRGC to enact its campaign 
against the United States led coalition in Iraq. President Bush failed to recognize the 
damaging effects of forgoing diplomacy in the interest of firing up domestic support with 
saber rattling. 
Iran’s intervention in Iraq was designed as a covert operation that could maintain 
plausible deniability with the domestic population and the international world. 
Conventional soldiers were not deployed, and QF operations inside Iraq were not openly 
publicized. This deniability and use of only SOF kept any public casualty figures low. The 
political fallout of the 2006 U.S. elections and wide debate regarding the 2007 surge in Iraq 
pointed to a U.S. population sick of the war and in no mood to accept escalation. QF 
military and political operations could continue unimpeded because the Iranian population 
was unaffected and the Iranian regime had every reason to believe the American people 
would not accept another war as long as the homeland was safe.  
In 2009 the U.S. had an opportunity to bridge build with Iran, but instead U.S. 
policies continued to enable the conservative narrative. Amid reports of election fraud, 
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Iranian President Ahmadinejad, was reelected in 2009.167 The opposition formed into “the 
Green Movement.” The movement did not accept the election results and clashed with the 
IRGC and Basij in the streets all over Iran.168 However, U.S. policies advocating support 
to the Green Movement were once again used by hardliners to demonstrate a Western 
conspiracy to overthrow the regime. Support to an anti-regime movement as opposed to 
pushing for cooperation between nations soured relations.169 QF and MOIS operations in 
Iraq continued as the regime could still point to the prospect of a Western conspiracy, and 
President Obama promised the American people to withdraw. 
2. QF Operations 
The QF campaign to subvert U.S. efforts in Iraq included military, cultural, and 
political mechanisms.170 Iran built its strategy for Iraq in recognition that it had cultural 
advantages with the Iraqi Shia and admittance that it was at a gross asymmetric 
disadvantage with the U.S. Military. Preparation for the campaign began post September 
11, 2001, when Iran and its proxies recognized the likelihood of the United States invading 
or forcing a regime change in Iraq. A 2002 Iraqi report indicates that Iranian agents were 
working with at least one of its proxies, the Badr Brigade, to form “open” and “secret” 
groups to operate inside Iraq post-U.S. intervention.171 The QF’s links to Shia groups and 
a porous border with which to move supplies across proved deadly for coalition forces 
attempting to stabilize Iraq post-defeat of Saddam’s regime. 
In order to conduct counter coalition operations militarily, the QF utilized several 
Shia groups who were in Iraq before the 2003 invasion, or infiltrated the open border soon 
after. These groups included the Badr Brigade, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), 
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Dawa, and those under the leadership of Shia cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr.172 These groups 
engaged in attacks on coalition and Iraqi security forces, while also infiltrating Iraqi 
security forces and government positions.173 The Badr Brigade successfully infiltrated the 
ranks of the Iraqi Ministry of Intelligence, army, and special forces units enabling 
intelligence collection to be passed to the QF and other Shia groups.174 Actions by these 
groups could be linked to Iran as the conflict grew, but political unwillingness to attack 
Iranians directly and chaos inside Iraq kept coalition forces occupied. 
The QF primarily supplied, trained and guided these forces in an effort to promote 
instability, inflict U.S. casualties, and increase control over the Shia population. By using 
proxies and remaining in the shadows, Iran could maintain a level of plausible 
deniability.175 At first, Iran primarily funneled weapons including improvised explosive 
devices (IED) and evolved them concurrent with coalition efforts to defeat them. This 
included explosively formed penetrators (EFP), and improvised rocket-assisted munitions 
(IRAM). These weapons proved difficult to defeat, and killed hundreds of U.S. 
servicemembers.176 By 2005, the coalition had intelligence linking Iran to the chaos, but 
how to target QF operations could not be agreed upon. By 2006, Iranian involvement 
became more pronounced as Iraq showed little signs of stabilizing. The QF ramped up 
activities for two likely reasons: The Iranian regime believed Iran was no longer a feasible 
target for U.S. invasion, and to undermine U.S. efforts to ensure power was shared with 
Iraqi Sunnis in the new government.177 Intelligence efforts aimed at targeting Iranian 
influence began to grow as QF involvement became readily apparent. 
While orchestrating proxies from the shadows was the QF’s preferred method, in 
several instances QF operatives were directly linked to operations. Graves found following 
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the coalition offensive in Najaf in 2004 were marked with glass jars. Inside the jars were 
names of the dead and their addresses, many with Tehran, the Iranian capital.178 In 2006, 
two senior QF officers were captured during a raid in Basra, Iraq.179 A Hezbollah 
commander captured in Basra, Iraq in March 2007 discussed QF involvement in a high-
profile raid resulting in five U.S. soldier deaths.180 In January 2007, QF operatives 
participated in or provided direct support to the raid. The assault force used forged identity 
cards, U.S. uniforms, and vehicles typically used by U.S. forces to gain entry to a U.S. 
base. The assault force ambushed a group of Americans, killing one at the scene, and 
capturing four. The four were later found dead and left on the side of a road.181 This raid 
was believed to have been in response to coalition special operations unit Task Force-17’s 
capture of five QF officers in Erbil a week prior.182 QF Commander Qassem Soleimani 
sent a personal message to U.S. General David Petraeus, stating that he was in control of 
Iran’s extraterritorial policies. He then followed up with publicized visits to Shia groups 
fighting in Iraq.183 Despite intelligence implicating Iran in numerous attacks, the coalition 
did not do more than utilize Task Force 17 to target proxy leadership. These efforts, 
however, fell flat because of the QF’s hold on Iraqi politicians controlling the judicial 
system.184 In Iraq, the QF were impeded minimally, and could operate more openly as the 
war dragged on. 
Although Iran’s proxy groups shared a Shia ideology and worked towards the same 
goals, operations were not without contention. Muqtada Al-Sadr did not always agree with 
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guidance from Iran, and the main Sadrist group, Jaysh Al-Mahdi, sometimes acted 
unilaterally.185 There existed a division between the authority of Iranian ideology and the 
guidance of prominent Shia clerics such as Ayatollah Ali Sistani. Ayatollah Sistani 
vehemently disagrees with the Velayat i Faqih (principle of the jurist), which is the 
foundation of Iran’s government.186 In 2008, Jaysh Al-Mahdi took on U.S. and Iraqi forces 
alone at the battle of Basra, suffering such a significant defeat that Muqtada Al-Sadr took 
up a more political approach afterwards.187 The group also clashed with other Iranian 
proxies including the ISCI. All of the groups, however, were reliant on Iran for continued 
support and the QF stepped in when required to do so. In response to a series of 2007 Shia-
Shia killings using EFPs in Karbala, the QF narrowed its support for groups receiving 
EFPs, denying them to those who used them for other goals.188 The QF commander, 
Qassem Soleimani, demonstrated his influence over the groups when he negotiated cease 
fires between Jaysh Al-Mahdi and the ISCI in 2007.189 The QF, in its advisory and support 
role was able to keep the groups in check enough to maintain a sufficiently cohesive effort.  
The QF’s cultural efforts were equally as important as the military aspect of the 
strategy to subvert the coalition and gain control over Iraq. Iran played upon the 
subjugation of Shia under Saddam’s rule, stoking calls to arms against Sunnis and the 
coalition. Al-Qaeda’s bombing of the Imam Ali Mosque led to several Shia groups taking 
up arms against Sunnis and leading to widespread sectarian violence.190 As sectarian 
conflict spread, sowing more chaos for the coalition, Iran then assured that the new military 
and government became Shia dominated.  
The QF began inserting agents into the Iraqi government immediately following 
the establishment of a transitional government. Two of the Iranian ambassadors, post 2003, 
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Hassan Kazemi-Qomi and Hassan Danaifar were both QF members, and from their 
positions, were able to wield diplomatic influence.191 In 2005 and 2009, Iran reportedly 
influenced political elections through funding and advisement.192 Iran inserted a Dawa 
Party member, Nouri Al-Maliki into the position of Iraqi prime minister and this action 
paid dividends for the QF’s campaign. 
The QF effectively controlled the government of Iraq by assuring its puppet was 
placed at the head of the government and that Shias dominated the legislature. Factions 
between the Shia members of parliament still existed, but Iran wielded sufficient influence. 
Qassem Soleimani reportedly orchestrated Nouri Al-Maliki’s attainment of Iraq’s first 
prime minister, and Maliki demonstrated clear alignment with Iranian goals in that 
position.193 The June 2009 U.S.-Iraq security agreement forbade unilateral U.S. action in 
Iraqi cities. Maliki further curtailed counter QF operations by having a veto power on Iraq’s 
counterterrorism command, effectively ending U.S. special operations raids. Concurrently, 
Shia proxy leaders under Iraqi custody were released in greater numbers.194 Maliki further 
demonstrated the level of influence held over him by the QF when he allowed senior 
operative Mustafa Al-Sheibani to return to Iraq, ignoring a warrant against him for leading 
an IED smuggling ring.195 The QF’s political hold over Iraq and its increase in violent 
activities after 2005 demonstrated an exceptional level of Iranian influence. The U.S. led 
coalition developed some options, but political will was falling fast. 
3. Reaction to QF Operations 
A series of blunders after the Iraqi regime was toppled sowed the seeds of mistrust 
between the American people, military leadership, and the administration. This series of 
missteps withered support for the war, weakened the U.S. military’s ability to respond to 
other threats, and enabled Iranian exploitation. President Bush declared an end to major 
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combat operations on May 1, 2003. The Iraqi military was disbanded later that month under 
the auspice that a fresh start was what the military needed and that the situation was stable. 
However, combat was far from over as the violence did not subside and instead morphed 
into an organized resistance. The country erupted throughout 2004 and 2005 with events 
such as the Abu Gharib Prison scandal, the battle of Fallujah, and violence surrounding the 
2005 Iraqi elections.196 By mid 2006 it was clear that the war was far from over and that 
the strategy was failing. 
The realities of the Iraq War took its toll on the U.S. military and political system 
in 2006. President Bush’s republican administration lost the House of Representatives and 
the Senate. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was forced to resign as the president believed 
the political fallout was due to the war, stating: “many Americans voted last night to 
register their displeasure with the lack of progress [in Iraq].”197 The election ended six 
years of a republican dominated U.S. government.198 Frustration with the situation led to 
a rift between leadership as a new strategy was formulated. The National Security Council, 
General’s Raymond Odierno, and David Petraeus argued for an approach that required 5 
to 10 additional brigades to secure Iraq.199 The joint chiefs of staff, the State Department, 
and the Central Command (CENTCOM) commander did not agree.200 The CENTCOM 
commander, Admiral William Fallon, was concerned that a surge of forces to Iraq would 
leave the military incapable of meeting other threats outside Iraq including Iran.201 
Numerous democrats opposed the surge including future U.S. President Barack Obama.202 
The stark divides caused by the 2006 U.S. elections led to the surge being an “all in” 
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strategy. The administration needed the war to end, the American people were 
disenchanted, the military was overstretched, and the democrats found in the continuing 
conflict a rallying point as they prepared for the 2008 presidential election.  
The surge was approved and in 2007 thousands more U.S. Soldiers flooded into 
Iraq to defeat Sunni Al-Qaeda and the Shia militia groups. Militarily successful, the 
campaign secured Iraqi territory and some groups were decisively defeated.203 Defeat on 
the battlefield, however, did not dismantle any of the QF’s proxies. Instead, several adopted 
new strategies including Moqtada Al-Sadr adopting a political approach. The political 
approach worked as Prime Minister Maliki reached out to reconcile with Sadr’s groups 
including Jaysh Al-Mahdi, without any consultation with U.S. diplomats or 
commanders.204  
In late 2007, some U.S. Senators sought to grant President Bush additional 
authorities to combat Iranian forces inside Iraq with amendment 3017 to the 2008 National 
Defense Authorization Act. Designated as the “Lieberman-Kyl amendment,” the 
amendment’s purpose was “to express the sense of the Senate regarding Iran.”205 The 
amendment sighted testimony from several reports and testimony regarding Iran’s efforts 
to destabilize Iraq and target U.S. soldiers. Paragraphs three and four essentially authorized 
expansion of counter-Iran efforts with paragraph three stating: “it should be the policy of 
the United States to combat, contain, and roll back the violent activities and destabilizing 
influence inside Iraq of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, its foreign 
facilitators such as Lebanese Hezbollah, and its indigenous Iraqi proxies.”206 Paragraph 
four called for the “prudent and calibrated use of all instruments of U.S. national 
power.”207 These aspects of the amendment were met with sharp criticism from democrats 
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and paragraphs three and four were ultimately cut. Instead, the senate provided the 
president with a non-binding resolution that supported declaring the IRGC a terrorist 
organization.208 With the democrats controlling both congressional houses and the 2008 
election year looming, there was little motivation to allow escalation with Iran. The QF 
remained unimpeded. 
In addition to the surge, the coalition utilized SOF to target QF support and mission 
command networks. While successful tactically, these operations typically fell flat because 
Iranian political influence led to the release of captured individuals and ignored coalition 
evidence. The U.S. Army in the Iraq War recounts the circumstances surrounding one of 
these operations: coalition special operations conducted a raid in December 2006 on a 
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) compound. They captured the 
intended target Mohsen Chizari, head of the QF operations department. Evidence from the 
raid clearly pointed to Badr and SCIRI involvement with the QF. This came to the shock 
of President Bush as the SCIRI leader, Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim, was a guest of the White 
House earlier in December. The evidence clearly pointed to QF intentions in Iraq, but 
Prime Minister Maliki released the prisoners with Iranian ties.209 Without the ability to 
waive diplomatic power over Maliki’s Shia dominated government, U.S. efforts yielded no 
lasting results against QF operations. 
Iran recognized effects of the 2006 elections on the U.S. political leadership, the 
repercussions it had concerning the U.S. military’s constrained capacity to escalate in the 
region, and the will of the American people to accept the costs. The Iranian regime, 
recognizing the American lack of will to confront it directly, increased its destabilizing 
efforts. Every U.S. strategy was thwarted as the QF maintained plausible deniability and 
was backed up by a puppet government. Without correcting the political issues, the U.S. 
strategy had no hope of succeeding. 
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According to the 2019 study, The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, the U.S. never 
developed a coherent strategy to deal with Iranian destabilization. The U.S. government 
seemed to think from the beginning, that regional actors would not react to the overthrow 
of Saddam Hussein. Once it realized the fallacy, it could only come up with tactical and 
operational level responses, ignoring the need for strategic action unified between military 
and politics.210 The Iranian strategy worked because it made sure its strategy 
complimented military and political mechanisms so that it could subvert the U.S. led 
coalition despite its asymmetric disadvantage.  
4. Iran’s NSOs Advancement 
Iran’s use of the QF during the U.S. occupation of Iraq resulted in Iran advancing 
all four of its NSOs at an acceptable cost. Domestic control was assured as the QF 
campaign incurred no significant costs or protests from the Iranian people. U.S. rhetoric 
from 2002–2008 was vehemently anti-Iran, so the regime could always point to the 
proverbial boogeyman in Iraq waiting to strike Iran as justification. Iran’s regional 
influence increased as it turned an enemy into an ally. The QFs placement of political 
officials including Prime Minister Maliki, and Shia dominated parliament ensured it had a 
grip on the future of Iraq’s policies. Iran also had a bridge now to its Syrian ally, and to its 
archrival, Saudi Arabia. Although Iran does not disclose complete economic figures, 
several statistics demonstrate the gains from opening trade with Iraq. From 2003–2007, 
trade between Iran-Iraq grew 30 percent each year.211 Iranian statistics show that between 
2013–2014 trade amounted to $6 billion, mostly involving exports to Iraq.212 Iran also 
supplies 5–10 percent of Iraq’s electricity, and uses Iraq for unloading cheap, subsidized 
products.213 The QF’s campaign defeated the U.S. military in Iraq and removed those 
forces from the Middle East. The campaign demonstrated that the QF was an effective 
military and political mechanism to avoid red lines. QF activities killed hundreds of U.S. 
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service members and coalition soldiers, while receiving no significant retaliation. The QF 
could do so because of plausible deniability, control of the political-judicial system, and 
the unwillingness of the United States to decisively engage after the 2006 elections.  
The continuation of the campaign to gain further control of Iraq, however, is an 
example of overreaching leading to reversing gains. Iran’s continued subversion of the 
Sunni to ensure Shia dominance disrupted the military and created resentment that allowed 
ISIS ideology to grow. Marginalization of Sunnis in the government and advancement of 
less qualified Shia military officials contributed to the near collapse of Iraq. The 
dislodgement of the Iraqi military from cities like Mosul, and its encroachment on Baghdad 
brought the U.S. military back in force to save Iraq, in addition to incurring economic, and 
influence costs. I further analyze the consequences of Iran’s overreach in a separate case 
study. 
C. THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR, 2011–2020 
Iran’s intervention in the Syrian Civil War demonstrates the capabilities and 
limitations of the IRGC’s expeditionary force. QF participation in the effort to save the 
Syrian regime began as a small package but eventually grew to include tens of thousands 
of regular and irregular soldiers, as well as the assistance of Russia to defeat the enemies 
of the regime. Currently, the QF’s campaign in Syria along with the intervention of Russia 
has succeeded in preserving President Bashar Al-Assad’s regime. The campaign has 
increased Iran’s regional influence through power projection in Israel’s back yard and soft 
power mechanisms. However, the campaign has not made gains in Iran’s other three NSOs. 
The conflict has been costly in blood and treasure. In addition to revealing the limitations 
of the QF expeditionary capabilities when met by a well-armed and determined resistance, 
this case demonstrates unprecedented reactions by the Israelis to stop the QF from 
establishing permanent bases in Syria, as well as the impact on the Iranian homeland when 
hundreds of soldier body bags begin returning home.   
1. Social-Political Situation 
The Syrian Civil War can be likened to a wrestling “royal rumble,” where there are 
multiple participants; everyone seems to be fighting everyone; and alliances can shift 
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rapidly. Approximately 10 resistance or terrorist groups, depending upon one’s 
perspective, are fighting for territory or to overthrow the regime. An equal number of 
external actors provide support to assist or defeat the regime. The United States has been 
involved in the civil war since 2015, but its operations have entirely been directed towards 
defeating the Islamic State. It has not taken steps militarily against the Syria regime, save 
a 2017 and 2018 cruise missile strike on Syrian military infrastructure in response to the 
regime’s use of chemical weapons. Surveying all parties involved in the conflict would 
unnecessarily go beyond the scope of this thesis. This case study examines the primary 
internal and external actors with whom the QF have supported or fought against in pursuit 
of Iran’s NSOs during this war. 
a. The Syrian Government 
From the beginning of the Arab Spring inspired uprisings in Syria, the Syrian 
regime believed that democratic reforms would lead to the regime’s dismemberment, and 
possibly punishment.214 The Syrian population in 2011 was comprised of Shia, Alawite, 
Christian, and Kurdish minorities with Sunnis accounting for 60 percent.215 The current 
regime traces its lineage to 1963 when the Ba’ath Party executed a coup. The Alawite 
minority has received the majority of governmental and military benefits since.216 When 
the uprisings began, it was the disenfranchised Sunnis whom the regime subjugated for 
decades, that filled the streets to call for reforms. Joseph Holliday points out, that the 
regime saw the calls for reform as an effort to remove and punish the Ba’ath party and 
Alawite minority for past injustices. The ruling party was fearful of what would happen, 
so it adopted the strategy President Assad’s father had to resistance in the 1980s: 
brutality.217 The regime failed to recognize the effects its strategy would have on the 
domestic population; its military ranks, which included a Sunni majority in its conscripts; 
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and international opinion. It believed brutality was the only answer to prevent regime 
change. 
The Syrian regime’s strategy to quell any uprisings, peaceful or violent, was to 
surround, cut off, and then clear through the affected city with military forces.218 These 
operations, however, only made the resistance more hardened as social media and news 
outlets demonstrated the death and devastation. President Assad’s father’s use of these 
tactics, along with bombarding cities such as Hama to obliteration in 1982, were no longer 
useful as the population and world could readily view what was happening. The Sunni 
dominated conscript ranks began to desert, and opposition groups formed. Author Kim 
Ghattas surmised that the Syrian resistance movement was in a race against radicalization 
and militarization in the first year of conflict. In the international world’s reluctance to stop 
the Syrian regime’s actions, it allowed the rebellion to splinter and become more 
violent.219 The Syrian regime found itself facing numerous opposition factions alongside 
terrorists, both of whom were beginning to enjoy external support. But it has survived. It 
has survived due to the actions of Russia and Iran, two nations who have vested interests 
in keeping President Assad in power. President Assad continues to rule in 2020 despite 
enormous political and irregular military forces pitted against him. 
b. Syrian Resistance and Terrorist Groups 
Internal opposition to the Syrian government encompasses hundreds of groups 
whose activities range from peaceful to terrorist. Ultimately it is a lack of unity between 
the groups that has aided the regime and its allies in its efforts to quash the resistance 
throughout Syria. As research analyst, Joseph Holliday, points out in his analysis of the 
conflict’s first year: “the resistance has not been able to hold terrain from which it can 
operate and organize, unlike Libya’s rebels, who enjoyed a liberated Benghazi in which to 
organize. In addition, Syria’s armed resistance has been made up of only small units of 
deserters and local insurgents.”220 This issue of organization has not been corrected over 
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the past nine years of conflict. Problems for the opposition are further aggravated by 
competing external actors who support them and terrorist organizations that operate 
throughout Syria with their own agenda. 
March 2011 saw the first clashes between protestors and Syrian government forces 
in the province of Dara, and this event became the genesis of the armed resistance 
movement in Syria.221 Joseph Holliday’s report on the first year of the conflict 
demonstrates that the regime’s methodology for ending the uprising was to surround, 
cutoff, and then clear through areas where protests erupted. The violent, militarist-oriented 
method only intensified protests and led many Syrian soldiers to desert with their 
equipment.222 The first armed rebellion against the regime occurred in the province of 
Idlib in June 2011.223 As of 2020, Idlib is the last territory in Syria still held by opposition 
forces. Idlib has remained outside of the regime’s control because it has mountainous 
terrain bordering Turkey where external actors can smuggle personnel and equipment, and 
it has a Sunni dominant population.  
The primary moderate resistance movement combating the Syrian regime militarily 
is the Syrian National Army (SNA); known up until 2019 as the Free Syrian Army (FSA). 
In 2013, it was estimated that there were over 1000 opposition groups in Syria.224 The 
SNA, is widely seen as the most legitimate and has received the most external support. 
What is now the SNA, began in August 2011, when former Syrian Army officer, Colonel 
Riad Al-Assad established a headquarters in Turkey from which to organize and control 
moderate opposition groups fighting the Syrian regime.225 However, the organization has 
demonstrated a lack of control over the various groups fighting in Syria under its banner 
and has been criticized as being more of a media outlet and conduit for foreign support to 
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groups fighting the regime in Syria.226 In 2015 and 2016, a U.S. led coalition sought to 
pull those forces from the organization that would combat ISIS in Syria instead of the 
Syrian regime under a train and equip program. This program failed to make any gains 
until U.S. and Turkish special operations entered northern Syria. The United States 
eventually turned away from direct support to the SNA to support the Kurds fight against 
ISIS. At this point, the SNA arguably became a proxy of Turkey alongside other groups. 
In Engin Yuksel’s study of Turkey’s use of proxies in Syria, he found that Turkey 
was able to bring several groups under its control, albeit not total, to meet Turkish 
intentions in North Western Syria.227 In 2016, Turkey admitted to its support of Islamist 
opposition groups Ahrar Al-Sham and Faylaq Al-Sham in Syria.228 These groups were 
effective forces, but their ideology did not match with the groups under the SNA. Yuksel’s 
study demonstrates that Turkey developed the National Liberation Front (NLF) in 2018 to 
bridge gaps between the moderate and Islamist groups it supported. Some SNA groups 
joined the NLF, and the two collaborated. Turkey eventually influenced the groups to 
merge and effectively created a significant force in the Idlib province that would combat 
the regime, Salafi jihadists, and Kurdish groups.229 The SNA and NLF officially united 
under the political arm of the resistance, the Syrian Interim Government, on October 4, 
2018.230 This design may have worked for Turkey but, ultimately, it has not helped the 
Syrian opposition to obtain regime change. The Syrian regime and its allies continue to 
fight these groups in Idlib Province.  
In addition to Turkey, resistance and terrorist groups fighting the Syrian regime and 
its supporters receive assistance from several Arab nations including Saudi Arabia and 
 
226 BBC. 
227 Engin Yuksel, Strategies of Turkish Proxy Warfare in Northern Syria: Back With a Vengeance 
(Netherlands: Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael,” 2019), 20, 
https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2019-11/strategies-turkish-proxy-warfare-in-northern-
syria.pdf. 
228 Yuksel, 9. 
229 Yuksel, 9–10. 
230 Dilara Hamit and Erogan Cagtay Zontur, “Free Syrian Army Transforms Into Syrian National 
Army,” Anadolu Agency, September 10, 2019, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/free-syrian-army-
transforms-into-syrian-national-army/1607384. 
66 
Qatar.231 It may seem counterintuitive for these nations to support resistance movements 
that seek to overthrow an Arab authoritarian in their region, but as Curtis Ryan argued in 
2012, the threat of an increased Iranian influence is a threat that regional powers cannot 
ignore.232 Ryan points out that this feeling was demonstrated before Iran came to save the 
regime, in 2006, when Hezbollah and Israel went to war. No Arab nations came to 
physically or verbally defend Hezbollah, likely for sectarian reasons.233 These nations saw 
some of the groups fighting to topple Assad’s regime as a method to remove Iranian 
influence from Syria without committing regular military forces. However, misaligned 
goals and improper handling contributed to a non-unified campaign and infighting between 
groups. 
When the Arab Spring occurred, two Middle East alliances formed to ensure their 
own interests were protected in the aftermath: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), and Israel on one side, and Turkey and Qatar on the other.234 Professor As’ad 
AbuKhalil points out that the two alliances could not work synchronously. The Saudi-
UAE-Israel alliance wanted to maintain a status quo in the Middle East, while the Turkey-
Qatar alliance supported groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood gaining power in the 
aftermath of the uprisings.235 When the Syrian regime did not fall apart in 2011, the Saudis, 
Turks, and Qataris began to arm groups that they believed could reach that nation’s desired 
end state in Syria. There was an attempt to form an opposition council to negotiate 
settlements to the fighting, but Professor AbuKhalil notes that there were sharp disconnects 
existed between the opposition fighting in Syria, and the opposition working to a peaceful 
solution elsewhere. The council’s loyalty was also divided between the Saudis or 
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Qataris.236 In 2014, a Saudi and Qatari rivalry spilled over during attempts to negotiate a 
peaceful resolution between the Syrian opposition and the Syrian regime.237 This divide 
resulted in no unity of effort between opposition groups in Syria and has benefited the 
Syrian regime. Finding themselves unable to form a unified front, often violently infighting 
and combating terrorist groups like ISIS, the Syrian opposition never stood a chance once 
Russia and Iran came to the aid of President Assad.  
The position of the Syrian opposition is further damaged by the prevalence of 
terrorist groups, such as Jabhat Al-Nusra, and ISIS seeking to carve out their own parts of 
Syria. In the summer of 2011, Assad released imprisoned jihadis alongside activists in a 
move meant to demonstrate mercy in the public eye but also sow chaos into the 
uprisings.238 In 2012, a Sunni organization named Jabhat Al-Nusra formed with the intent 
to overthrow the Assad regime with violence. The group follows strict Islamic governance, 
and violently quashes dissent and opposition.239 In the spring of 2013, Al-Nusra seized the 
Syrian city of Raqqah. After this, it became clear that the group was vehemently at odds 
with moderate opposition groups like the FSA and openly fought them.240 The hope for a 
moderate opposition to unite and defeat the regime dwindled as groups with increasingly 
extremist views and goals formed, intent on fulfilling their own agendas in the chaos of 
Syria.  
Al-Nusra’s early actions set the stage for the emergence of ISIS, which further 
complicated the situation in Syria. In the spring of 2013, the ISIS leader, Abu Bakr Al-
Baghdadi purportedly left Iraq to begin establishment of the ISIS caliphate in Syria.241 Al-
Nusra formally split from ISIS in August 2013, and they have since been competing for 
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the same territory and recruitment base.242 In January 2014, ISIS, having established a 
secure foothold in Raqqah, declared it the capital of the Islamic caliphate. What followed 
were sweeping ISIS offensives to annex as much territory as possible in Syria and Iraq. 
ISIS fights any who do not completely align with their ideology, including all Syrian 
opposition groups. ISIS pulled tens of thousands of Sunnis into the caliphate that might 
have been part of moderate opposition groups. This benefited the regime as ISIS soon 
attracted the attention of the United States and ultimately ended up fighting every nation 
and group present in Syria and Iraq. The physical ISIS caliphate was destroyed in the 
summer of 2019 by a U.S. led coalition that supported the Kurds; although cells are still 
active throughout the Middle East. The devastation ISIS caused to the future of Iraq and 
Syria will be felt for generations. 
The Syrian opposition to Bashar Al-Assad’s government may have been successful 
had it been able to form a unified military and political front. It was doomed from the start 
when competing external actors, such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, vied for 
influence and control. The opposition’s efforts were further decremented by the emergence 
of several terrorist groups like ISIS who pulled Syrians into the organization and fought 
everyone else in Syria and Iraq. The lack of unity ultimately benefited the regime and the 
efforts of Russia and Iran, who sought to preserve it. 
c. Israel 
Israel has a vested interest in the Syrian Civil War given the border the two nations 
share and the threats posed by Islamic militants and Iran’s military buildup in Syria. Israel 
and Syria have fought since Israel’s founding in 1948, fighting wars in 1967 and 1973.243 
Israel has also struck targets inside Syria that it perceives as threats, including a covert 
strike on a Syrian nuclear reactor in 2007.244 Israel is no friend of the Assad regime and 
politicians have openly stated that they support regime change. In 2017, Israeli Defense 
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Minister Avidor Liberman said: “We cannot allow a man like Assad, who kills his own 
citizens and who uses chemical weapons against them to remain in power,” and “keeping 
Assad in power is not in our security interests. As long as he is in power, Iran and Hezbollah 
will be in Syria.”245 Assad, however, is not the primary threat to Israeli security, it is the 
Iranian presence. 
The presence of such a large Iranian force alongside efforts to establish permanent 
bases is what most concerns the Israeli government.246 According to journalist David 
Kenner, Israel has not openly tried to shape the conflict politically or militarily to favor 
either the regime or the opposition, but it has pursued a strategy to keep Iran and its proxies 
at a safe distance.247 This strategy included supporting moderate opposition forces fighting 
the regime and IRGC in southwestern Syria, as well as hundreds of airstrikes against 
Hezbollah convoys and Iranian bases.248 In 2018, a former national security advisor for 
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Yaakov Amidror, remarked that “we cannot 
do everything, but we can do a lot to force the Iranians to decide if they are ready to pay 
the price [for intervention in Syria].”249 Israel may not like the Assad regime, but it is 
Assad’s welcoming of Iranian forces that is Israel’s greatest concern.  
Iran and Israel have had a bloody and contentious relationship since the founding 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Israel cannot accept being caught in a vice by Iran and its 
proxies. Iran supports terrorist organizations who attack Israel, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, 
and Islamic Jihad, and Iranian leaders regularly call for its destruction. Quds Force itself, 
translates to “Jerusalem Force,” which illustrates the unit’s ultimate goal. Israel and 
Hezbollah regularly engage each other militarily. Iran is Hezbollah’s primary financier and 
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supplier of its missile arsenal, estimated to be near 100,000.250 With Hezbollah and the 
IRGC to its north and north east, and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Israel may feel like it is 
being surrounded. Research fellow Michael Eisenstadt noted that “the goal [of Iran] is to 
encircle Israel with these proxies that could enmesh it in a series of open-ended, low-level 
conflicts that make [Israel’s] life unbearable.”251 Unwilling to accept this outcome, Israel 
has responded significantly to IRGC operations in Syria in the latter years of the conflict, 
which I examine in the third section of this case study.  
d. Russia 
Russia entered the Syrian Civil War in September 2015 with a large-scale military 
force to save the Assad regime. Russia was allies with Syria before the conflict and had 
called for diplomatic solutions throughout the conflict, as well as protecting Syria from 
hostile diplomatic actions in the UN. It was no shock that Russia wanted to preserve its 
only real ally in the Middle East who shares its Mediterranean Sea naval facilities. 
However, what did surprise the world was the extensiveness of the expeditionary package 
sent to Syria, which included everything from bombers to mechanized ground forces.  
A 2019 RAND report seeking to determine the factors that led to such a large-scale 
intervention cited three factors: the collapse of the Syrian regime was imminent, 
implications of a secular regime falling to domestic terrorism, and a perceived failure of 
diplomacy.252 Pulling its findings from a host of interviews and Russian reports, the study 
found that Russian officials believed ISIS or another group overrunning the Syrian regime 
could inspire others to do so. Citing comments from officials including Russian President 
Vladimir Putin, one can conclude that the Russian authoritarian regime perceives a Western 
effort to overthrow hostile authoritarians.253 By preserving Assad’s power, Russia would 
not allow this model for regime change to be used as a case study for anyone seeking to 
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overthrow the Russian system.254 Russia’s level of intervention was also likely based on 
efforts from the QF commander, Qassem Soleimani. 
By 2015, the Syrian Civil War was not going favorably for Assad and it appeared 
Iranian support would not be enough. The first openly reported meeting between Qassem 
Soleimani and Russian officials, including President Putin, occurred in July 2015.255 It is 
not clear which party called for the meeting to plan an escalation in the effort to save Assad, 
but it is probable that the QF realized its limitations and required extensive artillery and air 
power outside of its capabilities. The Russian military is far more advanced in material and 
technology. Russia’s resources were certainly required for retaking Syria’s largest city, 
Aleppo. The operation to retake Aleppo from the Syrian opposition included the largest 
deployment of Iranian forces and proxies to that point in the conflict.256 The battle took 
over a year to finish, and Russian firepower proved decisive. It is unlikely that Qassem 
Soleimani’s efforts alone were what convinced the Russian military to intervene in Syria, 
beginning in September 2015. However, what is clear is that both countries saw the 
prospect of regime change in Syria as unacceptable.  
Russia continues to support Assad’s grip on power, and in 2020, the likelihood of 
the Syrian establishment continuing is significantly better than any other year of the 
conflict. Russia denies that its soldiers are involved in regular combat operations, but 
Russian “contractor” fatalities began being reported in February 2016.257 In February 
2018, a suspected probing attack against U.S. and Kurdish forces resulted in a U.S. military 
response that left approximately 300 Russians dead.258 It is possible that the Russians were 
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seeking to test American will to defend Kurdish territory. The battle did not result in any 
changes to Russian activity besides remaining out of Kurdish territory, until being invited 
in when some U.S. forces withdrew in 2019. The defeat of ISIS, withdrawal of most U.S. 
forces, and a dwindling opposition that holds onto only one Syrian province demonstrate 
that the Russian intervention is succeeding in its goals. However, the cost to Russian blood 
and treasure, which is currently unknown, must be weighed against Assad’s survival before 
Russia can say its intervention was at an acceptable cost. 
e. Iran 
The Islamic Republic of Iran saw the Arab Spring as an opportunity and a curse. 
Uprisings in Yemen resulted in the Houthi movement turning into a rebellion against a 
Saudi friendly government by 2014. In Bahrain, Shia dominated protests against the 
monarchy brought the opportunity for regime change, but it was snuffed out by a Sunni 
coalition coming to the monarchy’s aid. In Syria, however, the majority revolted against 
the minority who happened to be the Islamic Republic’s oldest ally. If there was regime 
change in Syria, Iran might not only lose one of its few international partners, it could lose 
its link to its clients that maintains pressure on Israel. The Iranian regime went to the aid 
of President Assad with the tools it had used to stop an uprising two years prior. 
In response to perceived election rigging to keep hardline Iranian President 
Ahmadinejad in power, two million Iranians took to the streets in protest in 2009.259 The 
protestors contended that the election results were falsified to prevent moderate candidate 
Mir-Hossein Mousavi from winning. In Vanguard of the Imam, Afshon Ostovar accounts 
for how the IRGC and its paramilitary force, the Basij responded with brute force. Security 
forces responded to all protests with tear gas and batons. Basij units attacked protestors 
with metal rods, bats, and some used guns to fire indiscriminately into crowds.260 The 
Basij and IRGC were protected from judicial reprisals, including the deaths of protestors, 
and physical and sexual abuse committed against detainees.261 In the aftermath of the 
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protests, the IRGC invested heavily in capabilities to stop domestic challenges to the 
regime. These included cyber spying capabilities, as well as restructuring the Basij to better 
its standing with the public it had violently subdued.262 The initial Iranian package which 
included elements of the QF and Basij took the lessons learned from this uprising to Syria 
in 2011. However, it would not be enough as the violent reprisals against Syrian protestors 
generated international condemnation, military desertions, and sectarian divide. 
As the conflict worsened and it appeared like the Syrian regime’s days were 
numbered in 2015, Iran responded by deploying an expeditionary package that included 
thousands of soldiers and tons of equipment. The campaign continued to be led by the QF 
commander, Qassem Soleimani. Iranian casualties could not be hidden despite favoring the 
use of proxy forces to do the bulk of the fighting, and the casualties did have an eventual 
impression on the Iranian homeland. I examine the impact these casualties had and the 
military’s narrative to motivate the public in the third section of this case study.  
2. QF Operations 
Iran’s campaign to prevent administration change in Syria began with clandestine 
operations meant to enable the Syrian government’s counter opposition efforts. Evidence 
suggests that Iran intended, at first, to limit its involvement in the conflict, aiming to 
provide regime forces with the tools needed to stop the revolution in its infancy. Logistics, 
intelligence, and training provided by the QF were the mechanisms with which Iran hoped 
it would solve the problem. From the onset of the uprisings, Iran used the air corridor over 
Iraq to transport personnel and equipment into Syria. In March 2011, Turkish officials 
seized dozens of rifles, machine guns, and thousands of rounds of ammunition on a civilian 
plane that landed in Turkey as it transited from Iran to Aleppo, Syria.263 This was one of 
several public reports of arms smuggling via air. The United States was able to pressure 
the Iraqi government to stop these flights for several months, but by July 2011, the Iraqis 
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were no longer willing to deny the airspace.264 In addition to logistics, the IRGC reportedly 
assisted with intelligence capabilities which ranged from jamming to electronic 
eavesdropping.265 According to a 2011 Reuters article, the IRGC provided the Syrian 
regime with surveillance technology that enabled the regime to find and fix dissidents via 
email, cell phones, and social media.266 In the first year of the conflict, Iran reportedly sent 
dozens of senior officers, hundreds of QF trainers, and thousands of Hezbollah fighters into 
Syria to train and equip Assad’s forces.267 Iran denied any involvement or use of its forces 
at first. In August 2012, opposition forces captured 48 IRGC operatives, including QF 
members, as they attempted to conduct a reconnaissance mission under the cover of being 
Shia pilgrims.268 This event gave stronger proof to the opposition’s assertions of Iranian 
involvement. Other events implicated the IRGC and QF’s participation, including a QF 
operative’s personal video camera being found and turned over to Western media after he 
and his squad were killed by Syrian rebels in September 2013.269 The QF Commander, 
Qassem Soleimani, likely hoped logistical, intelligence, and training support would be 
enough for the Syrian regime to reestablish control. However, it was not, and the situation 
in 2015 demanded deployment of the IRGC’s complete expeditionary capability.  
By the summer of 2015, the QF’s campaign to save the Syrian regime from being 
overthrown by opposition forces and terrorist groups appeared to be failing.270 According 
to a Washington Post article, in September 2015, Syrian forces only controlled 16% of the 
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country.271 At the time, ISIS was continuing to annex territory throughout Syria and Iraq. 
Although a U.S. led coalition began an air campaign to stifle ISIS’s advance, no ground 
forces were powerful enough to contest its momentum. Syrian opposition groups continued 
attacks on the regime and were in complete control of several major cities including Syria’s 
largest, Aleppo. Additionally, faced with low Syrian military morale, Soleimani needed 
two things to turn the tide: deployment of a large ground force that could fight alongside 
the regime’s forces, and Russian fire support.272 Russian intervention coupled with 
thousands of additional ground forces was the only viable answer to reversing the course 
of the civil war. 
It is unknown the level of influence Qassem Soleimani had in the scale of Russia’s 
military intervention in the Syrian Civil War. A Reuter’s article citing an unnamed regional 
official claims that Russia’s decision to intervene was made several months before 
Soleimani’s arrival in Russia in July 2015.273 According to the article, a senior envoy from 
Ayatollah Khamenei secured President Putin’s support, and Soleimani was sent to develop 
the joint plan. Russia’s deployment of an expansive arsenal, along with special operations, 
and aircraft would enable large scale ground assaults to retake Syrian territory. Syria’s 
largest city, Aleppo, would be the first. 
The October 2015 Aleppo offensive marked an end to the covert nature of the 
campaign to save Assad, involving the deployment of hundreds of additional IRGC soldiers 
along with thousands of Shia militia fighters.274 The QF were joined by other Iranian 
regular and Shia irregular forces. Citing a report in the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Rai, a 
Guardian article stated that Iran sent an additional 2,000 soldiers to Syria, alongside 5,000 
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Shia fighters.275 Hezbollah continued to contribute the majority of Iranian proxy forces 
and reportedly sent 8,000 fighters into Syria during the time of the Aleppo offensive.276 
Other groups deployed included Katab Hezbollah, and Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq from Iraq, in 
addition to the Fatemiyoun and Zaynabiyoun brigades made up of Shia Afghans and 
Pakistani Shia militants respectively.277  
The groups made up of Afghani fighters demonstrate the innovative recruitment 
methods Iran has used to create proxies and lessen Iranian casualties. According to a report 
by Phillip Smyth, the majority of the Afghani fighters are recruited from refugees residing 
in Iran, with the promise of a salary and Iran residency papers.278 Nader Uskowi notes that 
these sort of foreign legion groups demonstrated a lack of control and discipline in several 
battles in 2015 and 2016 including Khan Touman and Tal el-Eis. Deploying high numbers 
with not enough command and control resulted in setbacks during the Aleppo operation.279 
However, these militias provide the QF with a front-line force that is ideologically aligned, 
less expensive than regular forces, and a valid way to keep Iranian soldiers away from the 
worst of the fighting.280 Another advantage, according to Smyth, is the possibility of 
reorienting these veteran fighters to Afghanistan to fill the vacuum that may come with the 
withdrawal of U.S. forces.281 The long term effectiveness of groups like the Fatemiyoun 
and Zaynabiyoun brigades remains to be seen, but they have almost certainly lowered the 
casualty figures for Iranian forces in Syria. 
With the deployment of so many fighters and material support, Iran was no longer 
limited to covert QF units who could maintain plausible deniability for their operations in 
Syria. Iran’s expeditionary force now included artillery and armor units, along with special 
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forces from its regular army branch to take part in the fighting.282 In an October 2015 
interview, Iran’s deputy foreign minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, claimed that there 
was no Iranian boots on the ground in a combat role, but there were advisers assisting the 
Syrian army.283 Amir-Addollahian went on to say that Iran’s support was solely about 
stopping terrorism, saying: “The fight against terrorism in Syria has intensified and Russia 
has taken effective steps to fight Daesh [ISIS]…We have decided to increase the number 
of our military advisers in Syria to help the fight against terrorists. The number of officers 
and advisers is not important. What is important is an unwavering will to fight against 
terrorism.”284 However, these comments could not hold weight with dozens of news 
reports showing the extent of Iran and Russia’s intervention. Iran’s escalation coupled with 
Russian fire power enabled the regime to retake Aleppo 14 months after the battle began. 
According to author and former Iranian policy advisor to U.S. CENTCOM, Nader Uskowi, 
the defeat of the opposition forces at Aleppo was the turning point in the war.285 The 
regime continued its offensive, retaking rebel-controlled territory piece by piece. 
The agreement reached between the Syrian regime and opposition groups in Aleppo 
in December 2016 involved a trend that appears to be part of a regime strategy to move 
defeated opposition fighters and their families to the Idlib Province of Syria.286 A May 
2017 article by Mays Al-Shobassi includes settlement agreements between opposition and 
terrorist forces, and the regime, beginning with the Homs settlement in 2014. In 10 of the 
13 agreements, opposition fighters and their families were allowed safe passage to Idlib 
Province if they met the regime’s demands.287 This strategy is sound in the short run, and 
may be in the long run, depending on the will of the opposition. By disarming and allowing 
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safe passage, the regime is giving the opposition a way out, which keeps them from being 
placed on Sun Tzu’s concept of death ground. If a fighter considers themselves on death 
ground, being backed into a corner with no way of escape or surrender, they are likely to 
fight twice as hard and increase the risk for the attackers. This strategy also allows the 
regime to move the Sunni dominated opposition into one province of the country, 
effectively limiting the likelihood of sectarian based resurgences in recaptured provinces. 
Kurdish areas aside, Idlib is the last province under opposition control in 2020. An assault 
to clear the province would be comparable to Aleppo in terms of required resources and 
bloodshed, but it is unlikely to be warranted in the near term. Containment may be the 
better solution for the time being, given the proximity to Turkey. Turkish proxies, and 
terrorist groups are also fighting amongst each other in the province, further deteriorating 
the moderate opposition. No hard evidence proves this strategy was orchestrated by the 
QF, but the significant degree of control Soleimani took in 2015 makes a strong case for 
it.  
Following the fall of Aleppo, Iranian forces, their proxies, and Russian forces 
backed the Syrian regime’s clearance through southern and eastern Syria. These forces 
were stonewalled from claiming all of southern Syria and moving east of the Euphrates 
River given the presence of a U.S. led coalition that supported Kurdish forces fighting ISIS. 
Several open sources reported incidents of Iranian and Russian proxies intruding on U.S. 
forces, including near At-Tanf garrison in the summer of 2017, and in Deir ez-Zour 
Province in the 2018 winter. These incidents resulted in extensive retaliation by U.S. forces 
and a retreat of the proxies. Efforts by the coalition and the Kurdish forces destroyed the 
physical ISIS caliphate in the spring of 2019, largely removing the problem the group posed 
for the Syrian regime. A settlement between the Syrian Kurds and the regime for deciding 
the future of Eastern Syria remains to be drafted as of 2020. Reclaiming the territories 
outside of Kurdish and United States control led to the current phase of the Iranian 
campaign in Syria: soft power projection and establishing a ground logistical chain via 
permanent bases. 
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Iran utilizes a soft power strategy across the Middle East to further its strategic 
goals, and provide civilian cover for QF operatives.288 According to a report by Ahmad 
Majidyar, these strategic goals are ideologically or politically based, including everything 
from charitable foundations to schools.289 The establishments advocate Iranian ideology. 
In a 2017 speech that announced the building of an Islamic Azad University in Iraq and 
Lebanon, board of trustees chairman Ali Akbar Velayati, demonstrated the IRGC’s 
influence on the school. Iranian media emphasized that the university is a “refuge of the 
Basij,” who have “a historical fatwa for resistance against oppressors.”290 Efforts inside 
Syria include transforming formerly Sunni mosques and communities into Shia ones to 
create buffer zones as well as provide properties for utilization by Hezbollah and the 
IRGC.291 Soft power mechanisms also allow the IRGC to turn enemies into subservient 
allies. According to a Washington Institute report, in Dara Province, Iran was offering jobs 
to young unemployed Sunnis to serve Shia militias in noncombat roles that kept them safe 
from conscription while providing economic relief.292 According to the report, Hezbollah 
also constructed approximately eight Shia religious centers and five schools in Dara. Soft 
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power establishments and projects are a useful tool for the Iranian regime and the QF and 
MOIS operatives who use it for cover throughout the Middle East. These projects also 
provide a thinly veiled cover for Iran’s other project in Syria: securing a ground logistics 
corridor. 
Afshon Ostovar posits that Iran’s ability to project a realistic threat to Israel is 
essential to Iran’s deterrence strategy.293 Syria’s enabling of this ability through its 
geographic location, and political relationship were paramount in Iran’s intervention 
according to Ostovar. Hezbollah and other agents of Iran have the location and means to 
threaten Israeli interests, as long as they can receive financial aid and materials from Iran. 
With the blessing or eye turning of Iraq, Iran could heighten the deterrent effect with being 
able to move support via ground. The establishment of a land corridor from Iran into Syria, 
in which the QF could easily supply and support its proxies fighting Israel is a strategic 
priority of the QF.294 Permanent bases in Syria enable the IRGC to house forces supporting 
the Syrian regime’s ongoing operations and create a ground logistic chain for moving aid 
to Hezbollah and other agents targeting Israel.  
According to a Jerusalem Post article written in the aftermath of an Israeli strike on 
an Iranian base in Syria, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) began noticing a shift in Qassem 
Soleimani’s priorities in Syria in 2016.295 Sometime after the fall of Aleppo, Iran began 
establishing permanent bases in Syria, including one at Tiyas Military Base, Syria’s largest, 
in Homs Province.296 This base is within 130 miles of Israel, and well within the range of 
Iranian UAV platforms.297 At the Damascus International Airport, the IRGC established 
a base with a headquarters, logistical, and intelligence element, reportedly for operations 
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ongoing near the Israeli border.298 These bases have resulted in significant military 
responses from Israel, which I discuss in the next section.  
3. Reaction to QF Operations 
Response to the QF’s campaign in Syria, along with the additional Iranian forces 
that joined in 2015 has come primarily from Israel and the Iranian body politic. Iran’s 
efforts to establish a ground logistic line through Syria via permanent bases continues to 
draw Israeli military action. Israel will not accept its main adversary establishing bases of 
operation in close proximity to its territory. In the Iranian home front, the loss of Iranian 
lives and the financial cost of the Syrian endeavor has resulted in some public outcry and 
contributed to the excitement of the November 2019 Iran protests.  
Beginning in 2018, there have been numerous exchanges between the Israeli Air 
Force (IAF) and Iranian bases, as well as Iranian proxies. Some have resulted in significant 
IAF action, which one could view as reestablishment of Israeli red lines. In Temperature 
Rising, Nader Uskowi summarizes one such set of events. In April 2018, an Iranian UAV 
flew over IDF formations. The IDF downed the UAV and then struck the Tiyas Military 
Base, from where the UAV launched, with air to ground missiles. The QF responded to the 
attack, in which and IRGC commander was killed by launching 20 rockets at Israeli 
installations. In an act of escalation to demonstrate the IAF’s capability, the IAF struck 16 
QF locations in Syria, killing an unconfirmed number of Iranian soldiers and Shia militia. 
Iran did not retaliate against these strikes, seemingly accepting that they were unprepared 
and outmatched.299 Israeli strikes continued, and at least one case almost led to an 
international incident with Russia. In September 2018, an Israeli F-16 striking an Iranian 
target in Latakia, Syria was targeted by Syrian air defenses. However, the Syrians 
accidently targeted a nearby Russian surveillance aircraft, shooting it down and killing 15 
Russians. Israel admitted their involvement but blamed it on Iran’s antagonism in the 
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region.300 The Russians did not respond beyond diplomatic measures, and Israel’s 
campaign continued. 
Israel’s policy of not allowing establishment of any Iranian positions inside Syria 
continues in 2020. In July 2020, Israel targeted an ammunition depot on the outskirts of 
Damascus, Syria, killing several Iranians. In the months prior to this, Israeli officials stated 
that the campaign to stop Iran and its proxies would be expanded.301 It is likely that unless 
the QF find a method to deter these actions, Israel will continue its program and reestablish 
red lines when they are tested. In this state, along with uncertainty concerning Iraqi 
allowance of the QF’s smuggling, the QF cannot hope to attain its objective of establishing 
a secure ground corridor to move personnel and equipment through Syria.  
In Syria, Soleimani sought to primarily utilize proxies for frontline fighting 
alongside Syrian forces, but the nature of the war would not prevent Iranian casualties. 
These casualties, alongside economic costs, ultimately contributed to negative responses 
from the Iranian people towards the war. A December 2018 report by Ali Alfoneh pulling 
from multiple open sources estimated Iranian casualties to be 561.302 However, an earlier 
Reuter’s article quoted the head of Iran’s Foundation of Martyr’s as saying the casualty 
figure had reached 1000 by November 2016.303 Until 2019, the bodies returning from Syria 
did not appear to generate public outcry against the war. The Iranian regime had an 
ideological narrative for the masses which seemed to be accepted, at least publicly, given 
the lack of free speech in Iranian media. 
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The regime and military leadership portrayed the Iranian bodies returning as 
martyrs, comparing their sacrifice to that of Imam Husayn’s.304 A typical quote for the 
dead was that their deaths were “defending the holy shrine of Sayyida Zaynab.”305 The 
shrine contains the grave of Zaynab, the granddaughter of the Prophet Muhammad, and is 
one of the holiest sites for Shia Muslims. In August 2017, an IRGC officer named Mohsen 
Hojaji was captured and beheaded on video by ISIS. This brutal and public act aided the 
Iranian narrative of being in a holy war against terrorism. Qassem Soleimani remarked: 
“Martyr Hojaji’s death was meant to provide further meaning and glory to the struggle for 
the defense of the [holy Shia] shrines.”306 The Islamic Republic’s method of generating a 
narrative that relates soldier deaths to holy martyrdom has been used since the Iran-Iraq 
War. The narrative seemed to help placate most contention as the death toll rose. The 
contention, however, grew greater from 2017 on as questions about the need to be in Syria 
joined domestic issues. 
Questions from the Iranian people concerning the government’s intervention in 
Syria were periodic throughout the conflict, but boiled over in November 2019 when 
combined with other issues demanding reform from the people. In April 2017, former 
Tehran mayor Gholam-Hossein Karbaschi criticized Iran’s military solution in Syria, 
advocating for a diplomatic one.307 The same month, a student questioned IRGC 
theoretician Hassan Abbasi, stating:  
Hassan Abbasi, your ideology is the ideology of terrorism and fear, of 
sending weapons to the bloodthirsty dictator Bashar Al-Assad, and of 
supporting him. Your ideology is to play with the nationalistic and religious 
beliefs of the people, defending non-existent shrines in Homs and Idlib. 
What shrines? … Your ideology places the budget of Iran in the bank 
account of Hezbollah in Lebanon. By Hasan Nasrallah’s own admission, 
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their weapons, their daily livelihood, their food, and even their underwear 
are provided through the budget of the Iranian people.308  
In response to a 50% rise in oil prices, widespread protests erupted across Iran in 
November 2019. The protests were dealt with violently as they had in 2009, but the 
government also shut down the internet for six days in an effort to prevent organization 
and documentation of its retaliation escaping.309 These protests primarily concerned the 
economic impact being felt by U.S. sanctions for Iran’s activities. The question of what 
Iran was getting for the billions of dollars and hundreds of soldiers it was sending to Syria 
was also an exacerbating topic. The people saw the investment in Syria as contributing to 
their misfortune. Ultimately, the brutal, totalitarian response by the Iranian regime quelled 
the protests as it had in 2009. This issue, however, has only gone dormant. 
4. Iran’s NSOs Advancement 
After nearly 10 years of conflict, the Islamic Republic of Iran has little to show for 
its campaign to save President Assad’s Bat’th Party in Syria. The Syrian regime is still in 
place and back from the brink of collapse it was upon in 2015. Although Iran, with the help 
of its proxies and Russia, was able to prevent regime change, it occurred at a high cost with 
little to show for advancement in three of Iran’s four NSOs. Iran has paid a high economic 
cost, its reconstruction efforts may likely fuel sectarian insurgencies, and the Israelis will 
not allow establishment of permanent bases anywhere near the Israeli border. 
It is unknown how much money Iran is spending each year to support the regime 
and pay for its military campaign in the country, but estimates put it exceptionally high. In 
2015, a spokeswoman for the UN special envoy for Syria put the estimate for Iranian loans 
to Syria at $6 billion annually.310 Nadim Shedadi at Tufts University put Iranian aid from 
2012 to 2013 between $14–15 billion dollars.311 A 2018 Foreign Policy article put 
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estimates between $30-$105 billion for economic and military aid between 2011 and 
2018.312 There is also a credit line Iran extends to Syria, which appears to act like a credit 
card when Syria really needs money. A 2020 report by the Atlantic Council, which sought 
to determine the value of a credit line Iran has extended to Syria since 2011, contends that 
the line is a way for Iran to hide its expenditures from the public eye.313 The report 
estimates the value of the credit line to be $5–7 billion dollars. Iran’s argument to its body 
politic has been that it is a tool to achieve long term investment in the reconstruction of 
Syria.314 In 2020, Iran has not reaped any financial rewards from its intervention, and as 
Thomas Juneau points out, Iran will likely need to prop up the Syrian regime for years, if 
not decades, to ensure gains are not reversed.315 It will be a long time before Iran is able 
to reap any economic returns from its billions or tens of billions spent in Syria.  
Iran hopes its soft power strategy may lead to some returns on its investment for 
reconstruction efforts, but sectarian issues will likely spoil those efforts. The IRGC’s 
investments in infrastructure could easily be used as an information warfare tool by 
adversaries as it alludes to Iranian control. The conversion of Sunni mosques and schools 
to Shia is unlikely to convert the majority of Sunni Syrians. Dara Province, which has been 
called the “cradle of the revolution” has witnessed a low-level insurgency permeating over 
the past two years.316 There is evidence suggesting the Sunni population, facing a regime 
that refuses to reform its ways, is fighting back once again. In 2019, there were 305 
assassination attempts reported in the province, and in response to actions like these, the 
regime is reportedly sidelining reconciliation efforts in favor of cracking down on the 
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resistance.317 Without extensive reforms that cut through sectarian divides and deal with 
grievances that caused the civil war, local insurgencies are likely to continue to hamper 
reconstruction and unification.  
Iran’s efforts in Syria are also degraded by the Israeli adherence to not accepting a 
permanent Iranian presence near its borders, and Israel possesses the military capacity to 
do so. The QF may continue to attempt to build its land corridor via establishment of bases, 
but the Israelis are likely to continue striking these bases in an effort to show Iran that the 
venture is too costly. As nationalism rises in Iraq too, the QF may find its efforts to move 
supplies to Hezbollah and its other agents impeded as the Iraqi population calls for removal 
of Iranian influence. Iran’s investment in Syria will continue to be costly, and although the 
regime has been saved for now, the future remains uncertain.  
D. THE YEMEN CIVIL WAR, 2014–2020 
The Yemen Civil War presented Iran with the prospect to establish a foothold on 
the southern border or its arch-rival, Saudi Arabia. The conflict in Yemen encompasses 
numerous internal and external actors, but at the heart of the war is a domestic fight 
between Houthi tribesmen, the Saudi backed government, and other groups desiring their 
own piece of the country.318 The Houthi struggle provided Iran with an opportunity to 
invest in the future of Yemen. This investment is a unique case in Iran’s use of the QF for 
three reasons. First, Iran did not and does not have a majority stakeholder say in the actions 
of the Houthis as it did with militias in Bosnia, Iraq, and Syria. Second, overt support that 
could garner greater control over the Houthi’s actions could result in escalation to total war 
with Saudi Arabia and its allies including the United States.319 Third, the QF’s support to 
the Houthis is covert, and does not follow the model it used in Iraq and Syria. The QF’s 
approach in Yemen is about a low cost, long-term gamble to spread its zone of influence 
to the underbelly of its archrival. 
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The QF’s campaign in Yemen has yielded no gains in its NSOs as its authority over 
the Houthis is modest, and the fear of Iranian influence in Yemen united a coalition of 
nations to counter the QF’s campaign. Yemen also provides little, if any, economic 
opportunities. However, this campaign is about long-term investment. Events in 2019 and 
2020 suggest the coalition is on the ropes and the Saudis are looking for a way out. If the 
Houthis prevail, Iran may see significant returns in its NSOs.   
1. Social-Political Situation 
a. Yemen 
Yemen’s civil war began in late 2014 with a Houthi led rebellion, but the genesis 
of the conflict began a decade prior. The Houthis, began rebelling against the government 
in 2004, citing a lack of political representation and distribution of resources. Fighting 
occurred sporadically until a 2010 ceasefire.320 In 2010, Canadian National Defence 
analyst Thomas Juneau cited several issues that would lead to the collapse of Yemen if 
uncorrected. These included a booming population with high unemployment in the Arab 
world’s poorest country, marginalization of the Houthis and southern districts by the 
government, widespread corruption, and the prevalence of jihadi groups inside Yemen 
including Al-Qaeda Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).321 The government was corrupt and did 
not appear to be concerned with reform. 
Yemen’s authoritarian president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, was forced to face the turmoil 
only after the Arab Spring came to Yemen in 2011. A Tunisian citizen, Mohamed Bouazizi, 
set himself on fire on December 17, 2010 in protest of authoritarian abuses, and in doing 
so set a fire that would become the Arab Spring. The movement, seeking democratic 
reforms via protests, spread over the next several months to Egypt, Bahrain, Syria, Libya, 
and Yemen.322 The Yemeni government reacted violently to protests. On May 29, 2011, 
security forces countered a several thousand strong protest in Yemen’s second largest city, 
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Taiz, with gunfire, tear gas, and arson. Incidents like this soon led to tribal militias 
expanding and increasing arming for protection against the government. The Army became 
overwhelmed in the fighting and tribal militias took control of areas in the north and 
southern parts of Yemen.323 President Saleh was forced to abdicate power to his deputy, 
Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, as a first step towards reformation.324 However, Yemen’s 
issues had already turned into a lit powder keg. 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) orchestrated agreement for a transitional 
government avoided a civil war at first but ultimately failed to correct any of the grievances 
of the Houthis and other disenchanted Yemeni tribes.325 Disillusioned with a lack of 
change, the Houthis began to seize control of areas in northern Yemen. Security forces 
once loyal to President Saleh, along with other Yemenis, joined the Houthis and seized the 
capital of Sanaa in early 2015.326 The rebellion forced President Hadi to flee to Saudi 
Arabia, and the Houthi advance continued.327 It appeared that the rebellion had the 
materials and support to take over the country. The Yemeni people gained no reforms that 
the transitional government had promised, and instead a costly civil war rife with famine 
and disease set in.  
b. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates–Led Coalition 
Intervention in the Yemen Civil War against the Houthis encompasses numerous 
nations, but it is Saudi Arabia and the UAE who have played the largest international 
role.328 In response to the escalating civil war in Yemen, Saudi Arabia launched a 
campaign to stop the Houthi advance and restore President Hadi to power in early 2015. 
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This campaign was supported by nine regional states including the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Senegal and Sudan.329 The United States provided only 
intelligence support at first, and then naval support, as it was, and is primarily focused on 
combating AQAP in Yemen.330 The civil war on the Arabian Peninsula concerned all of 
the nations surrounding it for commerce issues given the importance of the Mandeb Strait. 
The strait is strategic for global trade, particularly oil, and disruption of it could severely 
impact oil rich nations in the region.331 The Saudis and Emirates, however, saw the 
possibility of an Iranian controlled Yemen as a prominent security issue that required 
military action on a level both countries had not engaged in before. 
c. Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia’s efforts in Yemen stemmed first from concern of the Arab Spring 
ideology spilling into the kingdom in 2011, then from a security concern for an Iranian 
proxy on its southern border, as well as Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s ascent to 
power.332 These factors contributed to its initial bombing campaign, and later more direct 
involvement in the fighting. However, the years of conflict, economic and political toll, 
and lack of significant retaliation suggest it is weary of the conflict. 
The 2011 Arab Spring presented the Saudi monarchy with the possibility of a 
revolution that would seek democratization.333 Saudi Arabia is an authoritarian-monarchy 
with absolute control of its domestic population and favors heavy handed tactics. The 
Muslim Brotherhood seized power in Egypt and the Bahrain monarchy faced extensive 
protests that jeopardized its rule during the Arab Spring. The Saudis responded with an 
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operation to assist the Bahrain government to suppress the protests and ensure the status 
quo remained.334 The movement in Yemen forced President Saleh to step aside, and the 
Saudis had an ally in his successor, President Hadi. However, as reforms failed to come to 
fruition, the Houthi rebellion gained steam. The Saudis were faced with a movement on 
their southern border that threatened the stability of the region and could serve as a 
launching point for further rebellion. This movement was also supported by its chief 
adversary, Iran.  
The Iran-Saudi rivalry has existed since 1979 and led to numerous conflicts across 
the Middle East as the two vie for influence and control.335 Saudi Arabia is greatly 
concerned with Iranian influence on two of its bordering nations in addition to Yemen, 
Syria and Lebanon. The Sunni dominated kingdom, was effectively surrounded by Shia 
factions and disruption of the Yemeni coast could threaten the oil trade for which it bases 
its economy on.336 This was unacceptable for King Salman in 2015 as Yemen was 
collapsing, so he put his son in charge of preventing the Iranians from getting a foothold. 
The Yemen crisis was an opportunity for the new crown prince of Saudi Arabia, 
Mohammed bin Salman to gain popularity with the Sunni domestic population and his 
military.337 Prince Salman assumed responsibility for responding to the Yemen crisis in 
January 2015 when his father, King Salman, took power following his brother’s death.338 
Prince Salman was initially seen as a reformer on the world stage, speaking to the internet 
connected population of his country, of which 70% were under 30.339 He tackled 
corruption, supported reforms to women’s rights, and presented a casual attitude in an ultra-
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conservative government.340 However, the prince would eventually show this to be a 
disguise, and worse yet, he had zero military experience to plan a response in Yemen.341 
The campaign was ill designed and the five years of stalemate are proving disastrous for 
the now Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia. 
The Saudi led campaign relied on air superiority and Yemeni groups to do the 
majority of the fighting and has yielded only a continued stalemate at rising costs.342 As 
of spring 2020, the Crown Prince is faced with the COVID-19 crisis, fracturing of GCC 
goals, and a fracturing of the Yemeni alliances. Indiscriminate aerial bombings against 
Houthis and civilians alike resulted in global condemnation and alienation.343 The Crown 
Prince, facing multiple issues, is likely examining an exit strategy that could accept a 
permanent Houthi area in Yemen. A lack of significant Saudi responses to Houthi missile 
and drone attacks escalating since 2017 also suggests the Saudis are weary of the war and 
seeking a way out. The exit of the Emirates from the fight in 2019 was also a significant 
blow to the Saudis.  
d. United Arab Emirates 
The UAE had a vested interest in joining the coalition as it valued its relationship 
with the Saudis, wanted to ensure regional stability by denying Iranian influence, and 
wanted to stifle the spread of violent extremism.344 Up to this point, the UAE’s foreign 
policy had been one of maintaining good relations with its neighbors and not getting 
involved in conflicts, although it did join the U.S. counterterrorism fight in places like 
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Afghanistan.345 The UAE’s involvement in the Yemen Civil War involved combating two 
enemies: the Houthis and terrorist groups such as AQAP.346 The Emirates primarily 
provided special operations forces to train Yemeni forces and engage in counterterrorism. 
These demonstrated worth by removing AQAP from several key areas near Aden and the 
southern coast between 2015 and 2017.347 The Emirate Navy took part in disrupting 
smuggling efforts and securing the Red Sea.348 However, in 2018 the UAE military and 
the Yemeni forces it supported were unable to retake the port of Hodeidah.349 With no end 
in sight to the conflict, a worsening humanitarian crisis, and negative publicity for the air 
campaign, the UAE sought an exit. 
The Emirates withdrew from direct military action on February 9, 2020, not only 
removing its forces from combat operations but also complicating the reunification of 
Yemen. In 2017, the Emirates created the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a group of 
forces in the south of Yemen who still fought the Houthis and extremists but weakened the 
Yemini government the Saudis were propping up. In doing so, the Emirates ensured they 
had a loyal proxy that could have a say in the future of Yemen, whether it be reunification 
or dismemberment.350 While the Emirates’ efforts in Yemen did contribute significantly 
to counterterrorism efforts, their exit strategy only further splintered the coalitions efforts 
to unite Yemenis it supported against the Houthi movement. This has only caused more 
problems for the Saudis and increased the prospects for the Houthis and Iran of achieving 
autonomy.  
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In the Houthi rebellion, Iran found an ostracized resistance movement that it could 
support to increase pressure on its Saudi rival, but there were issues. First, there were 
logistical problems to sending adequate arms and supplies to the Houthis.351 Second, the 
Saudis might retaliate to an Iranian footprint on its southern border.352 Third, Iran’s 
campaign in Syria was resulting in more IRGC losses that Iran had to admit to publicly.353 
Fourth and finally, Iran was in negotiations to secure the survival of its nuclear program. 
Author Nader Uskowi contends that it was the inability of Qassem Soleimani to replicate 
the QF expeditionary model in Yemen that led to a more covert approach.354 Whether or 
not this was the thought process behind the QF’s construct for the Yemen campaign, it has 
succeeded, albeit that may not be apparent yet.  
Iran viewed the Houthis as a marginalized Shia group that would accept QF support 
and guidance as other Iranian proxies had done in the past. The Houthis follow Zaydi 
Shiism, and this form of Shiism is not identical to Iran’s practice of Twelver Shiism.355 
However, as demonstrated previously in this thesis, ideological alignment is not necessary 
for Iranian support.  
Iranian leadership sought to advocate for the group publicly and missteps by the 
anti-Houthi coalition proved detrimental to the world audience. In 2012, Iran added a daily 
Yemen program to its official Arabic language channel that is accessible in Yemen and 
was vehemently anti-President Saleh and anti-United States.356 After Sanaa fell to the 
Houthis, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani publicly described the takeover as brilliant.357 
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In February 2015, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister vowed Iran’s political and economic 
support to the Houthi movement.358 The Saudi led campaign that launched soon after only 
aided Iran’s narrative, as the Saudi bombing was described as indiscriminate. By March 
2020, the UN estimated most civilian deaths that occurred during the fighting were from 
Saudi air strikes.359 Iranian leaders supported the Houthis in their statements, while always 
denying any involvement outside of advisement. They could point to the devastation being 
caused by a Sunni coalition, which denied humanitarian relief and bombed innocents 
alongside Shia freedom fighters. Coupled with no Iranian deaths or retaliation, the 
domestic base remained content with the QF’s campaign. 
2. QF Operations 
The QF campaign in Yemen is built around investing in the Houthi rebellion to 
maintain pressure on Saudi Arabia and gain influence in the event of a Houthi victory, 
while managing risk to avoid an escalation to war with the GCC nations. Iran’s level of 
support is modest compared to what it gives other non-state actors, but this is because it 
recognizes the consequences of escalation, and the QF’s activities are about access to spoils 
during and post-conflict.360 Iran was also limited in the support it could provide at first 
due to the inability to move personnel and equipment freely into Yemen as it had in Iraq 
and Syria.  
Iran does not share a border with Yemen, and the GCC coalition quickly closed air 
and sea access in early 2015 as the coalition sought to stop QF efforts.361 The QF’s 
expeditionary model that it had utilized in Iraq and Syria was not an option due to this and 
the possibility of escalating too quickly with not knowing the reaction Saudi Arabia would 
have.362 The QF’s approach shifted to more covert material and training support to the 
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Houthis. This support increased over the years both in quantity and sophistication based on 
the actions and inactions of the Saudi led coalition. 
The QF’s primary support to the Houthis is via smuggling of financial and material 
support that includes weapons, ammunition, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and ballistic 
missiles. In order to smuggle these items, Iran takes advantage of the extensive Yemen 
coastline with disguised naval vessels. A 2015 U.N. report concluded that Iran began 
sending arms to the Houthis in 2009 in defiance of a 2007 U.N. resolution forbidding Iran 
from arms shipments. The report cited six other incidents including an Iranian fishing 
vessel seized in February 2011 that was loaded with 900 Iranian anti-tank and anti-
helicopter rockets.363 By March 2012, U.S. intelligence recognized a widening QF 
outreach to the Houthis. QF operatives were delivering rifles, rocket propelled grenades, 
and IEDs among other weapons primarily via small boat and freighter smuggling.364 A 
December 2014 Reuter’s report citing several Yemeni, Western, and Iranian sources 
concluded that Iran was sending weapons and money to the Houthis before the 2014 seizure 
of the capital of Sanaa.365 As external entities sought to stop the flow of support to the 
Houthis, the delivery methods and types of ordinance changed. 
Iran continued to take advantage of the 2700-kilometer-long coastline of Yemen, 
using ships disguised as commercial vessels to deliver increasingly destructive 
weapons.366 Beginning sometime in 2016, coalition navies began finding long range 
ballistic missiles, and by 2017 the Houthis had Iranian Qasef-1 UAVs. The Houthis also 
began utilizing a type of unmanned boat laid with explosives to attack coalition ships, 
including a Saudi frigate in January 2017. The UAVs were primarily used to target 
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coalition air defense infrastructure.367 By January 2018, the Saudis were able to 
demonstrate with recovered ballistic missile pieces that Iran was supplying the Houthis 
with missiles that could be launched into Saudi Arabia. The recovered pieces demonstrated 
great lengths being taken to hide the origin. Missile segments welded together suggested 
that the missiles were being shipped in segments to avoid detection.368 In a January 2018 
interview with CNN, Saudi Air Force General Turki Maliki, refused to state Saudi Arabia’s 
red line for retaliation after the reported 88th ballistic missile was intercepted near the 
capital of Riyadh.369 Facing no retaliatory targeting by the Saudis, the QF appeared to feel 
safe in enabling the Houthis to continue targeting Saudi soil and pushing the line. 
Since the 2015 intervention of the Saudi led coalition to reinstate President Hadi, 
the Houthis have retaliated with attacks along the Saudi-Yemen border and firing missiles 
into Saudi Arabia.370 In 2019 the Houthis, with an unknown level of guidance from Iran, 
claimed responsibility for more prominent attacks. This included a strike on the Abha 
airport in June 2019 that injured 26 people and a swarm drone attack on Saudi oil facilities 
in September 2019.371 The attacks resulted in no escalation from the Saudis or other 
coalition members despite threats from the Saudis and the Trump administration. Remnants 
from the drone attack showed that the weapons were too sophisticated to have been 
manufactured in Yemen but were also a type never seen in Iran.372 The covert delivery of 
material support has allowed the QF and Iran to maintain plausible deniability, even as 
Houthi attacks increased in destructiveness and sophistication between 2015 and 2020.  
Complimenting the delivery of materials and finances to the Houthis, Iran provided 
QF operatives for training and advisement. It is unclear when the QF began training Houthi 
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rebels, but by 2014, open source reporting suggested it was ongoing inside and outside of 
Yemen. According to an Iranian source for Reuters, the QF had a few hundred training 
personnel in Yemen and “about 100 Houthis had traveled to Iran [in 2014] for training at 
a Revolutionary Guards base near the city of Qom.”373 By 2015 U.S. intelligence 
concluded that although Iran’s direct involvement in the civil war was limited, IRGC 
personnel were training and equipping Houthi fighters.374 Houthis took control of the 
Yemeni Army’s missile force after capturing the capital of Sanaa. The QF provided 
technical help to extend the range of these systems up to 400 miles.375 QF operatives 
providing training and technical assistance appears to have remained unimpeded, with the 
anti-Houthi coalition members focusing primarily on interdicting material and financial 
delivery.  
3. Reaction to QF Operations 
The QF’s campaign in Yemen has not resulted in significant reaction from Saudi 
Arabia or its allies due to its covert nature and grind on the coalition’s will to continue. The 
former QF commander, Qassem Soleimani, may have wished to deploy an expeditionary 
package like he had in Iraq and Syria, but early actions by the coalition prevented this. 
During the initial phases of the coalition’s intervention, Yemeni airspace was declared 
restricted and the coast was blockaded. In April 2015, Iran sent naval vessels to challenge 
the blockade but ultimately reversed course when challenged by the U.S. Navy. Iran next 
tested the air restrictions by sending civilian Mahan airlines to the Sanaa airport under the 
guise of humanitarian aid. The Saudis responded by bombing the airport runways.376 
These responses made the QF adjust its campaign to be more covert. 
In 2015, Former Canadian National Defense analyst, Thomas Juneau, argued that 
Iran’s support to the Houthis is less impactful because it expects limited returns, coupled 
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with the possibility of total war if it angered Saudi Arabia too much.377 Yemen’s position 
was a vital security threat and, therefore, required the use of all elements of national power. 
Thomas Juneau also points out as Nader Uskowi in Temperature Rising and Helen Lackner 
in “Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis” that Saudi King Salman and his 
son, the current Crown Prince, intended to send a message about Iranian influence by 
subduing the rebellion in several months.378 The response, however, only resulted in 
stalemate, and the air campaign hurt the coalition publicly as it appears indiscriminate. 
Iran’s calculus at first likely included risk mitigation against a Saudi response, and it may 
have also wanted to deploy greater forces and support. We may not know for certain the 
original intent, but what time has shown is that the covert nature of the campaign has kept 
the QF and Iran from significant blowback, despite increasing the sophistication of 
weaponry and training delivered to the Houthis. 
A 2020 congressional report on Yemen cited several pieces of evidence linking 
weapons utilized by the Houthis to Iranian origin from ship seizures and debris analysis 
over the past several years.379 In January 2018, UN experts concluded from debris of 
missiles launched into Saudi Arabia that it showed similarities to missiles produced in Iran. 
In January 2019, the UN panel of experts on Yemen reported that Iran was funding Houthi 
purchases of UAVs and rocket fuel. In February 2020, U.S. CENTCOM announced the 
recovery of Iranian “Noor” anti-ship cruise missiles destined for the Houthis. Dissection 
of Houthi operated UAVs and waterborne explosive boats also suggest Iranian origin given 
the components.380 However, nothing is clearly marked “Iran,” nor have Iranian operatives 
been captured alongside these materials to provide definitive proof.  
The QFs covert smuggling of weapons and training bares similarities to the CIA’s 
Operation CYCLONE during the Soviet-Afghan War. In the 1980s, the CIA provided 
equipment to the mujahedeen resistance combating Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Training 
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occurred in Pakistan and arms flowed via backpack and donkey through the rugged 
mountain passes. The CIA took advantage of the extensive Pakistani border for smuggling 
in everything from rifles to anti-air missiles. This covert operation effectively enabled the 
resistance to defeat the Soviets while the United States and its supporting allies could 
maintain plausible deniability. The Soviets were unable to justify retaliation against the 
United States and its allies for the operation.381 Throughout the Yemen Civil War, Iran 
has been able to avoid retaliation because its soldiers are not on the front lines with the 
Houthis, and there exists no definitive evidence that could justify expanding the war. 
The U.S. military has provided support to the Saudi coalition, but the political 
issues surrounding the civil war and presence of other threats to the United States have 
limited U.S. involvement. The Saudis handling of the war is politically distasteful given 
the humanitarian crisis and documenting of indiscriminate air operations by the coalition. 
In 2018, the U.S. Air Force stopped refueling coalition combat planes amid criticism of air 
strikes on civilians.382 From the start of the conflict, the U.S. Military did provide 
intelligence and naval support to the coalition to locate and interdict shipments to the 
Houthis. The Houthis, however, do not present a realistic threat to U.S. security. Terrorist 
groups like ISIS and AQAP present a greater threat, and have therefore, bore the brunt of 
American attention. 
Terrorist groups in Yemen have been targeted by the U.S. military since the 
beginning of the Global War on Terrorism. According to one report, the U.S. military 
conducted 372 air or ground operations against terrorists in Yemen between 2002 and 
2020.383 U.S. special operations forces do work with coalition forces, including Yemeni 
government forces inside Yemen for certain operations. These include an operation in 2019 
to capture the leader of the Yemeni ISIS branch, and a 2017 raid against an AQAP camp, 
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during which a U.S. Navy SEAL was killed.384 Counterterrorism appears to be the United 
States’ primary interest in Yemen. It did begin deploying special operations to assist 
counter-Houthi operations by late 2017, but open source reporting demonstrates that it is 
limited and reserved. 
By late 2017, the United States began sending teams of Army Special Forces to 
Saudi Arabia to train Saudi soldiers and assist with locating and targeting Houthi ballistic 
missiles. The mission was focused on training, border defense, and intelligence, appearing 
to have taken steps to remain apart from any offensive operations.385 There is no open 
source evidence that the Special Forces teams accompanied Saudis on counter-Houthi 
operations. The United States did attempt to target then QF deputy commander, Abdul 
Reza Shahlai, in Yemen the same day Qassem Soleimani was killed in Iraq. However, the 
operation appeared to be more about disrupting and signaling to the IRGC following 
increasing tensions in Iraq.386 The QF’s support to the Houthis does garner some attention, 
but the reservation of U.S. operations against the Houthis in Yemen demonstrates that it is 
a secondary or tertiary concern.  
4. Iran’s NSOs Advancement 
The QF’s campaign in Yemen has not resulted in any significant gains to Iran’s 
four NSOs, but the campaign is one of a long-term investment strategy. Operations yielded 
minimal gains to its NSO of increasing regional influence via the ability to apply pressure 
against Saudi Arabia. The United States expanded its support to the GCC alliance beyond 
naval support and intelligence sharing, deploying advisors to Saudi Arabia in 2017. This 
increase in the U.S. special operations footprint does not help Iran’s NSO of removing U.S. 
influence. There are no economic advances from supporting the Houthis, nor has the 
conflict had any tangible effect on Iran’s domestic population control. However, this is a 
campaign in gambling on the Houthis gaining power and being able to reap the benefits 
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should that occur. Conducting risk management to avoid escalation with the GCC coalition, 
and not spending more in blood and treasure than necessary makes it a less risky gamble.  
Since 2019, there have been an increase in issues for the Saudi led coalition that 
suggest it may be looking for a way out. Before withdrawing from military action in 2019, 
the UAE created the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in May 2017, from several non-
state actors it supported. This council ensured the Emirates maintained influence and a say 
in the future of Yemen at the expense of weakening the position of the Saudi backed 
Yemeni government.387 In 2020, the Saudis are facing the COVID-19 pandemic, alongside 
evidence that their operations in Yemen are unsustainable. 80% of Yemen is reliant on 
humanitarian aid, there is widespread famine, and the Saudis military operations continue 
to draw criticism on the world stage for exacerbating the human toll.388 The COVID-19 
crisis may provide the Saudis with an opportunity to withdraw under the guise of 
humanitarianism.389 The Saudis seem unable to retain an agreed cease fire, and the Houthis 
continue to launch attacks into Saudi territory with the Saudis only responses being 
politically damaging air strikes. A Saudi withdrawal from major combat operations could 
be inevitable if the coalition continues to deteriorate. This is almost a certainty given the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in the region and with allies including the United 
States. When this occurs, Iran will be in a better position to assert influence over the 
Houthis, and begin reaping more benefits from its gamble in Yemen. 
E. THE WAR IN IRAQ AGAINST ISIS AND THE UNITED STATES, 2014–
2020 
The QF led campaign to defeat ISIS in Iraq, and subsequent campaign to remove 
reintroduced U.S. forces are lessons in the consequences of using proxies and exceeding 
an opponent’s threshold for violence in IW. The QF’s campaign to remove U.S. forces 
from Iraq between 2003–2011 resulted in advances of all four of Iran’s NSOs, but its 
subsequent actions resulted in the reversal of those gains. These actions were centered on 
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fostering a Shia dominated government and military at the expense of the majority Sunni 
population. The sectarianism fed the growth of ISIS and its offensive to unite the Middle 
East under a singular Islamic caliphate that was completely at odds with the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. The QF, its proxies, and U.S. backed Iraqi forces defeated ISIS in Iraq 
by the end of 2017, but the renewed presence of U.S. forces was unacceptable for Iran. QF 
operations to push the United States back out of Iraq escalated to the brink of war in 2020 
with the targeted killing of Qassem Soleimani because the QF had again overstepped 
victory and misjudged the responses of its adversaries.     
1. Social-Political Situation 
The campaign to defeat ISIS in Iraq united American and Iranian forces in pursuit 
of a common goal. Both nations could not afford to allow an extremist organization to 
overtake a sovereign country. The United States saw the possibility of a nation being 
established whose intention was to launch terrorist attacks throughout the world. For Iran, 
ISIS rhetoric called Shia Muslims apostates who needed to be put to death; defeating ISIS 
was an act of survival. Both nations needed a secure and stable Iraq, and this depended on 
preserving the autonomy of the Iraqi government and its territory.390 This unification, 
however, was fleeting. As ISIS was pushed further back, the two old adversaries once again 
turned to ensuring that the other did not have a majority say in rebuilding Iraq.  
a. Iraq 
In 2011, Iran could undeniably say that its efforts in Iraq had worked; the U.S. 
military was removed and what was left was a friendly government with a heavily 
influenced, if not controlled prime minister, Nouri Al-Maliki. When the Americans left, 
the Iraqi people purportedly had a democratic system of government with a viable military 
capable of defending the country, but this was by all accounts a gross exaggeration. 
Sectarian actions by Maliki and others would splinter the Iraqi population in favor of Shia 
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dominance. These actions helped set conditions for the rise of ISIS and weakening of the 
Iraqi military.  
The level of Iranian say in the policies of Prime Minister Maliki and other 
politicians post U.S. withdrawal is unknown, but what is clear, is that sectarianism played 
a substantial role.391 According to one RAND report, at the discretion of Maliki, the Iraqi 
Security Forces went from 55% to 95% Shia between 2010 and 2014. According to the 
same report, Maliki also allowed Shia militia groups such as Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq to attack 
his rivals.392 According to accounts of several politicians who served under Maliki, those 
who did not agree with his policies faced intimidation, discrimination and arrest.393 Anti-
government protests in primarily Sunni areas were dealt with harshly, including one case 
in April 2013, where 44 civilians were reportedly killed by security forces.394 Maliki’s 
selfish actions served to only further the Shia-Sunni divide and protect the interests of his 
power base. Sunnis found that the government that the Americans had left in place was not 
serving their interests. As ISIS began to grow and spread its ideology through numerous 
media platforms, its message became more appealing. 
In “Why was ISIS Successful” Kenneth Pollack finds five factors that contributed 
to the initial success of ISIS’s expansion: poor adversaries, zeal, fighting commanders, 
unorthodox hierarchy, and foreign fighters.395 The sectarian actions of the Iraqi 
government contributed to poor adversaries and zeal. When U.S. troops withdrew in 2011, 
Maliki replaced experienced officers with those who aligned with his goals. Some of these 
officers sold excess ammunition, auctioned commissions, and created “ghost soldiers” on 
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paper to fraudulently collect payroll.396 ISIS faced the Iraqi Third Armored Division when 
it marched on Mosul. In six days, ISIS overwhelmingly defeated what was a better armed 
but incoherent force.397 One contributing factor for defeats like this was the 
marginalization of Sunni soldiers, who may have been more skilled or experienced in 
positions they were denied.398 ISIS’s message, amplified by a sophisticated propaganda 
campaign, targeted the disillusioned Sunni population, including former soldiers. ISIS 
fostered a sort of zeal through its propaganda machine that encouraged adherence to only 
the Caliph and sacrifice for Sunni Islam. The Iraqi government, after years of pushing aside 
Sunnis, could not compete with this message, and nationalism gave way to extremism. 
b. ISIS 
ISIS is an extremist Sunni Islamic group whose goal is to establish an Islamic state 
guided by the interpretations of religious scholars, and ruled by a singular caliph (supreme 
leader).399 ISIS began as a splinter group from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, taking part in the Sunni 
insurgency against the U.S. led coalition.400 ISIS is unique from other Islamic terrorist 
organizations like Al-Qaeda, and Al-Nusra because it succeeded in drawing in enough 
individuals and support to establish its own form of government over an exceptionally large 
area. At the height of its expansion in June 2014, ISIS ruled over an estimated 10 million 
people.401 The group attracted foreign fighters from almost every nation across the globe, 
developed an unprecedented propaganda campaign, and inspired attacks in countries like 
the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and France.  
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The group’s leader, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi routinely called for the overthrow of 
governments and acts of terrorism. Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi reportedly decided that the 
situation in Syria in the summer of 2011 possessed the conditions for sowing the seeds of 
his interpretation an Islamic caliphate.402 By the summer of 2013, ISIS had seized the 
Syrian city of Raqqah and accelerated its propaganda machine to feed recruitment from 
disenfranchised Sunnis locally and globally. It openly warred with any who did not submit, 
including moderate Syrian opposition groups. In the spring of 2014, ISIS fighters launched 
into Iraq, seizing major cities such as Mosul and eventually threatening Baghdad. In June 
2014, ISIS published a document that attempted to paint Baghdadi as the rightful 
descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, and additionally removed all references to 
geographic boundaries in its messaging.403 ISIS made it clear it was on the march and 
would not stop short of engulfing the Muslim world under the umbrella of its caliphate. 
Ultimately, it was the actions of violent subjugation and advocation of world-wide 
terrorism that brought about its demise. ISIS overplayed its hand and united allies and 
enemies alike in a mission to destroy it. The non-Sunni populations who did not align with 
its ideology in seized territories were either executed, enslaved, forced to convert, or pay 
religious taxes. ISIS sought no allies, and favored making enemies. The physical ISIS 
caliphate was gone in Iraq by late 2017 and finished in Syria in April 2019. Remnants of 
the group including cells which attack Iraqi forces do exist, but it is a shell of its former 
self because it united too many enemies. 
c. The United States 
President Barack Obama fulfilled a campaign promise and removed all U.S. forces 
from Iraq in 2011. The global war on terrorism continued but the United States was done 
with Iraq. The situation that brought the United States into Iraq in 2003 appeared to haunt 
the administration as it took multiple efforts to avoid getting drawn into the situation 
developing in 2013. Despite voicing chemical weapons as a “red line” that would result in 
U.S. military action against the Syrian regime, President Obama did not follow through 
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after evidence of over 1000 Syrians being killed in a chemical attack in Eastern Ghouta, 
Syria.404 The president’s administration showed similar reluctance to get involved in 
another Middle East conflict when ISIS continued to expand and call for terrorist attacks 
abroad. It was only after ISIS marched across northern and western Iraq that the United 
States became more involved. In July 2014, U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel 
announced that there were 750 U.S. servicemembers in Iraq, conducting assessments for a 
U.S. response to ISIS.405 The administration was no longer able to defend not getting 
involved in the conflict. The situation demonstrated that substantial military support and 
advanced air support was required to save Iraq. A month later, the U.S. military began an 
air campaign to counter the advance of ISIS and U.S. soldiers were being prepared to return 
to Iraq. 
On September 10, 2014, President Obama announced that the U.S. military had 
conducted over 150 airstrikes against ISIS targets in the month prior, and began doing so 
only after Prime Minister Maliki was removed by the Iraqi president.406 The prime 
minister attempted to hold to power for several days before he reportedly lost favor with 
Iranian supporters and was told to stand down by Iraq’s most influential Shia Cleric, Ali 
Sistani.407 President Obama stated that the U.S. mission was to “degrade and ultimately 
destroy the terrorist group,” through an air campaign and support to partner forces on the 
ground.408 Air support, material, and training support to the Iraqis did help the Iraqi Army 
stop ISIS’s advance. The strategy did not originally include authorities for U.S. forces to 
accompany any partner forces but was later modified after the train and equip program 
proved a complete failure in Syria. The U.S. military strategy next evolved to include U.S. 
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SOF being allowed to enter northern Iraq and Syria to support Kurdish fighters battling 
ISIS. Authorities would continue to relax as President Trump assumed office in 2016. 
From 2016 to 2017, the U.S. military expanded its footprint in Iraq and Syria to 
defeat ISIS on one hand and prevent control of the Iraqi military by Iran on the other. U.S. 
SOF primarily supported the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service (CTS), while conventional 
forces trained regular army units and security forces. According to Nader Uskowi, the CTS 
was the only Iraqi unit that was believed to remain apolitical at the time.409 The CTS bore 
the brunt of the Iraqi Army’s fighting to retake cities such as Mosul. After Mosul was 
liberated in July 2017, the ISIS capacity to fight in Iraq beyond sporadic hit and run attacks 
greatly diminished. However, the U.S. military would not be leaving this time. The military 
did not want a repeat of 2011, and the administration saw Iranian influence as being 
detrimental to Iraq’s stability.410 This policy would lead to increasing tensions for the next 
two years as Iran sought to remove U.S. influence from Iraq. These tensions would escalate 
to the possibility of war in 2020 due to the American political will to respond to QF 
operations that threatened U.S. forces and interests. I explore these events in the third 
section of this case study.  
d. Iran 
ISIS presented the Islamic Republic of Iran with a cataclysmic threat to its 
campaign in Syria, Iranian influence in Iraqi politics, religious sites in Iraq, economic 
interests, and sovereign Iranian territory.411 The ideology of ISIS was and is vehemently 
at odds with that of the Islamic Republic of Iran. ISIS’s narrative portrayed the Islamic 
Republic of Iran as Shia apostates who sought to subjugate the “true” Sunni Muslim 
community.412 ISIS propaganda included Persian-Farsi language that sought to inspire 
Iran’s Sunni minority to terrorist acts. The literature sought to delegitimize the religious 
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authority of the government, denouncing its authority to rule and Ayatollah Khamenei.413 
Iranian leadership quickly realized that the ideology of ISIS spreading across Syria and 
Iraq was a significant danger.  
ISIS shocked Iran and Western nations in 2014 when it seemingly exploded across 
Syria and Iraq, easily defeating Iraqi forces and capturing cities such as Mosul, Iraq. By 
the summer of 2014, it was possible that the Iraqi capital of Baghdad could be overrun and 
the Iranian border could be crossed by ISIS fighters. Iran was at risk for losing everything 
it had gained from its campaign to remove U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011. The Iranian 
military deployed QF and conventional forces to Iraq in a manner similar to what it did in 
Syria. Arms and training aid gave way to deployment of expeditionary conventional units 
to push ISIS back away from the Iranian border. The difference between this campaign and 
the one in Syria was that the Iranian public did not protest the Iraq intervention as ISIS was 
a threat to Iran and its people. This threat was demonstrated in several instances of ISIS 
inspired terrorism inside Iran.  
When ISIS was pushed back from the Iranian border region, it turned to terrorism 
for inflicting a toll on the Islamic Republic. However, these actions failed to ignite a Sunni 
uprising in Iran or deter Iranian popular support as it united the people against a real threat 
to the Shia majority. According to one Reuters report citing Iranian media, Iranian security 
forces arrested 12 militants inside Iran and over 50 sympathizers promoting ISIS ideology 
in May, 2016. The same report stated that Iranian intelligence claimed to have prevented a 
terrorist attack in Tehran in June 2016, arresting 10 individuals and seizing 100 kilograms 
of explosives.414 In June 2017, five Kurdish militants acting on behalf of ISIS carried out 
two attacks in Tehran at the Iranian parliament and Ayatollah Khomeini’s mausoleum. Iran 
placed blame on Saudi Arabia and the United States for the attacks but ISIS quickly 
claimed responsibility with a video from inside the parliament building during the 
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attack.415 The attacks did not have the effects ISIS desired, as it only invigorated popular 
support for the war on ISIS the same way the recording of an IRGC soldier being beheaded 
in Syria had that same summer.416 The Iranian government succeeded in preventing an 
ISIS inspired uprising, or allowing the threat of terrorism to impede its efforts to destroy 
ISIS.  
As the threat of ISIS posed to Iran diminished, and U.S. forces appeared to not be 
leaving Iraq, Iran’s efforts turned to pushing the Americans out of Iraq once again. 
However, this time would be different from 2011. The American political will to meet the 
QF’s operations forcefully, coupled with the Iranian body politic who would not accept 
more conflict at the continued expense of the Iranian economy are a barrier that has kept 
the U.S. forces in the region. QF IW activities aimed at pushing the Americans out of Iraq 
culminated with the targeted killing of the QF commander, Qassem Soleimani in January 
2020. Despite weeks of Iranian rhetoric warning of exceptional retaliation, what followed 
was minimal. Iran responded by launching several volleys of ballistic missiles at two U.S. 
bases in Iraq. There were no U.S. deaths from the attack, although,110 U.S. service 
members were diagnosed with traumatic brain injuries.417 However, after a U.S. military 
review, only 29 met the criteria for being significant enough to award the Purple Heart 
medal for an injury sustained in combat.418 The U.S. government felt no need to respond 
to the missile barrage. Iran ratcheted down its rhetoric after this, seemingly realizing that 
further escalation with the United States could prove too costly. The missile barrage also 
coincided with an Iranian air defense system accidently downing a civilian airliner over 
Iranian airspace. The Iranian government suffered embarrassment, and demonstrators took 
to the streets in protest of the situation which had caused the accident. Iranian leadership 
also likely realized that the Iranian people, who had taken to the streets in protest of the 
government’s policies two months prior, did not see value in a new conflict with the United 
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States. In an Op-Ed, British Parliament member Bob Blackman pointed out the 
“#IraniansDetestSoleimani” Twitter tag being tweeted by hundreds of thousands 
concurrent with Soleimani’s funeral as an example of the true feelings many Iranians had 
for Soleimani and the QFs activities.419 According to Mr. Blackman, the Iranian narrative 
surrounding the sense of grief in Iran for Soleimani’s death was grossly exaggerated given 
the part Soleimani played in the brutal crackdown of protests in Iran two months prior. 
Outside of state-controlled media inside Iran, there is little to suggest that the body politic 
cares about a continuing U.S. presence inside Iraq. The Iranian people do not care enough 
about a modest U.S. presence, especially when there are greater concerns, such as a 
struggling economy. This lack of popular will, alongside an American political will to 
respond to hostile QF activities in Iraq, are the reason why the QF have been unable to 
push U.S. forces out like they did in 2011.  
2. QF Operations 
The ISIS offensive that spread across Iraq in 2014 demanded a response from the 
Iranian military as the Iraqi Army demonstrated itself incapable of stopping a force that 
threatened to engulf Iraq and position itself to take on Iran next. The Iranian strategy was 
once again orchestrated by the QF commander, Qassem Soleimani. Soleimani’s campaign 
strategy followed a construct similar to that of the one used in Syria, although at an 
accelerated pace. The campaign’s design can be broken down into three key tasks required 
to reach Iran’s desired end state: prevent sectarian division of Iraq, minimize support 
diverted from the Syrian campaign, and ensure proxies setup for political and military 
power in Iraq after the defeat of ISIS.  
Maintenance of plausible deniability and avoiding overt deployment of forces to 
Iraq in 2014 was intended to prevent further Iraqi secularization that risked splitting the 
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country across sectarian lines.420 ISIS sought to use the sectarian policies of Prime 
Minister Maliki’s government to feed its recruitment and divide the country. Iran 
recognized that an unstable and partitioned Iraq would weaken its regional interests.421 In 
“Iran’s ISIS Policy,” Dina Esfandiary and Ariane Tabatabai explore the beginning and 
transition of the Iranian strategy between 2014 and 2015. According to the authors, Iran’s 
strategy of primarily using the QF to arm, train, and support militia groups inside Iraq 
allowed Iran to maintain some deniability. The concern of the Iranian leadership, according 
to the authors, was sparking an Iraqi nationalist reaction to direct Iranian involvement. This 
reaction could lead to further secularization, and a possible dividing of Iraq between the 
three main populations: Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish.422 Citing statements from officials and 
an interview with Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, the authors contend 
that a divided Iraq would weaken Iran’s sphere of influence and possibly create new 
enemies as the Sunni province would possibly align with Saudi Arabia.423 To prevent 
further destabilization of Iraq, Soleimani utilized the QF to arm, train, and support various 
groups inside Iraq that could stop the ISIS advance moving towards Iran. 
The QF’s initial actions in Iraq were aimed at enabling friendly Kurdish and Shia 
militia groups to stop ISIS from reaching Iran. In an August 2014 press conference, 
Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani stated that Iran had been delivering military aid to 
Iraqi Kurdish fighters, and that Iran was the first nation to come to the Iraqi Kurds aid.424 
A separate Washington Post article quoting an Iranian Cleric stated that Iran had sent over 
1000 advisors and $1 billion dollars in aid to Iraq between June and December 2014.425 
QF operatives provided logistics, guidance, and assistance to the Kurdish Peshmerga, and 
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Shia militia groups including the Badr Brigade, Katab Hezbollah (KH), and Asa’ib Ahl Al-
Haq (AAH).426 The three latter groups would make up the heart of the Popular 
Mobilization Force (PMF). This list is not all encompassing, but reporting demonstrates 
that these three made up the bulk of Iran’s proxy force to counter ISIS. QF influence after 
the fall of Mosul in 2014, capitalized on the call to arms from Shia cleric Ayatollah Ali 
Astani, who called for all Iraqis to unite and take up arms against the ISIS invasion. The 
QF mobilized over 100,000 fighters into the PMF, and through Prime Minister Maliki, 
made them a legitimate arm of the Iraqi military.427 By supporting these groups, the QF 
could lead the ISIS counterattack from the rear to maintain deniability, and prevent the 
need for a full-scale intervention of Iranian forces.   
The QF led militia groups proved successful at counterattacking and pushing back 
ISIS forces, but the situation in Syria demonstrated the issues inherent in fighting a two-
front war. By August 11, 2014, ISIS forces had reached the town of Jalula, Iraq, some 22 
miles from the Iranian border.428 According to an Al-Monitor article citing Iranian 
Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Pourdestan’s testimony before Iran’s parliament, he said 
that Iran responded by deploying five combat brigades, to the Iranian border to defend 
it.429 The general’s testimony also included that some infantry and helicopters passed over 
the border. Realizing that further incursion towards Iran would be met with a high level of 
resistance, ISIS forces turned to fortifying the towns around Jalula.430 The QF led militias, 
Iraqi forces, and anti-ISIS Sunni groups were successful in retaking several towns and key 
infrastructure by the end of 2014, including Jalula, Kirkuk oil fields, and the Mosul 
Dam.431 However, as the QF was orchestrating its campaign in Iraq, it was facing a 
worsening situation in Syria that threatened fulfillment of its key task for mission success: 
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minimize support diverted from the Syrian campaign. In March 2015, QF and IRGC 
officers led 25,000 Shia militia fighters and 3000 Iraqi Security Forces in an operation to 
retake the city of Tikrit.432 Due to the deteriorating situation in Syria, Soleimani was 
unable to reinforce these forces as the battle went on, leading the new Iraqi Prime Minister 
Haider Al-Abadi to seek U.S. air support to speed the pace of the operation.433 As 
discussed in the Syrian Civil War case study of this thesis, the situation in Syria in early to 
mid 2015 demanded the deployment of an exceptional Iranian expeditionary force as well 
as all available proxy forces. However, the QF continued to advise and support the PMF 
as it continued to retake ISIS held territory, albeit with smaller numbers.  
The Iraq campaign continued with the unintended aid of the U.S. military and Iraqi 
forces not under QF influence. U.S. intelligence and airpower, alongside increased training 
and support to Iraqi forces accelerated gains made against ISIS, culminating in the 
liberation of Mosul in July 2017.434 The PMF continued its offensive west to Al-Qaim and 
into Syria, thereby linking a ground corridor between Iran and Syria for movement to the 
Syrian front.435 The QF’s campaign significantly contributed to the defeat of ISIS in Iraq 
and the American led coalition would finish it off in Syria. Two of the QF’s key tasks to 
reach mission success were complete. Now it needed to ensure its allies were in power as 
the future of Iraq was developed. 
The third key task for the campaign to be a success and help Iran reclaim the NSO 
advancement it lost in 2014 was ensuring that allies or proxies were in positions of power 
from which Iran could exercise influence. A report by Vice News highlighted the efforts 
of PMF groups like Harakat Hezbollah Al-Nujaba, to gain political office in 2018. 
Statements from PMF officers and the Al-Nujaba spokesman, Hashim Al-Moussawi, 
clearly articulated Iranian influence. The Iraqi vice president, Ayad Allawi, emphasized 
the concern for this influence, stating: “They want to control Iraq. As they are doing now, 
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they control Iraq.”436 However, the 2018 parliamentary elections did not go Iran’s way. 
According to Nader Uskowi, Qassem Soleimani failed to account for the split among Iraqi 
Shia leadership once ISIS was no longer a threat.437 The PMF led coalition was forced to 
contend with three other Shia parties in the 2018 parliamentary elections including an anti-
Iran Muqtada al Sadr group, and a group led by the former and current Iraqi prime 
ministers. Uskowi posits that the QF was forced after this point to adjust its strategy to 
counter an emerging “Iraq first” mentality.438 The QF, however, had another problem to 
reclaiming the influence it had between 2011–2014; the U.S. maximum pressure policy. 
Following its decision to withdraw from the JCPOA agreement on May 8, 2018, 
the U.S. government adopted a maximum pressure policy to deter and coerce Iranian 
activities.439 Part of this strategy is preventing Iranian control of the Iraqi government, and 
the Trump administration has demonstrated exceptional resolve to respond to hostile 
Iranian actions in Iraq. Keeping U.S. forces in Iraq enables the U.S. military to prevent an 
ISIS resurgence in Iraq, as well as Syria, while also curtailing Iranian influence. President 
Trump repeatedly stated on the campaign trail that leaving Iraq was a mistake and likely 
sees staying there as a way to avoid the blame President Obama received for ISIS.440 When 
the U.S. appeared to not be leaving Iraq like it had from its main bases in Syria during 
2019, the QF orchestrated several small-scale attacks using rocket attacks, believing 
casualties might force a U.S. withdrawal. After a U.S. contractor was killed, the U.S. 
military responded by striking an Iranian supported militia position, killing 25.441 The QF 
responded by mobilizing fighters and civilian supporters to march on and threaten the U.S. 
Embassy in Baghdad. This action, along with a reported imminent threat to U.S. forces in 
Iraq, resulted in an airstrike that killed the QF commander, Qassem Soleimani, alongside 
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others including the PMF operation chief, Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis. I explore the reasons 
behind this reaction, which was so different from previous U.S. responses, in the next 
section.  
3. Reaction to QF Operations 
The QF’s campaign to defeat ISIS in Syria and restore a level of control over the 
Iraqi government was initially successful but failed to realize the second order effects 
continued sectarianism was having on the Iraqi population, as well as the change in U.S. 
policy towards Iran. According to former ambassador to Iraq, James Jeffrey, the Obama 
administration may have not reacted quickly enough to ISIS in Iraq, instead wanting to see 
political reforms from the Maliki administration before intervening. The former 
ambassador remarked: “The Iraqis were in desperate straits, and the only ones who came 
to their rescue was Iran…These guys will remember that.”442 Despite being the first to 
come to the aid of the Iraqi people when ISIS stormed across their border, the mood of the 
population changed during the conflict as they saw the implications of an externally 
controlled government and military continuing the cycle of conflict. The U.S. government 
also took up a drastically different stance towards Iran in 2018, reacting quite differently 
to QF operations that sought to remove U.S. forces from the region. 
It is unknown exactly what level of control the QF had over the PMF when it came 
to sectarian reprisals against ISIS fighters and liberated Sunni civilians, but the problems 
it caused are worth exploring as preventing these actions are essential in IW. The rise of 
Iraqi nationalism that impacted Iran’s efforts to reestablish a level of control over the Iraqi 
government is related to the activities of the PMF. A November 2014 article in the Seattle 
Times cited several videos, purportedly showing Shia militiamen from groups like KH 
beheading ISIS captives and retaliating against Sunnis they saw as ISIS supporters.443 Iraqi 
Sunni lawmaker, Raad Al-Dahlki, accused the militias of “carrying out sectarian 
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cleansing.”444 Accusations led to militia leadership having to publicly denounce the 
retribution and react. In one case AAH expelled 49 members in October 2014 for using 
ISIS as an excuse for unknown actions.445 Shiite cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr was forced to 
publicly decry the sectarianism when his fighters were filmed carrying the heads of ISIS 
fighters during a battle in August 2014.446 However, sectarian issues that exacerbated the 
divide among Iraq’s population continued. In January 2016, seven Sunni mosques in 
Eastern Iraq were burned in retaliation for ISIS fighters destroying several Shia 
mosques.447 The PMF were blamed for these actions. Speaking as part of a panel 
discussing the issues with the PMF, former spokesman for the Iraqi Government, Ali Al-
Dabbagh, remarked that the problems were PMF members like Badr and KH, who were 
loyal to Iran.448 Fellow at the Iraq Institute for Strategic Studies, Renad Mansour, shared 
similar thoughts, pointing to these groups being primarily concerned with their interests 
and not so much with what the Iraqi prime minister may want for the betterment of the 
country.449 Whether by lack of concern, allowance, or inability to control the sectarian 
reprisals of the groups the QF supported, this activity did not support Iran’s goal of 
maintaining a unified Iraq under Iranian influence. 
According to U.S. IW doctrine, “The strategic point of irregular warfare is to gain 
or maintain control [of] influence over, and the support of, a relevant population.”450 By 
allowing the Iraqi population to be further divided, the QF failed to present the PMF as a 
viable protectorate of the Iraqi people, regardless of their ideology or heritage. Iran needs 
the majority of Iraqis, or at least the government body, to be on its side if it wants to expand 
its influence and push U.S. forces out of Iraq. It cannot do so without appealing to Sunnis 
and Kurds the same way it does to the Shia. PMF retaliations over the conflict only 
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increased concern and fear in a population who has witnessed what happens when the 
power of one sect becomes too great. A PMF that could demonstrate itself as an 
accomplished part of the Iraqi military that protected the interests of all Iraq would likely 
have secured significant QF influence in the future of the Iraqi military, but the lack of QF 
control instead contributed to the rise of Iraqi nationalism.  
Several reasons were given by the Trump administration and media outlets for the 
January 3, 2020 targeted killing of Qassem Soleimani. One Business Insider article cited a 
half dozen statements by U.S. officials ranging from an imminent threat to targeting 
Soleimani for previous crimes against U.S. forces.451 What was clear is that the action was 
a significant change from previous U.S. reactions to hostile Iranian actions. I contend that 
the administration saw the QF orchestrated attack on the U.S. embassy in Baghdad in 
December 2019 as the QF passing a red line. This consensus was shared in several articles 
in the wake of Soleimani’s death including an OP-ED in the Washington Post by Marc 
Thiessen.452 In this OP-ED, Thiessen cites a Washington Post report that Secretary of State 
Mike Pompeo personally delivered a message during a visit to Iraq in May 2019. This 
message reportedly stated that any attack on Americans would result in military action, and 
Iran would be held responsible for any actions of its proxies. Retired U.S. General Jack 
Keane shared this sentiment in an interview with Fox News, saying that Iranian activities 
were increasing through 2019 in hostility and that they would continue if President 
Trump’s administration followed the policy of President Obama.453 The Trump 
administration would not accept an attack on U.S. diplomats or servicemembers, so it took 
the opportunity to reestablish the red line with Iran. The subsequent counterreaction by 
Iran to save face, and then the cooling of hostilities demonstrates that Iranian leadership 
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received the message. The United States would tolerate some QF activities as it had in the 
past, but substantial threats to U.S. personnel were off limits.  
4. Iran’s NSOs Advancement 
The QF’s campaign against ISIS and the United States in Iraq did prevent the 
potential invasion of Iran by ISIS, save Iran’s economic interests in Iraq, and enable its 
proxy army to receive legitimacy as part of the Iraqi Security Forces. However, the 
sectarian nature of the campaign helped give rise to Iraqi nationalism, which advocates for 
the removal of external influence. Additionally, the Trump administration’s policy towards 
Iran has made it clear the U.S. military will be staying in Iraq this time, and antagonization 
by the QF will not be tolerated on the level it was before. 
Iran’s NSO advancements from the conflict are the renewal of economic 
partnerships with Iraq and the continued legitimacy of the PMF, which expands its regional 
influence. In 2019, Iran-Iraq trade stood at $12 billion per year and stands to increase to 
$20 billion per year.454 A March 2019 trade treaty between the two countries heavily 
favored Iran with expansion of Iranian imports and shared oil wells.455 Iraq depends on 
Iranian provided gas and electricity, and this dependence has stifled the United States’ 
efforts to enact economic sanctions.456 The PMF remains a legitimate wing of the Iraqi 
Security Forces, and several of the factions that comprise the PMF display loyalty to Iran. 
Factions inside the PMF continue to demonstrate that their actions are not beholden entirely 
to the Iraqi government.457 The QF’s plan to push U.S. forces out of Iraq, leading up to 
the killing of Qassem Soleimani, was executed by some of these groups. However, 
maintaining legitimacy requires majority support to the Iraqi government. Aymenn Jawad 
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Al-Tamimi contends that some factions like AAH and KH now have dual roles. One role 
is of an anti-American resistance force, the other is supporting the Iraqi government 
security interests.458 The PMF also entails forces like the Atabat units, who have no link 
to the IRGC and are affiliated primarily with prominent Iraqi Shia cleric, Ayatollah Ali 
Sistani.459 The continued existence of the PMF does provide several of the QF’s proxies 
with legitimacy, and a force with which to counter the U.S. military. However, it is wrong 
to look at the organization as a singular Iraqi military branch under Iran’s control. 
The QF’s lack of control over sectarian vengeance and an increased perception that 
it sought to control the future political landscape of Iraq contributed to a rise in Iraqi 
nationalism. In November 2019, hundreds of Iranian intelligence reports and cables were 
leaked to the press. These documents verified the U.S. narrative that the QF and MOIS 
sought to make Iraq into an Iranian satellite state.460 Anti-government protests escalated 
in the fall of 2019, as thousands of Iraqis marched in opposition to corruption and external 
influence. What was unique from previous protests is that they advocated for removal of 
Iranian influence in predominantly Shia areas like Karbala and Najaf. In November, the 
Iranian Consulate in Karbala was burned down.461 The Iranian Consulate in Najaf was 
attacked and burned by Iraqi protestors in November, and then again on December 1, 
2019.462 In July 2020, three gunmen assassinated an Iraqi researcher named Hisham Al-
Hashemi. Protestors marched through Najaf chanting anti-Hezbollah slogans and some 
blamed Iran’s supreme leader for the assassination with posters labeling Ayatollah 
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Khamenei a murderer.463 Protests in Iraq between 2019 and 2020 have also called for the 
removal of U.S. forces and influence as well, but no U.S. structures have been attacked 
besides a QF orchestrated violent demonstration resulting in minimal damage to the U.S. 
Embassy in December 2019. The protests have shown that the Iraqi people are demanding 
that the future of their country will not be a repeat of what happened in 2011. 
Iran’s level of political influence over Iraq has been degraded over the course of 
the conflict with ISIS and the return of U.S. forces. Iraqis wishing to remove the level of 
external influence that aided the rise of ISIS resulted in the Shia bloc being split between 
pro and anti-Iran groups during the parliamentary elections of 2018.464 In May 2020, Iraq 
elected its current prime minister, Mustafa Al-Kazimi. According to a report by Raz 
Zimmt, the secretary of the Iranian National Security Council and the current QF 
commander actively sought to oppose his election.465 Thus far, Prime Minister Kazimi’s 
policy appears to desire continuing relations with the United States and Iraq’s Sunni 
neighbors, while preventing the Iraqi government from becoming an Iranian satellite 
state.466 Iran has lost the control it had with Nouri Al-Maliki and it appears that the current 
Iraqi administration is comfortable with a continued U.S. presence. 
In 2011, the QF’s campaign in Iraq successfully removed U.S. forces, but the threat 
of ISIS which Iran could not contain brought them back. The Trump administration has 
shown that it is planning to maintain a military presence of thousands of soldiers in Iraq 
for years.467 Its acceptance of escalation risk to stop QF activities that past a certain 
threshold of violence, also presents Iranian decision makers with a problem. The political 
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will to face and respond to the QF is preventing the advancement of Iran’s NSO to remove 
the United States from the Middle East.  
F. QUDS FORCE USE OF TERRORISM AND SUPPORT TO TERRORIST 
ORGANIZATIONS 
In the following case study, I examine the reasoning behind the QF’s use of 
methods associated with terrorism and support to terrorist groups. This case study takes a 
different approach than the others in this thesis. The reasoning for this is that the conflict 
is not confined to one period of time, and the availability of open source data that can 
definitively prove guilt is lacking. In examination of how a weak state actor like Iran can 
use special operations forces in IW, it is essential to understanding the purpose and 
limitations behind such universally condemned activities. U.S. doctrine concerning IW 
states that adversaries will use irregular methods like terrorism to “wage protracted 
conflicts in an attempt to exhaust the will of their opponent and its population.”468 Use of 
activities associated with terrorism do not serve advancement of Iran’s four NSOs the same 
way its other activities do, but it is a valuable tool for signaling to adversaries with 
asymmetric advantages.  
In 1984, the U.S. government designated Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism and 
has continuously maintained that it is the world’s leading sponsor of international 
terrorism.469 The QF are a designated terrorist organization and so is its parent division of 
the military, the IRGC. Iran uses terrorism alongside other instruments of power to achieve 
its national security objectives.470 Labeling Iran’s support to terrorist activities may 
provide the legal basis for sanctions. However, viewing the IRGC’s methodology through 
the prism of terrorism is incorrect. Many of its activities, including assassinations, are not 
internationally acceptable, but these activities are executed by a state that is acutely aware 
 
468 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, I–6. 
469 U.S. State Department, “State Sponsors of Terrorism,” in Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 
(Washington, DC: U.S. State Department, 2017), https://web.archive.org/web/20170721054054/
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2016/272235.htm. 
470 Negar Fayazi, Iran: Is It Really the Leading State-Sponsor of Terrorism? (Pretoria, South Africa: 
Institute for Global Dialogue, 2017), 1, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep17466. 
122 
of its exceptional asymmetric disadvantage with its primary adversaries, the United States 
and Israel. 
I submit that IRGC’s use and sanctioning of activities labeled as terrorism are an 
extension of their strategy of using extraterritorial networks to compete with Iran’s 
adversaries. Labeling the IRGC a terrorist organization does enable the U.S. government 
to target its resources to combat hostile actions. However, looking at the IRGC from a 
terrorist group model is incorrect. To the contrary, many of its extraterritorial operations 
associated with terrorism are about strategic retaliation and signaling. In the following 
sections I first examine several definitions of terrorism, and then compare it to the U.S. 
State Department’s justification for labeling the IRGC a terrorist organization. Next, I 
assess reasons why a state may choose to use such activities. Finally, I examine several 
cases during the leadup to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Agreement (JCPOA) in which 
several Iranian linked attacks against United States and Israeli targets occurred or were 
foiled. The analysis demonstrates that labeling terrorism is subjective to an establishment’s 
perception, and activities often associated with terrorism can be effective in the conduct of 
IW for a state in signaling and retaliation. 
1. Defining Terrorism 
What constitutes terrorism and a terrorist act is subject to interpretation and varies 
between assemblies. UN General Assembly Resolution 49/60 defines terrorism as 
“criminal acts, intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a 
group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstances 
unjustifiable whatever the considerations…invoked to justify them.”471 This definition is 
vague and many UN nations have definitions that vary significantly such as Russia, whose 
definition is closer to acts of sabotage.472 According to the FBI, terrorism is “the unlawful 
use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, 
the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social 
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objectives.”473 Groups of nations, nations, or the entities that exist internal to those nations 
will base their definition upon the perception of external and internal threats which might 
undermine it through irregular means. 
Terrorist designation not only varies between organizations, but time and culture as 
well, illustrating subjectivity of the term. In Inside Terrorism, political analyst and 
terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman points out that the definition evolved over time. The term 
was primarily associated with revolution between the French Revolution and World War 
I.474 During World War II it took on a meaning in line with political violence being 
conducted against domestic populations by authoritarians such as Hitler and Stalin. The 
definition then reverted back to being associated with violent revolutions as the post-World 
War II era saw numerous indigenous populations rise up to overthrow occupying powers 
through irregular means.475 Hoffman and others including Brian Jenkins point out that the 
term is itself subjective, and labeling a group terrorists depends on a point of view.476 
Hoffman concludes that terrorism should be defined by five points that distinguish them 
from criminals and irregular fighters. These points are  
• Ineluctably political in aims and motives.  
• Violent - or, equally important, threatens violence.  
• Designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the 
immediate victim or target.  
• Conducted either by an organization with an identifiable chain of 
command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no 
uniform or identifying insignia) or by individuals or a small collection 
of individuals directly influenced, motivated, or inspired by the 
ideological aims or example of some existent terrorist movement and/
or its leaders. 
• perpetrated by a subnational group or nonstate entity.477  
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Numerous attacks linked to Iranian agents share Hoffman’s characteristics, and 
characteristics of what terrorism entails according to the UN. The U.S. State Department 
regularly provides press releases to why the IRGC is considered a terrorist entity.  
According to the U.S. State Department, Iranian agents and proxies have been 
implicated in terrorist attacks, both failed and completed, as well as assassinations in more 
than 40 countries. Iran primarily uses the exterritorial arm of the IRGC, the QF, to engage 
in these acts. These acts are committed by QF operatives, or by using proxies such as 
Hezbollah and drug cartels, to silence dissidents and attack foes.478 These assertions are 
backed up across the U.S. government. At a 2011 U.S. House of Representatives joint 
hearing regarding Iranian threats to U.S. soil, subcommittee on oversight, investigation, 
and management chairman Michael McCaul remarked “Iranian backed political violence 
has killed more than a thousand people in over 200 terror attacks, including the 1983 
suicide bombing [of the U.S. Marine barracks]…in Beirut.”479 Various expert witnesses 
laid out QF support to South American drug cartels in the form of tunnel construction, as 
well as financing to groups who seek to destroy Israel including Hezbollah, Hamas, and 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad.480 Actions of these groups who receive support from the QF are 
well documented and give credence to the U.S. government’s assertions.  
The groups receiving QF support meet Hoffman’s criteria for identifying terrorism, 
and some link the doctrine for their attacks to Iranian origin. In March 1992, Islamic Jihad 
claimed responsibility for bombing an Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, leaving 21 dead 
and over 250 wounded. The group sought retaliation for Israeli airstrikes, and made a 
political statement regarding Israeli antagonization.481 Hezbollah assassinated Lebanese 
Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005, reportedly at the direction of Iranian agents for trying 
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to take Lebanon out of the Iran-Syria orbit.482 Hezbollah effectively created the concept 
of suicide bombing in the name of martyrdom throughout the 1980s against leftist and 
Western targets inside Lebanon.483 This concept, according to author Kim Ghattas, was 
inspired by Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran. Facing defeat by better armed Iraqi forces during 
the Iran-Iraq War, Khomeini found an effective countermeasure in religious fervor that 
inspired suicidal human wave charges. These charges in the name of religious justification 
became the basis for suicide attacks.484 These examples demonstrate groups receiving 
Iranian support can be labeled terrorists according to UN definitions, and academia. One 
must ask then, why would a rational state actor choose to support terrorists beyond 
ideological alignment? 
2. Why a State May Use Terrorism in the Conduct of IW 
A nation state such as Iran may wish to use activities associated with terrorism to 
overcome asymmetric deficiencies that it feels other foreign policy tools cannot attain. Iran 
cannot compete with the United States and many other Western powers diplomatically or 
economically due to several factors including availability of resources. Iran’s only true 
resource is oil and Western sanctions are aligned with restricting Iran’s ability to export it. 
Iran views U.S. influence in the Middle East as a persistent threat to the regime’s survival. 
Iran’s military strategy is primarily built around conventional deterrence for defense, which 
includes its ballistic missile program.485 For offensive operations, use of militant clients 
allows Iran to extend its influence outside its border to achieve its national security 
objectives.486 Use of these clients is part of Iran’s grand strategy as it has demonstrated 
effectiveness in countering adversaries.487 These clients include Shia militias that 
effectively pushed the United States out of Iraq in 2011, as well as groups who readily 
 
482 Filkins, “The Shadow Commander.” 
483 Ghattas, Black Wave, 141. 
484 Ghattas, 141. 
485 Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran Military Power, 23. 
486 Afshon Ostovar, “The Grand Strategy of Militant Clients: Iran’s Way of War,” Security Studies 
28, no. 1 (January 1, 2019): 11–12, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2018.1508862. 
487 Ostovar, 11–12. 
126 
commit acts of terrorism including Hezbollah and Hamas. These groups, under direction 
of the QF, can further Iran’s objectives abroad through actions associated with terrorism, 
without invoking military retaliation against Iran itself.  
Terrorist activities linked to Iran demonstrate that it will utilize QF agents, or QF 
advised proxies to silence dissidents, and signal capabilities. As Andrew Kydd and Barbara 
Walter point out in their study of terrorist strategies: “Terrorism works not simply because 
it instills fear in target populations, but because it causes governments and individuals to 
respond in ways that aid the terrorists’ cause.”488 The authors surmise that terrorism is a 
type of costly signaling, conducted by an entity too weak to achieve their goals directly. 
Iranian agents have assassinated dissidents abroad since the 1979 revolution, believing 
their message might pose a threat to the regime’s internal security.489 Support to terrorism 
can also act as a form of deterrence.490 The IRGC will never admit the QF influenced or 
supported any attacks; doing so could result in military retaliation. However, when plots 
are executed, the IRGC is essentially signaling its capacity to inflict damage abroad. Even 
when the attacks are foiled, the signal is still sent in media coverage that the capability and 
willingness exist. 
The Iranian regime may also view support to terrorist groups and activities such as 
assassinations as necessary given that its adversaries also use it. The regime may view these 
activities as a form of covert warfare, rather than terrorism. In most cases where the finger 
was pointed at the IRGC for supporting terrorist activity, Iran and the perpetrator were 
ideologically aligned. The United States and Israel have also admitted to or been accused 
of conducting covert action against Iranian interests. Iran views these as terrorist acts. In 
1953, the CIA and MI6 deposed Iran’s democratically elected prime minister over fears 
that an oil dispute with the British could push Iran into the USSR’s orbit.491 In 2010, the 
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STUXNET malware program was discovered to be undermining Iran’s nuclear program 
progress. In 2012 there were a string of assassinations conducted inside Iran with Iranian 
nuclear scientists being the target. The CIA has admitted since that it did conduct the 1953 
covert action. STUXNET and the assassinations’ perpetrators have not been definitively 
proven, but Iran blames the United States and Israel. Iran’s arch-rival in the Middle East, 
Saudi Arabia, has itself been accused of assassinating dissidents abroad. Saudi Arabia was 
universally blamed for the 2018 killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi for his criticism of 
the Saudi Crown Prince. In August 2020, the Saudis were accused of dispatching a hit 
squad to Canada to silence former intelligence official, Saad Aljabri.492 If Iran’s 
adversaries are conducting these acts that it perceives as terrorist, it likely feels justified in 
reciprocating. 
These activities, whether perceived as terrorist or covert can also serve the purpose 
of signaling in the interest of preventing escalation overtly. Austin Carson and Keren 
Yarhi-Milo posit that covert action can be conducted completely in secret, or intelligibly 
to communicate resolve.493 The authors demonstrate that covert action that does not 
remain entirely hidden can be effective if it demonstrates credibility to two audiences: 
Strategic adversaries and local allies. An example used is the 2007 bombing of Syria’s 
nuclear reactor. Israel could not act overtly in the interest of regional stability, but 
intelligence strongly suggested Israel was to blame. This sent a message to Syria and Iran 
that Israel had the willingness and capacity to directly attack their nuclear ambitions.494 
Several cases in the early 2010s suggest Iran executed covert action intended for retaliation, 
and signaling of its ability to fight back against threats to its nuclear program. 
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3. Attacks Signaling Resolve for Iran’s Nuclear Program 
There were several unsuccessful and well publicized attacks linked to Iran and the 
QF between 2011 and 2013 that demonstrate retaliation and signaling from the Iranian 
government. Between 2011–2013, former QF commander, Qassem Soleimani, reportedly 
orchestrated as many as 30 attacks across the globe.495 Several of these attacks appeared 
to be in retaliation for a string of assassinations of Iranian scientists in January 2012, for 
which Iran blamed Israel.  
In February 2012, an Iranian cell operating in Bangkok was discovered after an 
explosion at their safe house. One member of the cell blew his own legs off after using his 
own explosives to evade the police, and the other two were later apprehended trying to get 
out of Thailand.496 At the same time, attacks were carried out against Israeli targets in New 
Delhi, India and Tbilisi, Georgia. A magnetic bomb was emplaced on a diplomatic vehicle 
in New Delhi by a motorcyclist, injuring the Israeli diplomat’s wife. In Tbilisi, an Israeli 
embassy driver found a car bomb under his car. Israel immediately accused Iran of the 
attacks. Many pointed in the aftermath to the likelihood of the attacks being based on 
retaliation.497  
Several months prior to these attacks, an assassination attempt on U.S. soil was 
foiled. In October 2012, Iranian expatriate, Mansour Arbabsiar, plead guilty to U.S. 
Department of Justice charges related to a 2011 plot to kill the Saudi ambassador to the 
United States. The plot allegedly involved the QF tasking Mansour to work with a Mexican 
drug cartel to kill the ambassador with a bomb that would be planted inside a Washington, 
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DC café the ambassador frequented.498 The news of this attack, alongside 
acknowledgement that over a dozen Americans would likely have been killed in the blast 
led some lawmakers to claim that it was a declaration of war by Iran. However, others were 
skeptical that it was really a QF orchestrated operation. 
IRGC expert, Afshon Ostovar, notes that the brazenness of the attack and 
Mansour’s background are not in line with other QF operations.499 Some including 
Secretary of State Hilary Clinton appeared to look at the case almost as if it was a joke. If 
the QF or Iranian leadership were involved its tenacity would implicate a gross misstep 
and demonstrate that Iran was once again favoring aggressive, unconstrained terrorism as 
part of their strategy.500 If the plot was known to or conceived by Iranian leadership, could 
it have been designed to fail as a method of signaling capability or willingness?  
Developing the plot with the intention of having it fail could still demonstrate some 
capacity by Iran to conduct terrorism on U.S. soil if Iran’s nuclear program was attacked. 
The failure of the plot also ensured the signal yielded zero loss of life, and the QF only 
losing a patsy while exposing a mole in the drug cartel. The final withdrawal of U.S. forces 
from Iraq was occurring as the plot was unmasked, and President Barack Obama was 
headed into an election year. Iran could likely say with a degree of certainty that the U.S. 
president would not seek to escalate the situation if no Americans were killed. This is not 
the only case where an Iranian attack on U.S. soil failed. As part of a series of cyber-attacks 
against U.S. institutions between 2011–2013, Iranian hackers were able to access the 
system controlling the Bowman Dam in New York. The part of the system that would have 
allowed the hackers to open the dam was reportedly manually disabled at the time due to 
 
498 Department of Justice - Southern District of New York, “Man Pleads Guilty in Manhattan Federal 
Court to Conspiring with Iranian Military Officials to Assassinate Saudi Arabian Ambassador to The 
United States,” Press Release, October 17, 2012, https://web.archive.org/web/20140408225049/
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/October12/arbabsiar.php. 




maintenance, preventing remote access.501 Iran signaled that its cyber soldiers could get 
into U.S. infrastructure, and in the case of the dam, a capability to cause death and damage. 
If it was able to remotely open the dam, causing U.S. deaths at the time would not have 
supported Iran’s ongoing efforts with the JCPOA negotiations. 
There is a common saying: “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” 
Terrorism is subject to interpretation across nations, cultures, and time. There are many 
countries who would call the U.S. military and CIA terrorists for having taken part in 
several coups, and forceful regime changes throughout its history. Labeling the IRGC and 
its extraterritorial arm, the QF, terrorist organizations does provide a legal basis for 
sanctions. Sanctions are perhaps the best way of imposing costs on the IRGC at this time. 
I also do not posit that all of its operations are calculated, and civilians are often killed. 
However, as the United States continues to study and target the IRGC, it must not look at 
all of its operations under the lens of violent, ideological terrorism. Acts we view as 
terrorism are an effective mechanism for covert retaliation and signaling that Iran could 
not possibly do through other policy tools. 
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V. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
This study sought to determine which factors have enabled the Iranian regime’s use 
of its special operations force to remain a resilient competitor with the United States and 
its allies despite significant asymmetry. Through its irregular warfare (IW) strategy by the 
Quds Force (QF), Iran has been able to spread its revolutionary ideals and regionally 
compete with the United States and other adversaries below the level of armed conflict. 
The five conflicts and QF’s use of activities associated with terrorism that are examined in 
the previous chapter demonstrate that the QF can be an effective mechanism for 
competition below the level of conventional armed conflict. However, the case studies also 
demonstrate limitations and disadvantages. In the following sections I highlight the scope 
of QF activities conducted during the conflicts examined in this thesis to illuminate the 
capacity of the QF. I then examine the conditions that enabled the QF’s operations to be 
effective. As in the previous chapters, effectiveness is determined by advancement of Iran’s 
four national security objectives (NSOs) at an acceptable cost, which is preventing 
revolution or total war with an adversary. Finally, I provide recommendations for military 
leadership and policy makers to impede these conditions from occurring and how to 
approach confronting the QF.  
Each of the six case studies presents insight into how the QF operates during 
conflicts ranging from covert smuggling and advise/assist actions, to large scale 
expeditionary operations coordinated with state and non-state actors. This expansive range 
of mission sets also includes activities associated with terrorism and employment of soft 
power to expand Iranian ideology. Each case is unique in the manner in which it was 
executed and the diversity provides a look at the depth and capacity of the QF. The 
expansive breadth of operations demonstrates that the QF is not limited to traditional 
military roles. The organization has wholly adopted every tool available to wage IW 
against adversaries with superior capabilities and resources like the United States, Israel, 
and U.S. backed Saudi Arabia. Table 1 highlights the expanse of known activities surveyed 
in the case studies of conflicts and key points that affected achievements in the campaigns.
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Central to answering the research question of this thesis is identifying the 
conditions that make the QF’s IW campaigns effective. The above table illuminates the 
activities the QF execute in pursuit of furthering Iran’s NSOs. The next step is to identify 
the conditions that make these activities effective or ineffective based on the empirical 
evidence collected in the six case studies of the previous chapter. A 2019 report by the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies identified four characteristics essential for 
Iran’s success during the U.S. occupation of Iraq. These characteristics are 
• A failed state of geostrategic significance with a disorganized 
opposition and local partners willing to employ lethal force to achieve 
Iran’s goals. 
• A Shia community that believed itself to be under existential threat. 
(However, the fractious Shia community in Iraq was such that no single 
umbrella organization like Lebanese Hezbollah could ever be created 
and some Shia elements – such as that led by Muqtada al-Sadr – would 
challenge Tehran as much as Washington.) 
• A logistics pipeline, which allowed Iran to transfer personnel, materiel 
and weapons in support of its allies, as well as enabling it to bring 
surrogates to Iran for training. 
• The absence of an external actor with the will and capacity to threaten 
Iran’s core interests sufficiently to end its intervention.502  
I maintain that these characteristics still represent the ideal situation for an IW campaign 
conducted by the QF. However, all six case studies represent varying territorial, political, 
social, and economic conditions. Since no two campaigns were the same, it is essential to 
find the commonality of conditions which had the greatest impact on the outcome or 
current state of the campaign.  
Analysis presented in this thesis demonstrate three conditions that make the QF’s 
activities effective and its IW campaigns more likely to succeed in advancing Iran’s NSOs. 
These conditions are (1) Maintenance of plausible deniability, (2) an opponent’s lack of 
political will to confront covert action, and (3) an opponent’s lack of unity of effort and 
unified action. The presence of these conditions during each conflict represented in this 
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thesis demonstrate that they are recurring variables with the greatest impact on the efficacy 
of QF operations. 
A. MAINTENANCE OF PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY 
To avoid escalating too far with an adversary or encouraging popular 
demonstrations amongst the Iranian people, the Islamic Republic of Iran strives to maintain 
a level of plausible deniability in its covert activities. Gregory Treverton’s work on covert 
warfare cited the 1948 U.S. National Security Council Directive 10/2 as the link between 
plausible deniability and covert action.503 The directive was in response to perceived 
covert actions by the Soviet Union and in part stated: “[covert actions] are conducted or 
sponsored by this government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of 
friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any U.S. 
government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if 
uncovered the U.S. government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.”504 
This directive effectively ordered the CIA to maintain a level of deniability to the U.S. 
people and the world to mitigate consequences for covert action. Iran follows this ideal as 
well with how the QF is employed. 
Iran regularly rejects responsibility for the actions of the QF, regardless of the 
intelligence presented to the contrary. In Syria it denied QF operatives taking part in the 
fighting despite a deceased soldier’s personal video camera being published showing the 
opposite.505 During the U.S. occupation of Iraq, Iran vehemently denied providing Shia 
militias with EFP and IRAM weapons despite substantial U.S. and British intelligence.506 
The September 2019 drone swarm attack on Saudi oil fields drew extensive finger pointing 
at Iran, but no retaliation occurred because irrefutable evidence could not be placed at the 
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feet of Iran. Ali Vaez, the director of the Iran Programme at the International Crisis Group 
remarked that: “plausible deniability is a trademark of Iran’s pushback strategy…Iran 
wants to show that, instead of a win-lose contest, Iran can turn this into a lose-lose dynamic 
for everyone.”507 This tactic has proven effective for Iran in most cases as its adversaries 
routinely fail to come to an international consensus regarding Iranian guilt.508 Responding 
to these activities brings with it the potential escalation to total war. In most cases, this risk 
was too great and social-political factors did not allow a response. For instance, this was 
the case in Iraq in 2007 when the Bush administration found expanding the war 
inconceivable based on the information it could present to the American people for 
justification.  
Like all aspects of covert action, loss of plausible deniability can result in 
unforeseen consequences from adversaries and the body politic alike. The January 2020 
targeted killing of the QF Commander, Qassem Soleimani, and the attempted targeting of 
his deputy, Esmail Qaani, was an individual act by the United States. The Trump 
administration justified this operation after concluding that the QF were behind the attack 
on the U.S. Embassy in Iraq and were planning other attacks. Plausible deniability could 
no longer be maintained in the eyes of the U.S. president. The QF had pushed too hard, in 
too little time, against an adversary who found the evidence sufficient to justify retaliation.  
The risks associated with a loss of deniability are not only reserved for external 
audiences. The Iranian population must also be complacent in the QF’s campaigns. In the 
Balkans, Yemen, and the U.S. occupation of Iraq, the Iranian government was able to 
sufficiently hide the QF campaigns. Leadership denied sending anyone but advisors, 
casualties were low, and there appeared to be no negative economic impact. In the war 
against ISIS, the Iranian people were faced with an existential threat that warranted 
deployment of the Iranian military. However, in Syria, the escalation required to save the 
Assad regime in 2015 removed the curtain for a great deal of the Iranian people. Survival 
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of the Syrian regime provided nothing to the majority of Iranians less the possibility of 
holy Shia sites being destroyed by groups like ISIS. Fallen soldiers began returning home, 
and as the numbers increased alongside economic downturn, the Iranian regime’s 
reasoning faltered in the eyes of the people. The QF’s campaign in Syria exacerbated the 
late 2019 protests across Iran. The Syrian case demonstrates that deployment of an 
extensive expeditionary force for a prolonged time, comes with the loss of plausible 
deniability in participation, and brings with it the risk of repercussions from the body 
politic.  
The level of deniability that must be maintained varies over time and according to 
the action being taken. It must be maintained with all actions associated with terrorism. 
Definitive proof of assassinations that can be shared with the public carries the risk of an 
international response. However, plausible deniability can also be managed according to 
the level of risk identified by the perpetrator. In Yemen, the QF have been able to increase 
the sophistication of weaponry delivered to the Houthis, and the amount of attacks on Saudi 
targets due to the international world not seeing Iranian culpability. The lack of reaction 
may also be based on some actors having a lack of concern for the conflict as long as it 
remains isolated. 
As long as Iran is able to refute international and internal evidence presented against 
it, QF operations prove to be very effective as escalation and retaliation are avoidable. It is 
when the operations spill into overt conflict, without justification that the Iranian people 
will no longer remain complacent and willing to accept the consequences. Additionally, 
the acceptance of plausible deniability is beholden to one’s perspective and willingness to 
act against that perspective. The United States, under the Trump administration, has shown 
that it is willing to accept risk by retaliating against activities it perceives as QF 
orchestrated in the face of discontent from lawmakers and the American people. Israel is 
even more likely to act against QF operations near its borders, ignoring the guise of 
intentions purported by Iranian officials. Maintenance of plausible deniability may be 
delicate, but it is essential for effectiveness in covert action. 
137 
B. AN OPPONENT’S LACK OF POLITICAL WILL TO CONFRONT 
COVERT ACTION 
The legacy of the Iran-Iraq War weighs heavily on the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
Iran has only deployed conventional forces since to Syria and its border with Iraq when 
faced with the threat of an ISIS invasion. Iran’s military posture is more designed around 
deterrence against the threat of invasion.509 To fight foreign wars and compete with its 
adversaries below the level of traditional armed conflict, Iran favors irregular tactics 
designed to attrite the will of an opponent over time. The QF is Iran’s orchestrator for this 
strategy. Tactics found in IW intensify the toll on an adversary over time and are harder to 
target discriminately. The conflicts analyzed in this thesis demonstrate that the lack of 
political will to confront the QF’s covert activities lead to continued escalation in Thomas 
Schelling’s concept of “salami tactics” and will eventually lead to capitulation of the 
opponent.  
The effectiveness of the QF’s ability to attrite political will for conflict continuation 
increases over time. In Yemen, the conflict became politically unsustainable for the 
coalition and U.S. support as the Saudi air campaign has been widely viewed as 
indiscriminate and worsening a humanitarian crisis. The Saudis also appear to lack the will 
to expand the conflict to a ground war or react to an increase in ballistic missile and drone 
attacks beginning in 2017. The increase in quantity and sophistication of Houthi attacks on 
Saudi targets from 2017 on, demonstrate that they were escalating to see how the Saudis 
would react. By 2019, the coalition has mostly dissolved, and the Saudis are likely looking 
for a way out. Although it became clearer in 2006–2007 that the QF were supporting 
several insurgent groups and targeting coalition soldiers in Iraq, the loss of the Senate by 
the Republican Party, which one can view as an addendum by the American people on their 
dissatisfaction with the war, resulted in the U.S. military being restrained from expanding 
the conflict to Iranian targets. This inaction, in a way, gave the QF the green light to escalate 
support to Shia groups and delivery of weapons. The QF continued their operations until 
remaining in Iraq became politically infeasible for the United States. The U.S. government 
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was more concerned with leaving as soon as possible rather than accepting risk for 
targeting the core issues destabilizing the country. In the Balkans, U.S. intelligence 
articulated a continued threat to the stability of the region and NATO forces after the 
Dayton Peace Agreement was signed, assessing that not all QF operatives would be 
expelled.510 However, the Clinton administration elected to not further the subject. The 
agreement was signed in November 1995, it was a win, and the administration was going 
into an election year. Any additional skirmish arising from action against the QF could be 
politically detrimental. 
The case of the U.S. occupation of Iraq and the Clinton administration’s lack of 
concern to deal with QF operations in Bosnia after the Dayton Peace Agreement also 
reveals the extra toll wars place on democracies. A 1998 study by political scientists, D. 
Scott Bennet and Alan Stam, used quantitative data to demonstrate the correlation between 
war outcomes and duration, in relation to democracies fighting autocracies. The data 
included all interstate wars between 1816 and 1990 in the Correlates of War list, with the 
dependent variable being the outcome of the war (win, lose, draw, or continue).511 The 
authors found that wartime advantages are fleeting for democracies as public support is an 
essential variable in political decision making. The data shows that after 18 months, the 
advantage passes to the autocracy and after this point, the democratic state is more willing 
to accept a draw or loss.512 The key advantage an autocracy has over a democracy as a war 
drags on is that “political leaders in democratic states are painfully aware of and sensitive 
to the electoral punishment mechanism at work in their states.”513  
This condition that enables the QF to prevail over an adversary by degrading 
political will can be combated and immobilized if met with the proper will and force. The 
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Israeli military has continuously reacted to perceived and real threats near its border. When 
the QF worked to establish a ground corridor and bases near Israeli territory after 2016, the 
Israeli military has stood by its red lines, retaliating in a destructive fashion to any QF 
threats. In this case, Israel sees the QF near its borders as an existential threat that must be 
dealt with. Popular support remains behind the military’s actions because the threat posed 
outweighs the cost to the Israeli people. The January 2020 targeted killing of Qassem 
Soleimani was a high-risk maneuver by the United States that did not have the full support 
of the U.S. government. However, it reestablished the U.S. red line in the aftermath of Shia 
militias attacking the U.S. embassy in Iraq. The reaction by Iran that was non-casualty 
producing, and a lack of QF orchestrated attacks on U.S. personnel in 2020 shows that it 
was an effective measure for halting the QF’s campaign to push U.S. forces out of Iraq.  
U.S. doctrine concerning IW states that: “the strategic point of IW is to gain or 
maintain control or influence over, and the support of, a relevant population.”514 It is 
incorrect to think of this in terms of only the population inside the territory of the conflict. 
The will of the population of all actors and the constraints it imposes upon the government 
directly correlates to the will of the actor to continue participating. An IW strategy met by 
an opponent favoring a traditional approach and lacking the political support to adapt to 
changing dynamics creates a condition that erodes will. This is compounded when the 
tactics test resolve in a calculated manner over time. Democracies feel the greatest impact 
as an inability to produce results play into popular support that votes leaders in or out every 
two to four years. Meeting the irregular threat requires an adaptable strategy that utilizes 
all elements of national power and is supported by political will to see victory achieved.  
C. AN OPPONENT’S LACK OF UNITY OF EFFORT AND UNIFIED ACTION 
U.S. doctrine places a large emphasis on the concepts of unity of effort and unified 
action. As summarized in Joint Publication 3.05, “Unity of effort is the coordination and 
cooperation toward common objectives, as a result of unified action, even if the participants 
are not necessarily part of the same command or organization. Unified action is the 
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synchronized, coordinated, and integrated activities of government and nongovernment 
entities with those of the military to achieve common objectives.”515 Both concepts are 
essential for achieving objectives as the doctrine recognizes that conflicts are rarely 
resolved by military action alone.516 Synchronization between all involved agencies is 
required to achieve a common goal. In the Balkans and Yemen, fissures in unity of effort 
between military and political action supported QF success, while in the U.S. occupation 
of Iraq it led to victory for Iran. The evidence also demonstrates that QF leadership place 
emphasis on these concepts as well, becoming directly involved in political matters in the 
area of operations to compliment military action. 
QF leadership understood in the conflicts examined in this thesis that military 
engagement alone is not sufficient to gain control of a territory in modern warfare. If Iran’s 
ideology and influence is to be cemented, political weight over the territorial government 
is necessary. When the QF and Iran’s MOIS are able to insert adequate power over 
politicians during war time, this creates a condition that allows the QF’s targeting of 
opponents to occur with a level of impunity. Additionally, when unity of effort between 
military and diplomacy breaks down in the adversary’s strategy, the ability to arrest QF 
activities is impeded. The opponent finds their intelligence activities compromised, 
military operations restrained, and increased vulnerability that coincides with protracted 
conflict. If this condition is not corrected, the QF is able to continue or escalate its 
operations.  
While there was no danger of an Iranian satellite state being established in Bosnia 
or elsewhere in the Balkans in the 1990s, Iran’s influence over President Izetbegovic 
degraded U.S. intelligence efforts and posed a threat to NATO forces. The Bosnian 
campaign may have not yielded any gains in Iran’s four NSOs, but the political influence 
that prevented complete expulsion of operatives from the region allowed Iran to gain a 
small foothold in Europe’s underbelly. The ethnic and religious dynamics of the region 
prevent Iranian ideology from solidifying, but the level of reported infiltration provides 
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Iran with a point from which to launch disruptive operations into Europe if Iran’s interests 
are threatened elsewhere.517 The condition created by Iran’s influence over Bosnian 
politicians and NATO’s unwillingness to sever that link enabled the QF and MOIS to 
continue debilitating NATO’s goals and establish an infiltration mechanism into Europe. 
The Saudi led coalition hoped that military power alone could defeat the Houthi 
movement when it began its campaign in 2015. Military force blockaded the coast, 
destroyed airports, and bombed Houthi targets. However, the Houthis did not surrender 
and the QF developed innovative methods for smuggling personnel and equipment by land 
and sea. The coalition’s mission faltered due to the lack of an accompanying political 
strategy. The situation turned into a humanitarian crisis and the Saudi air campaign has 
been widely viewed as indiscriminate and cruel. There was little, if any, unity of effort 
between the coalition nations. Smuggling occurred across Oman’s borders and the UAE 
paved its own way in Southern Yemen with investment in the Southern Transitional 
Council. Interstate political competition in the coalition ruined several cease fire attempts. 
As of 2020, the Saudis have found themselves relatively alone in the conflict, scrutinized 
by the international community, and the situation aggravated by the actions of other Gulf 
States like the UAE.  
In the aftermath of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s government, the QF 
obstructed the U.S. led coalition efforts to stabilize the country by supporting numerous 
Shia insurgencies. These operations were coupled with extensive work by the QF to control 
as much of Iraqi politics as possible. Qassem Soleimani once bragged to the U.S. 
commander, General David Petraeus that he was in control of the country.518 General 
Petraeus remarked that: “they [QF] serve as the executive arm of Iran’s foreign policy in 
Iraq.”519 QF operatives moved throughout Iraq, protected by the Iraqi judicial system if 
apprehended. QF operatives were detained by coalition forces on numerous occasions after 
2006, however, any efforts to prosecute or interrogate these individuals were thwarted by 
 
517 Khatab, Iran’s Influence in Bosnia, a Dagger in the Flank of Europe. 
518 Filkins, “The Shadow Commander.” 
519 Guzansky, “Made in Iran,” 87. 
142 
the QF’s direct line to Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki. Iran also worked to influence 
elections inside the new government since 2005 by providing funding and advisement to 
preferred candidates.520 Political sway complimented military action by the QF. Both 
approaches were effective against an increasingly frustrated coalition, however, it is unified 
action that made the QF’s campaign particularly effective. The QF had a unity of effort 
inside Iraq while the coalition military was increasingly restrained by dwindling political 
support to confront Iran militarily or politically. The strategy led to the complete expulsion 
of U.S. forces in 2011, and advanced all four of Iran’s NSOs. The U.S. corrected this 
mistake when it returned to Iraq in 2014 as it demanded political change as a precursor for 
military support. As U.S. forces returned to aid in the war against ISIS, U.S. agencies better 
utilized all four elements of national power to stimmy Iranian efforts, develop the capacity 
of the Iraqi military, and prevent a sectarian model of government from reemerging. These 
efforts, coupled with the rise of Iraqi nationalism, continued presence, and adherence to 
red lines have demonstrated that the QF’s strategy is likely not to work a second time. 
A lack of unity of effort and unity of action significantly debilitates efforts to defeat 
an IW strategy. U.S. doctrine emphasizes that: “Military operations alone rarely resolve 
IW conflicts… whole-of-nation approaches where the military instrument of power sets 
conditions for victory are essential.”521 Military action must be supported by diplomatic 
tools and other mechanisms to build a cohesive and stable government that is capable of 
dealing with internal and external threats. Additionally, any military action must be 
supported by the other elements of national power as modern warfare’s expansive portrayal 
in mass media brings internal and international scrutiny. A lack of unity of effort between 
allies also exacerbate interstate relationship dynamics concerning competition and self-
serving interests that could devastate the entire campaign as witnessed in Yemen.  
When the QF are able to execute unity of effort and action between military and 
political action, their campaigns become much more effective and difficult to combat. One 
must remember that the weaker actor in IW will “seek to create instability and disrupt and 
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negate state legitimacy and governance to gain and maintain control or influence over and 
the support of a relevant population.”522 Iranian political influence via the heads of state 
and infiltration of agents in Bosnia and Iraq complimented the QF’s military activities 
while also subverting the political system to the detriment of the United States.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Military theorist Carl von Clausewitz famously wrote “The first, the supreme, the 
most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to 
establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, 
nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”523 Iranian leadership 
understands its asymmetric disadvantage with the United States and with its near peer 
adversaries who are supported by strong states like the United States. It will not engage in 
conventional battle unless its survival is at risk. Instead it has, and will continue to favor 
IW strategies that use the QF to compete in the gray zone of conflict, somewhere between 
open hostility and covert action. If the United States and its allies are to defeat these tactics, 
they must not enter into these conflicts believing the competition to be quick, easy, or 
solved with one instrument. The empirical evidence demonstrates that the QF’s 
maintenance of plausible deniability, an opponent’s lack of political will to confront its 
covert action, and an opponent’s lack of unity of effort and unified action will foster 
effectiveness for Iran in most of its IW campaigns. 
The QF are not beholden to one particular model of IW to be studied, nor can all of 
its actions be understood by traditional convention surrounding the conduct of warfare. 
Perhaps its least costly but potentially most successful campaign is still ongoing in Yemen. 
The design for which may have been due to a lack of resources at the time rather than a 
well-developed covert operation. Additionally, it is wrong to look at the QF’s support to 
terrorist groups and use of activities associated with terrorism from the lens of terrorism. 
Iran’s adversaries conduct assassinations and other hostile acts. Iran views these activities 
 
522 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, II–1. 
523 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret, reprint (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2008), 88. 
144 
as an extension of its IW arsenal that it is forced to use due to its asymmetric handicaps. 
These activities should instead be viewed as a method for deterrence and signaling 
capability as part of a broader strategy. One should not expect previous cases to precisely 
predict future models, as the nature of a good IW strategy is unpredictable. 
The QF’s activities are not without disadvantages and limitations. Nor are the three 
conditions for effectiveness canon for all situations. The Balkans case demonstrates that 
although all three conditions were present, the lack of a substantial support base for Iranian 
ideology in Bosnia, and the depth of NATO resources led to the campaign not attaining 
advancement of Iran’s NSOs. The Syrian Civil War illuminated the capacity of Iran’s 
expeditionary capabilities, and the requirement for involvement of a stronger actor (Russia) 
intervening when faced with multiple obstacles. The war also enlightened the impact the 
body politic could still present to an authoritarian government when covertness is lost 
alongside blood and treasure. The QF’s relative grip on Iraqi politics that helped push the 
U.S. military out of Iraq was also a primary factor in the rise of ISIS and the return of the 
U.S. military.  
The evidence reveals beyond the three conditions that prove most effective for a 
weak state actor’s use of its special operations forces, like the QF, in IW, is the fallacy of 
approaching the problem conventionally. Doctrine provides a basis for understanding, it is 
not all encompassing and will change over time. The QF are an incredibly dynamic special 
operations unit who do not play by the rules of Western military tradition. They also are 
not limited to purely military action, with leadership being directly involved in political 
matters, as well as being in positions for an ostensibly longer time than Western leaders. 
Qassem Soleimani had over 20 years of command, experience, and relationship building 
as the head of the QF. As the world emerges from the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
the conflict between Iran, the United States, and other actors is likely to expand beyond its 
current, relatively cold state. Iran will likely continue to prefer its IW strategy with a model 
that varies according to the territorial and political situation. The QF will remain Iran’s 
instrument for this strategy. It is imperative that military and political leadership recognize 
the conditions that foster effectiveness for this organization. Only by denying these 
conditions to propagate can another actor expect to immobilize and defeat it. 
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